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This thesis identifies and analyzes good practice measures that public policy can employ to 
support high-growth SMEs (small- and mid-sized enterprises).
The research is based on a case study of support measures for high-growth SMEs that have 
been employed in 9 countries. The data from each country has been collected by national 
teams in the Global Entrepreneurship Monitor research consortium. In all, 47 support 
measures have been identified and reported, of which the 25 most successful are separately 
described and analyzed in the report.
The thesis finds a number of commonalities between the most successful support measures. 
These include a high degree of selectivity, flexibility and independence, and an involvement 
of private-sector actors. Furthermore, this thesis proposes a framework for the 
categorization of support measures based upon whether the measure acts pre- or post-start­
up and whether the measure employs an innovation-, business-, or financing-based 
perspective. The thesis finds that there seems to be a lack of measures that target the 
entrepreneurial level of analysis and particularly the motivational component of growth. 
Finally, the thesis proposes a number of normative recommendations for policy makers for 
the continued development of public support measures for high-growth SMEs.
This work is part of a study conducted for the Ministry of Trade and Industry in Finland on 
high-growth entrepreneurship. The research has thus been conducted from a Finnish 
perspective, however is should nevertheless be relevant for policy makers and researchers 
also in other economically developed countries.
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Public policy support measures directed at high-growth SMEs (small- and mid-sized 
enterprises) is a relatively new concept that has emerged as numerous studies have 
indicated the importance of these firms for job growth and innovation (e.g. Storey 1994; 
GEM 2005). This report is a part of a study carried out for the Ministry of Trade and 
Industry in Finland on high-growth entrepreneurship. The report aims to identify and 
analyze good practice measures that public policy can employ to support high-growth 
SMEs. This section will serve as an introduction to how public policy in the EU has 
shifted from focusing on large firms to small firms, with an increasing emphasis on 
high-growth SMEs.
Western governments, particularly in the European Union, often underscore the 
importance of small and mid-sized enterprises (SMEs) for economic development and 
growth (Ström 2001). In the EU, a first action program for SMEs was drafted in 1986, 
and since then, many public programs and policies have continuously been introduced 
to support SMEs. For example, the EU recently announced its new Competitiveness 
and Innovation Programme (CIP), which will support investments by SMEs in ‘all 
forms of innovation and growth’ with 2.17 billion EUR between 2007 and 2013.
Nevertheless, the focus on SMEs over the last 20 years represents a shift in policy 
compared with the approach that western governments took on industry and growth 
during the larger part of last century (Ström 2001). In the post-war period, it was large 
firms that were considered the principal drivers of the economy and therefore placed at 
the heart of industrial and economic policy. The reason why this shift has taken place is 
that small firms have been recognized as the main drivers of innovation and 
employment. The idea that entrepreneurial activity is the source of growth, however, is 
not new. In 1832, French economist Jean-Baptiste Say noted that, when successful, the 
entrepreneur “shifts economic resources out of an area of lower and into an area of 
higher productivity and yield.” And Schumpeter (1934) famously recognized that new 
firms are principally responsible for the process of “creative destructions” whereby new
1
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firms replace complacent incumbents by introducing novel goods, services and 
processes to the market.
There are number of reasons why small firms are having an increased impact in the 
economy (Rennie 1993). First, smaller firms have internal structures that encourage 
innovative behavior. For example, an employee in a smaller firm is more likely to be 
able to capitalize on his innovations and will thus have a greater incentive to innovate 
compared to the employees in a larger firms whose innovations typically become the 
properties of their employer, limiting the chance of employees to make individual profit 
and likewise reducing their incentive to innovate. Second, small firms are typically very 
effective at seeking out and exploiting new niche markets that are created due to 
consumers’ demand for increasingly customized and specialized products. Third, smaller 
firms often exhibit less bureaucracy and greater flexibility than do larger firms and can 
therefore take advantage of opportunities for both process and product innovation that 
arise as a result of e.g. new technologies and markets more quickly. Finally, 
improvements in technology increasingly allow firms to cooperate more effectively 
through firm networks, which in turn reduces the need to operate through the 
traditionally common vertically integrated organizations in order to be cost-efficient.
However, several recent empirical studies have found that promoting entrepreneurship 
as such is not likely to be a magic bullet for either innovation or growth. In fact, the 
most “entrepreneurial” countries in the world - measured by the degree of self- 
employment - are in the developing world, e.g. Peru and Uganda (GEM 2005). In these 
countries, becoming an entrepreneur is often an issue of necessity rather than choice.
There are several reasons why “generic entrepreneurship” does not necessarily lead to 
growth and development. First, most small new firms do not innovate by developing 
new products or technologies or by conquering new markets. The typical business 
model for small firms is rather to serve a local market with quite established or even 
‘old-fashioned’ products (Hyvärinen and Rautiainen 2006). For example, in Finland, 
only about 5-10% of new firms can be considered ‘innovative’ (Rouvinen and Ylä- 
Anttila 2004). Second, most new firms tend to grow very slowly if at all, and as a result 
they will employ very few people. In Finland, the median size of firms three years after 
start-up was one (Hyvärinen and Rautiainen 2006). In fact, only a minority of firms even 
want to grow. In a 2004 survey (KTM 2004b), only 7% of firms in Finland wanted to
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grow substantially. Furthermore, most new firms, e.g. in the service sector, will not 
create any of the “high skill jobs” that policy makers often seek to promote.
Multiple empirical studies have confirmed that the distribution of job creation among 
firms is extremely skewed towards only a few top-performing firms. Thus, among all 
new firms, only a select few will be responsible for the bulk of all new jobs created. In 
the United Kingdom, 4% of new start-up survivors were responsible for 50% of jobs 
created 10 years later (Storey 1994), and in the U.S., 3% of the fastest growing so-called 
“gazelles” generated over 70% of the new jobs between 1992 and 1996 (Birch 1987). 
More recently, studies in ‘high-expectation entrepreneurship’ (GEM 2005) have 
suggested that a small group of entrepreneurs who have high growth expectations for 
their firms (defined as intending to employ more than 20 people within 5 years), may be 
responsible for up to 80% of total job creation by all entrepreneurial activity.
Thus, while the degree of entrepreneurship has no correlation with economic 
development, growth willingness and actual growth among small firms is correlated with 
economic development (GEM 2005). That is, what economies need for economic 
growth and employment is not merely any new firms and entrepreneurs, but rather new 
firms that innovate and grow quickly.
Policy makers need to be aware of the job creation potential of high-growth SMEs, and 
selectively target these firms with dedicated support measures (GEM 2005). As this 
study will illustrate, the needs of these high-growth SMEs differ from the needs of 
slower-growing firms, and consequently, the way governments most effectively can 
support these firms is also different. Given scarce public resources and the skewness of 
job creation among firms, selectively targeting high-growth SMEs will arguably lead to a 
more effective policy for growth. However, this is not to say that support for small 
firms should exclusively go to the potential high-growth SMEs. For example, supporting 
other small firms has an important role to play in regional and social policy; in some 
regions and sectors, small SMEs make up 80% of the employment (CEC 2005a).
While support for high-growth SMEs is currendy gaining momentum within the sphere 
of public policy, it is doing so on two separate fronts: within both SME Policy and 
Innovation Policy. These policy areas have much in common, but have traditionally 
acted from separate platforms and with somewhat different objectives and philosophies. 
In order to more effectively support high-growth SMEs, these two policy areas will need 
to cooperate more comprehensively around common goals for high-growth SMEs. In
3
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this paper, I will refer to this common approach between SME policy and Innovation 
policy as “highgrowthpolicy"’.
1.2 Research problem and objectives
Thus far, surprisingly littie research has been done on the characteristics and needs of 
high-growth SMEs and the implications of these for policy. Even so, several issues that 
can be considered elements of the broader issue of supporting high-growth SMEs have 
indeed received considerable treatment, including the financing of these firms and the 
creation of university spin-offs. However, these studies naturally focus only on a very 
limited range of measures. Furthermore, while the OECD (OECD 2004; OECD 2005a) 
and the EU (CEC 2005a; CEC 2005b) have published several catalogs on the range of 
measures for supporting innovation or SMEs in general, these studies do not typically 
recognize the specific needs of high-growth SMEs.
The broad goal of this paper is thus to identify and analyze effective measures that 
policy can employ to support high-growth SMEs in particular. The overarching research 
question is:
what are good practice government policy measuresfor supporting high-growth SMEs?
While this research question is relatively broad, the specific intended contributions of 
the study are the following:
1. to identify, describe and analyze support measures that have been implemented to 
support high-growth SMEs
2. to develop a framework for categorizing support measures for high-growth SMEs
3. to identify good practices and provide normative recommendations for policy 
makers about how to develop effective policy measures for high-growth SMEs
As this work is part of a study that has been funded by and carried out for the Ministry
of Trade and Industry in Finland, the report will mainly take a Finnish perspective and it
will have a bias towards Finnish literature sources. Nevertheless, the study should also
be relevant more broadly for policy makers and researchers in other economically
developed countries.
1.3 Methodology
To accomplish the objectives of the study, I have chosen as the principal research 
method a case study on high-growth support measures that have been employed in a 
range of countries. More specifically, the data is based on 47 support measures, which
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have been identified and reported as relevant to high-growth SMEs, from 9 different 
countries. The data from each country has been collected through a snowballing method 
by national teams in the Global Entrepreneurship Monitor research consortium. For 
detailed case descriptions and analyses, I will focus on the 25 most successful measures 
of those reported.
The study follows the qualitative research tradition. The research is inevitably 
exploratory in nature since the field is broad and the research question has not been 
comprehensively dealt with previously. Although case data is abundant, it is for the most 
part not suitable for quantitative or more formal analysis, and I have therefore not 
carried out any strict theory-testing exercise, if indeed such an exercise is ever possible 
given the multi-layered effects of support measures. Nevertheless, by qualitatively 
analyzing primary data on policy measures, I hope to develop a broader understanding 
of the range of policy measures applicable to entrepreneurial firm growth, and develop 
models and frameworks that can be used to categorize policy measures for high-growth 
SMEs. Finally, by analyzing successful policy measures from different countries, I hope 
to generate insights for policy makers on characteristics of good practice support 
measures.
In terms of relevant theoretical models, I will first provide a literature review on the 
processes of firm birth, growth and internationalization, with the purpose of providing a 
better understanding of high-growth SMEs, their founders, and the dynamics of growth. 
Second, I briefly review the literature on relevant government policies, in order to map 
typical support measures that are employed within the two policy fields that extensively 
deal with high-growth SMEs, namely SME policy and Innovation policy. These two 
literature reviews will provide necessary insights on firm growth behavior and the needs 
of high-growth SMEs, as well as illustrate typical policy measures for supporting SMEs 
and Innovation in general.
The methodology has some notable limitations. First, I will focus on concrete support 
programs and initiatives implemented by governments, defined as measures that have a 
budget and possibly also a dedicated organization. Therefore, while e.g. pure regulatory 
and legislative measures have an important role to play in promoting high-growth 
SMEs, these measures will receive very limited treatment. Second, it is clear that the 
design of appropriate support measures will depend on the national context; for 
example, the OECD (2005a) notes that “the benefits of countries’ science, technology
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and innovation policies cannot be adequately assessed outside the specific context of the 
national innovation system for which they are designed”. Nevertheless, this contextual 
dimension will also receive very limited treatment in this study. That is, in the scope of 
this study, policy measures will be identified and analyzed in their own right, with very 
little consideration of the national context for which they have been designed. Third, 
support measures do not exist independent from other support measures, and it is 
therefore important that the portfolio of support measures in a country is coherent and 
effective. Nevertheless, for the analysis, support measures will be analyzed individually, 
i.e. with the policy measure as the unit of analysis. Finally, due to the fact that a large 
part of the material that will be used for this paper consists of policy white papers and 
research from Finland, a “Finland-bias” is implicit.
1.4 Definitions
While most readers probably have a general understanding of the concepts of policy, 
policy program, entrepreneur, firm, and high growth, these terms are not unambiguous. 
In this section, I will define these concepts as they will be used in the study.
Polity. A policy is a general approach taken by government to address an issue. Typically, 
policies do not lay out specific action in themselves, but rather outline visions and goals 
while relying on a group of programs that relate to the policy for implementation.
Polity program andpolity initiative. A program is a directed action or measure to achieve 
some goal as defined by the policy. A program typically has a dedicated budget, a 
defined duration, and may also have a dedicated organization or staff during this period. 
A policy initiative is similar to a program, but is usually more short-term than a 
program, and can e.g. be temporary or carried out as a test.
Entrepreneur. I will define the entrepreneur broadly as an individual who carries out 
‘entrepreneurial actions’. These actions can be categorized according to Schumpeter’s 
(1934) classification of new combinations introducing a new good, introducing a new 
method of production, opening up a new market, finding new sources of supply, or 
reorganizing an industry. The formal position of the entrepreneur in an organization is 
not important in this context; the entrepreneur can be the founder/owner, a manager, a 
patent officer, a mentor, a board member, or any other person undertaking 
entrepreneurial activities on behalf of an existing or to-be firm. Nevertheless, in most 
cases in this study, the entrepreneur will be an individual who starts or manages a young
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firm. For simplicity of expression and while not subscribing to any sexual bias, I will 
henceforth use “he”, “him” and “his” to refer to the entrepreneur and issues related to 
him.
Small- and midsized enterprises (SMEs). SMEs will be defined in accordance with the 
current EU definition (CEC 2006b), that is, an enterprise that employs fewer than 250 
persons and that has an annual turnover not exceeding 50 MEUR, and/or an annual 
balance sheet total not exceeding 43 MEUR.
High growth SMEs. High-growth SMEs will be defined as SMEs that have a future 
potential to grow over 20% in terms of employment over each of 3 consecutive years, 
and employ at least 20 people within 5 years. The growth must be primarily organic and 
thus not driven by mergers and acquisitions. I use employment instead of sales as the 
main unit of growth, since growth in employment arguably is the primary policy 
objective. Furthermore, the definition is forward-looking since poEcy measures today 
can only affect the future growth of firms. In the definition, I include all firms with a 
potential to grow, which is a broader definition than firms that have an actual plan or 
ambition to grow since an integral part of high-growth poEcy will be to motivate firms 
that may have a potential to grow but that have not yet recognized this potential or do 
not have a motivation grow. While no standard definition of what constitutes a high 
growth SME exists, this definition is in close accordance with other studies on “high- 
growth firms” or “gazeUes” (Birch 1987; Autio, Arenius, and WaUenius 2000; GEM 
2005). For simpEcity, I wiU often refer to high growth SMEs as “high growth firms”.
1.5 Structure of thesis
The paper wiH foUow a structure which broadly corresponds to the objectives as 
outiined above. In the next chapter (Chapter 2), I wiE investigate the birth, growth and 
internationaEzation processes of the firm. Chapter 3 outiines the approaches taken by 
SME and Innovation PoEcy and how these relate to high-growth firms. In Chapter 4,1 
describe the research methods for the empirical part of the study, and in Chapter 5,1 
present and analyze the empirical findings. In Chapter 6,1 conclude and propose 
recommendations for poEcy based on the theoretical and empirical analyses.
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2 Firm birth, growth, and 
internationalization
There are many steps on the path from an idea to a successful high-growth company. In 
order to spur new high-growth firms, ideas and innovations must be translated into 
business plans, and business plans materialized in the form of new firms. Next, in order 
to grow, the entrepreneurs of these firms must have a motivation to do so and the firms 
must have the means and resources to translate this motivation into realized successful 
growth. Many high-growth firms will also go through a process of internationalization. 
The internationalization step is most important for firms in niche markets and in small 
economies where the domestic market is limited. The above process can be illustrated in 
a number of discrete steps in a “firm growth pipeline” as depicted in Figure 1.












Figure 1. The firm growth pipeline
During each step in the pipeline, firms and entrepreneurs face different needs to be met 
and challenges to be overcome. Thus, in order to improve the “flow” of high-growth 
firms, one central challenge for policy makers is to identify these needs and challenges 
and design appropriate policy measures that support firms throughout this process.
In addition to acting on different steps in a firm-growth pipeline, policy can also 
support the creation and growth of high-growth firms by designing support measures 
that act on various levels of analysis. These levels include the entrepreneurial/individual 
level, firm-level, sector-level, and environmental/national level of analysis. However, 
policy can only promote more or less static characteristics within these levels of analysis 
that support firm growth; I will refer to these as the “structure” for growth. In order for 
actual growth to happen, these structural factors need to be translated into a strategy for 
growth, and the growth strategy must be implemented through action; only the
8
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entrepreneur can take these latter dynamic steps. Figure 2 provides an illustration of the 
relationship between the different structural levels, strategy, and action for growth.
Structure
Figure 2. Structural levels of analysis, strategy, and action for growth
All of the levels of analysis and their corresponding factors will be treated in more depth 
in the following sections, but I provide some examples here as they relate to the high- 
growth firm pipeline.
Starting up a new firm is the decision of one or several entrepreneurs, and so the factors 
that influence firm birth are principally on the entrepreneurial level of analysis. Growth 
motivation is the result of individual attitudes and plans, i.e. likewise on the 
entrepreneurial level, although it is influenced also by e.g. the firm resources and 
capabilities (firm-level) as well as the market opportunities (sector-level). Growth 
success will depend chiefly on the firms’ resources, capabilities and strategy (firm-level) 
but also external market factors (sector and environment-level) can create upswings or 
recessions that can tip the scale for or against the odds of growth success. 
Internationalization also depends on the same factors that affect growth, but 
internationalization typically requires yet greater (firm-level) resources and capabilities 
than does domestic growth. The first step in the pipeline, the link from an idea or an 
innovation to firm birth is, however, less direct and thus more difficult for policy to 
isolate and act on. Some of the factors behind innovation are known, such as a high 
level of education and high-quality research (environment-level); nevertheless, in many 
countries it has proven difficult to translate increasingly higher levels of education and 
research into actual new businesses.
9
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Figure 3. Levels of analysis in high-growth policy
This chapter will examine the three processes of firm birth, firm growth and firm 
internationalization. While the academic literature in this field is vast and a plethora of 
models exist to represent firm birth, growth and internationalization respectively, I will 
venture to present an eclectic selection of theories and models that I have deemed to be 
most relevant to the issue at hand, i.e. to provide a theoretical background to designing 
and implementing support for high-growth SMEs through policy action. Many of the 
models will be behavioral in their tradition, as opposed to e.g. the economists’ aggregate 
view of entrepreneurship. I have chosen this approach since it is arguably through the 
behavioral perspective that policy can best understand the growth process and design 
instmments that influence the growth-related actions of the entrepreneur and the firm.
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2.1 Firm birth
“"Entrepreneurship is a way of thinking a way of thinking that emphasises opportunities 
over threats” (Krueger et al. 2000)
One thing that entrepreneurs have in common is their emphasis on opportunities over 
threats; but thinking about entrepreneurs in terms of a homogenous group may be a 
fallacy. In fact, entrepreneurs constitute a very heterogeneous group and so do the firms 
they create.
Researchers often have tried to identify e.g. individual or environmental factors that 
influence the creation of new firms. For example, studies have pointed to the fact that 
individuals are more likely to become self-employed if they have family members that 
are entrepreneurs (Stanworth et al. 1989), they are highly educated (Evans and Leighton 
1990), unemployed (Blanchflower and Oswald 1990), or if they have previously worked 
in a large firm (Keeble et al. 1992), or in a small firm (Cross 1981). Entrepreneurs have 
also been shown to have a need for achievement (McClelland 1961), be proactive rather 
than reactive, innovative, easily bored, alert to business opportunities (Chell et al. 1991), 
avid information gatherers (Kaish and Gilad 1991), and able to successfully identify 
potentially profitable resource combinations when others do not (Barreto 1989).
However, the fallacy lies in that very few of these findings have had any predictive value 
for evaluating behavior (Krueger et al. 2000). Furthermore, by trying to identify 
common factors behind entrepreneurs and new ventures, these studies have implicitly 
suggested that the underlying factors behind various new ventures are similar. When in 
fact, the issues that are involved in the creation of new ventures are highly diverse and 
have a high level of interaction. As described by Gartner (1985):
The creation of a new venture is a multidimensionalphenomenon; each variable describes only 
a single dimension of the phenomenon and cannot be taken alone... entrepreneurs and their 
firms vary widely; the actions they take or do not take and the environments thy operate in 
and respond to are equally diverse - and all these elements form complex and unique 
combinations in the creation of each new venture.
Furthermore, even if it would be possible to e.g. predict what demographic group may 
be more prone to become entrepreneurs, this information would still lend little insight 
into why an individual goes about starting a new business, under what circumstances, 
and what policy makers can do to influence his behavior.
11
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To make sense of this complexity, several frameworks attempt to model and capture the 
process of firm birth. In the continuation of this section, I will present two of these, one 
on the aggregate level, and one on the individual level.
Starting from the aggregate level of analysis, Verheul et al. (2001) describe various 
demand and supply factors as the macro-drivers of entrepreneurship as depicted in 
Figure 4. Researchers sometimes refer to the demand and supply side factors and “pull” 














Figure 4. Determinants of entrepreneurship (adapted from Verheul et al. 2001)
On the demand side, there can be a pull for new firms due to macro-level changes in 
industrial structure. This is often an effect of globalization and technological 
developments, combined with an increasing diversity in customer demand for products 
and services. On the supply side, push factors such as the availability of external 
resources (e.g. capital) and the internal abilities and personal preferences of the potential 
entrepreneur determine whether these individuals will make the choice to become self- 
employed. In making this assessment, the individuals will weigh the risk and rewards of 
entrepreneurship against any alternatives, such as waged employment or unemployment. 
The sum of choices made by individuals of whether to start a new firm or whether to 
withdraw from self-employment thus determines the aggregate level of 
entrepreneurship.
On the individual level, Stevenson (1996) has formulated a framework for 
understanding the factors influencing the entrepreneur’s occupational choice. This 
model consisting of the factors: Motivation, Opportunity, and Skill, as depicted in 
Figure 5.
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Motivation
Opportunity
Figure 5. Factors of entrepreneurship (adapted from Stevenson 1996)
According to Stevenson’s model, the entrepreneur will make his decision based on the 
external market opportunities, the capabilities and resources that he can use to exploit 
these opportunities (skill), and some cognitive factor which ultimately influences the go 
vs. no-go behavior of the entrepreneur (motivation).
I have compared these previous two models in Table 1. The comparison reveals that the 
models are remarkably similar, although Verheul et al. naturally describe e.g. 
opportunities in aggregate while Stevenson describes one opportunity as recognized by 
one entrepreneur. Thus, there appears to be some level of consensus in the 
entrepreneurship literature that these three factors, motivation, skill, and opportunity, 
are the most relevant when modeling firm birth.
Table 1. A comparison between Verheul et al.'s (2001) aggregate model and Stevenson's (1996) 
individual model of firm birth
Verheul et al. (2001) Stevenson (1996)
Opportunities Opportunity
Resources and Abilities Skill
Preferences Motivation
Of these three factors, I shall argue that the most important single factor for firm birth 
is the cognitive factor — what Stevenson calls “Motivation” and what Verheul calls
“Personal preferences” - i.e. the entrepreneur’s intentions whether to start a business or 
not. I base this conclusion on Ajzen (1991), who also notes that e.g. exogenous 
situational factors merely affect behavior indirectly, through their effect on perceptions 
and attitudes that in turn affect intentions.
I will therefore focus my discussion in the following section on intentions. As we shall 
see, the two other factors modeled by Verheul at al. and Stevenson, opportunity and
13
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skill, can be considered more important for firm growth and survival than they are for 
firm birth, and these two factors will therefore be described in more detail in the section 
on firm growth.
2.1.1 Intentions of the entrepreneur
Much research has been done in search of situational factors, demographic variables and 
personal traits that characterize entrepreneurs. However, perhaps not surprisingly, 
variables such as these have often been found to be poor predictors of the act of 
actually starting a business. Instead, the main factor that determines whether a person 
will choose an entrepreneurial career is simply his intentions to do so (Krueger et al.
2000). As Krueger et al. succincdy puts it, “we don’t start a business as a reflex, do we?”
Starting a new business requires significant time and deliberate planning; and the reason 
why entrepreneurs go through the process of starting a firm is obviously not primarily 
because they statistically have a good demographic fit for it, or merely that they would 
have access to a business idea, or access to the capital necessary for starting a business, 
but simply because they intend to start a business. This helps to explain why, for 
example, entrepreneurs often start a firm even before they start to scan for business 
opportunities (Brockhaus and Horwitz 1986).
Having established that it is the entrepreneur’s intention which mainly influences his 
behavior to start a new firm, we can start to look for the factors that in mm influence 
the entrepreneur’s intentions. Krueger et al. (2000) finds empirical proof for just such a 
model in Shapero’s (1982) ‘Model of the Entrepreneurial Event’, depicted below in 
Figure 6. Shapero’s model describes three factors determining the intention to become 
an entrepreneur, these are: the individual’s general propensity to act; the perceived 







Figure 6. Shapero-Krueger Model of the Entrepreneurial Event (Krueger et al. 2000)
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The perceived desirability can be defined as the attractiveness of starting a business, 
which includes both intrapersonal and extrapersonal considerations. This level of 
attractiveness is in turn based on an assessment taking the entrepreneur’s risk-reward 
profile of entrepreneurship into account. The perceived feasibility is the degree to which 
the individual feels personally capable of starting a business, which in turn is influenced 
by his perceived degree of self-efficacy. The propensity to act can be defined as the 
personal disposition to act on and realize one’s decisions. In other words, the 
entrepreneur’s intentions will depend on three attitudes — “I want to do” (desirability),
“I can do” (feasibility), and “I will do” (propensity to act).
According to Krueger et al. (2000), an assumption in Shapero’s (1982) model is that 
human behavior is guided by inertia until something interrupts or displaces that inertia - 
this is called the ‘catalyzing event’. The displacement is often negative, such as job loss 
or divorce, but it can also be positive, such as getting an inheritance or winning the 
lottery. However, while this ‘catalyzing event’ may trigger the individual to act on his 
entrepreneurial intention, it is unlikely to be the source of this intention. Thus, unless 
the individual has held this intent before the catalyzing event, it is unlikely that any event 
will trigger entrepreneurial behavior. Therefore, external situational factors tend to affect 
the tinting of starting a firm but not as much the actual choice of whether to become an 
entrepreneur or not.
2.1.2 Risk/reward assessment
In making the assessment whether to start a new firm or not, the individual at least 
implicitly must evaluate the expected risks and rewards of his choice, which in turn will 
determine the perceived desirability. Since people have different preferences and attach 
different values to e.g. economic achievements and non-pecuniary benefits (McClelland 
1961), the perceived desirability for different people will vary significantly even when 
faced with similar prospects.
In terms of rewards, multiple studies have shown, however, that the financial rewards of 
becoming an entrepreneur generally tend to be quite poor. On average, self-employed 
have lower initial earnings as well as lower earnings growth than employed people. 
Hamilton (2000) finds that die median earnings differential is 35% to the disadvantage 
of self-employed; and this difference cannot be explained by e.g. self-selection due to 
the fact that lower-ability employees may more often choose self-employment. Also
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Moskowitz and Vissing-Jorgensen (2002) come to a similar conclusion when they 
establish that, despite the fact that entrepreneurs bear a high risk and have a low degree 
of diversification of their assets (entrepreneurs typically have over 70% of their wealth 
invested in the firm), their return on investment is on average not higher than the return 
on investments in public equity. According to Hamilton (2000), entrepreneurs make this 
seemingly irrational economic choice due to the significant non-pecuniary benefits of 
self-employment, such as “being your own boss”, or a perceived autonomy or flexibility 
in the life as an entrepreneur.
Another reason for choosing an entrepreneurial career may be the skewness in the 
reward distribution combined with a preference for risk-taking among entrepreneurs. 
This is sometimes referred to as “superstar theory, and this theory is related with the 
fact that entrepreneurs tend to overestimate their probability for survival (Moskowitz 
and Vissing-Jorgensen 2002). For example, Cooper et al. (1988) found that 68 percent 
of entrepreneurs think that the odds of their business succeeding was higher than for 
another similar business, while only 5 percent of entrepreneurs think that the odds for 
their business succeeding was worse. Thus, it is not unlikely that entrepreneurs simply 
assume that their particular firm will not fail, and on the condition that an entrepreneur’s 
business actually survives, the return to the entrepreneur’s investment is indeed higher 
than the return to public equity.
Nevertheless, in many economies, the choice to become an entrepreneur may also be 
one of necessity. This is typically the case in countries where there are no or very limited 
benefits for the unemployed and few available opportunities for employment.
2.1.3 Barriers to firm birth
Even when people hold positive attitudes towards entrepreneurship, they may still 
choose not to pursue an entrepreneurial career due to some perceived barriers. A range 
of such barriers to firm birth have been suggested:
Bureaucracy and red tape. Red tape decreases the perceived feasibility of becoming an 
entrepreneur and also negatively affects the risk/reward assessment. This issue has often 
been recognized as a potential barrier to the creation of new firms, and several surveys 
have compared the cost and time to set up a new business in different countries with 
the implicit assumption that less is better. In general, the cost and time required for 
setting up a business and the bureaucracy and red tape faced with when running a
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business has been decreasing in many countries, which pardy may be due to the high 
visibility this issue has received.
High opportunity cost. People may also choose not to pursue an entrepreneurial career due 
to high opportunity costs in the form of e.g. a well-paying current job or generous 
unemployment benefits, which reduce the perceived desirability of entrepreneurship. 
This issue is exacerbated when a potential entrepreneur has high fixed costs and 
obligations - for example, a mortgage - and cannot risk sacrificing a relatively stable 
income for the insecurity of becoming an entrepreneur. Furthermore, in some countries, 
people may immediately lose certain social security benefits if they choose an 
entrepreneurial career over paid employment or self-employment.
High risk. This issue is related to the issue of opportunity costs above in that 
entrepreneurs will not want to risk their current income for an uncertain future income 
as an entrepreneur. Furthermore, in the absence of personal bankruptcy laws and since 
many banks require entrepreneurs to personally stand as guarantors for loans granted 
for their firms, prudent potential entrepreneurs may be especially reluctant to take on 
ambitious high-growth projects due to the fear that they may accumulate considerable 
personal debt in case of business failure.
Hack of confidence. Lack of confidence in one’s business model corresponds to the 
absence of the self-efficacy factor in Shapero’s (1982) model. Entrepreneurs with low 
confidence may also generally have a lower propensity to act. Therefore, it is important 
that potential entrepreneurs are exposed to role models and entrepreneurial success 
stories. The fact that many entrepreneurs have friends or family members who also are 
self-employed may be largely due to the fact that these entrepreneurs have had an 
opportunity to build confidence in their own abilities as entrepreneurs.
Hack of finance. Lack of finance is likewise often quoted as a significant barrier to starting 
a firm. A lack of externally available financing discourages the entrepreneur by 
decreasing the perceived feasibility of the venture in case the entrepreneur is not 
independently capable of raising the required funding. This is arguably why the 
entrepreneur’s income and wealth have been shown to affects the creation of new 
ventures. Although a high income increases the opportunity cost of becoming an 
entrepreneur, personal wealth may facilitate the financing of the new venture and thus 
improve the entrepreneur’s perceived feasibility.
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No need. This corresponds to a low level of desirability in Shapero’s (1982) model above. 
People who do not need to become entrepreneurs are unlikely to start a firm even when 
the potential risk/return ratio is favorable. In addition, since the actual monetary 
rewards actually on average are negative, having no direct need may essentially eliminate 
all desirability to become self-employed. Nevertheless, entrepreneurs typically do have a 
need for achievement which may make them attracted to the skewness of returns that 
entrepreneurship offers. Entrepreneurs have also been shown to be poor “team 
players”, which in turn may potentially make them less fit for paid employment and thus 
result in a greater need to become self-employed.
Stigma of failure. A stigma of failure is also connected to the issue of lack of confidence 
above, and may decrease both the propensity to act as well as negatively affect the 
perceived risk/reward ratio of entrepreneurship, handier (2005) argues that failure is 
particularly stigmatized in Europe and Asia, and shows that the level of 
entrepreneurship is in fact negatively correlated with the stigma of failure across 
countries, regions and sectors.
2.1.4 Birth of high growth firms
A relevant question is whether the birth of high-growth firms somehow is different 
from that of the average start-up in terms of the underlying individual-, firm-, or sector- 
level characteristics.
Arguably, new high-growth start-ups and the entrepreneurs behind them, display a 
higher degree of homogeneity than do start-ups and entrepreneurs overall. Therefore, 
an analysis of situational characteristics may be more valuable for this group of start-ups 
than studies on traits of “generic” start-ups and entrepreneurs. In terms of the personal 
characteristics of the entrepreneur, Roberts (1991) has showed that individual-level 
psychological factors can explain the creation of ‘high-technology ventures’; these 
ventures are often also assumed to be high-growth. Furthermore, Audretsch (1995) has 
showed that the creation of such ventures will depend on sector-level issues such as a 
young and un-concentrated industry structure. Furthermore, Shane (2001) suggests that 
new technological opportunities may explain the creation of high-growth firms; and he 
shows that at least three aspects of ‘technological opportunity’ do seem to affect the 
creation of such firms, including the importance, the radicalness, and the patent scope 
of the new technology.
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However, while such sector-, technology- and personal-level factors may create 
opportunities for new innovative firms, new ventures may often face higher entry 
barriers into these specific sectors since they are often R&D-intensive and thus require 
much capital. In fact, entrepreneurs have been shown to be less likely to exploit 
opportunities in R&D intensive industries due to limited funding (Audretsch 1995). 
Therefore, in these industries, new entrants often must focus on niche customers that 
large incumbent firms have neglected (Christensen 1997).
Nevertheless, the evidence for any individual, industry-level, technological, or some 
other situation factor explaining the creation of high-growth start-ups is at best 
indicative. While we may suggest that entrepreneurs in these sectors e.g. tend to be 
young and well-educated and that push factors due to e.g. unemployment may play a 
smaller role in the creation of high-growth start-ups, the principal reason behind every 
new start-up remains the personal preferences and intentions of the entrepreneur. An 
entrepreneur with intent will identify an opportunity and the means to exploit it. By the 
same token, an individual without this entrepreneurial attitude and intent is unlikely to 
start a firm given even the brightest of prospects and the best of skills.
2.2 Firm growth
As already noted in the introductory section, only a small percentage of all new start-ups 
are responsible for the bulk of all new jobs created by new firms - these are the high- 
growth firms.
A characteristic of high-growth firms is that they target growth from the beginning of 
the firm life-cycle. However, most firms and entrepreneurs do not have this ambition to 
grow. For example, in a 2004 survey in Finland, only 7% of firms reported that they 
targeted substantial growth (KTM 2004b), and out of the firms that target growth, not 
all will successfully realize this growth. For example, only 2-3% of all firms 
internationally can be characterized as high-growth firms (KTM 2004b).
This section will examine the firm growth process, the factors that influence growth 
motivation as well as growth success, and the barriers to growth that firms face as they 
move through various growth stages.
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2.2.1 Growth factors
The factors that influence growth motivation and growth success are similar to the 
factors that influence firm birth. The entrepreneur must make an assessment of his 
ability, capability, desirability, and the opportunity to grow when evaluating whether or 
not to target firm growth; i.e. the same assessment as when making the decision of 
whether to start a firm. Furthermore, even when the entrepreneur or firm targets 
growth, actual growth is further impacted by additional factors that influence the 
successfulness of growth.
As with firm birth, previous studies have suggested a plethora of different factors and 
models that explain firm growth. For example, Storey (1994) suggests a framework for 
firm growth consisting of the following factors:
The characteristics of the entrepreneur. This includes the entrepreneur’s skills, motivation, 
experience, values, personal traits, and life situation.
The organisational characteristics of the firm, including growth need, firm resources, and the 
market sector.
Firm strategy, i.e. how the firm combines its resources and capabilities into a business 
model.
Storey’s model corresponds quite well with the various levels of analysis in high-growth 
policy that we have previously identified. The entrepreneurial characteristics are simply 
the motivation and skill on the entrepreneurial level of analysis. The organizational 
characteristics correspond partly to the resources on the firm-level of analysis. Storey 
includes the market sector as an organizational characteristic (i.e. on the firm-level of 
analysis), and what he thus refers to is the firm’s choice of market as outlined in the 
firm’s strategy. Firm strategy in Storey’s model refers to the combination of resources 
on the firm-level of analysis. Thus, in order to be successful, firms not only need to 
possess the sufficient resources and capabilities but also combine and use these 
resources through an effective business model as defined in the firm strategy (which can 
be either deliberate or implicit).
Another similar influential model was introduced by Van de Yen et al. (1984), who 
investigated success factors from three perspectives: the entrepreneurial, the 
organizational, and the ecological perspective — again, these correspond well to the 
entrepreneurial, firm- and sector-levels of analysis. Van de Ven et al. also noted that the
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most significant factors were found in the entrepreneurial perspective. That is, the 
entrepreneur’s competence (education, experience, internal locos of control), 
imagination (active risk management, a clear business idea), and commitment (personal 
investment in the firm) were most strongly associated with start-up success and 
development of firms.
Nevertheless, as for firm birth, it remains clear that firm growth is intentional. Growth it 
simply does not “just happen”. Davidsson (1991) describes a model for firm growth 
where growth motivation is the principal driver of actual growth, and where motivation 
in turn is influenced by the following three perceived factors:
Need, i.e. that growth serves the entrepreneur’s and the firm’s goals,
Opportunity, i.e. that there are external conditions that can be exploited for growth, and
Ability, i.e. that the entrepreneur is able to exploit these conditions in the market.
This model is depicted in Figure 7.
Davidsson’s (1991) model is quite similar to Krueger et al’s (2000) intentions model, 
which we examined in the section on firm birth, in that it is the entrepreneur’s 
motivation to grow - a similar concept to the entrepreneurs’ intent to start a firm - that 
ultimately determines whether he will embark on a growth path or not. However, while 
the entrepreneur’s motivation will be influenced by the perceived ability, need, and 
opportunity, it is the actual ability, need and opportunity that will affect whether the 
growth is successful. To illustrate, if the entrepreneur is over-optimistic about his own 
skills (and thus perceives a higher ability), he will have a higher growth motivation. 
However, it is the actual and not the perceived ability that together with the 
entrepreneur’s growth motivation will influence actual growth.
21













Figure 7. A model of determinants of small firm growth (Davidsson 1991)
Davidsson (1991) finds empirical support for his model, and while reality doubdessly is 
more complex than the model portrays - for example, there is a higher degree of 
interaction between the factors (opportunity does not only affect the perceived 
opportunity but also the perceived need) — the model represents a good synthesis of the 
various behavioral models for entrepreneurial growth, and will therefore be used for the 
continued analysis and discussion in this paper.
Next, I will separately discuss each of the factors in Davidsson’s model: beginning with 
ability, followed by discussions on need, opportunity, these three factors as perceived, 
and finally, growth motivation.
2.2.1.1 Ability
Davidsson (1991) focuses on the individual level of analysis, and thus talks more about 
the entrepreneur’s abilities, rather than e.g. firm resources and capabilities. However, on 
a more general level, growth ability can be considered to depend on both the 
entrepreneur’s skills, the firm’s internal capabilities and resources, as well as the firm’s 
access to external resources (e.g. financing or consulting services).
Important skills for the entrepreneur include training, especially in business, as well as 
experience from previous entrepreneurial venture. For example, Davidsson (1991) 
shows that previous business ownership is positively correlated with growth.
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Important firm resources include financing, social capital and networks, reputation and 
brand, business expertise, technological expertise, a capability to innovate, and 
infrastructure. These resources and capabilities can either be held within the firm or the 
firm must be able to access them in the market, e.g. by recruiting competent employees 
or by contracting independent consultants.
Thus, while the abilities of the entrepreneur is important, his skill and experience can be 
complemented with the skill and experience of the employees or the management team, 
as well as with the skill and experience of externally accessible resources such as 
business mentors, business angels, venture capitalists, and consultants.
2.2.1.2 Need
In Davidsson’s (1991) empirical investigation among 510 firms in Sweden, need had the 
strongest effect on growth motivation of all three factors. Davidsson also goes on to 
suggest that growth satiation, i.e. the absence of need, is the main reason why firms stop 
growing.
This finding is further supported by the fact that the firm’s age (Evans 1987) and the 
owner-manager’s age (Boswell 1972) have both been shown to be negatively correlated 
with firm growth. When a firm has been in operation for some time, the firm may have 
reached an optimal size (either objectively or as perceived by the entrepreneur) and the 
entrepreneur may not need to increase his rents from the firm, or he may attach a lower 
priority to the continued growth of the firm. In fact, most entrepreneurs/managers feel 
that the current size of their firms “is optimal” (KTM 2004b), and thus, they do not 
have a perceived need to grow.
For the firm, its actual/objective optimal size may depend on factors such as capital 
intensity or regulation. For example, high R&D intensity may require larger companies 
(this has driven much of the consolidation in the medical industry), while e.g. product 
liability risks may lead firms to remain small (e.g. every taxi driver in New York has a 
separate firm) (Kumar et al. 1999). In any case, smaller firms are often more flexible and 
nimble and may thus be perceived by the owner as easier to manage.
However, while many entrepreneurs claim that the current size of their firm is 
“optimal”, firms in very competitive markets and sectors may nevertheless be required 
to embark on a growth path in order to attain higher economies of scale and 
specialization. This is also why external factors such as increased competition in the
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market can affect growth motivation and actual growth by inducing a pressing need to 
attain a larger scale of the business. In addition, personal events in the entrepreneur’s 
life such as higher expenses (e.g. supporting a child) may create a situation where the 
entrepreneur has a need to grow the revenues and profits of the firm.
2.2.1.3 Opportunity
In contrast to ability and need, opportunities exist in the market and, and opportunities 
are thus external to the firm and typically outside the entrepreneur’s span of control.
Opportunity has been shown to have a relatively lesser impact on growth motivation 
and actual growth than either need or ability (Davidsson 1991; Van de Yen et al. 1984). 
For example, firms with high ability tend to do well and grow regardless of whether its 
market is buoyant or not (Hughes 1998).
Nevertheless, it is clear that some sectors do seem to be more prone for growth than 
others. In Finland, 71% of growth firms are in the service sectors — mainly the 
construction, transport, business service, and ICT service sectors.
A number of factors influence the opportunities in specific markets. These factors 
include: industry structure and dynamics (e.g. the degree of fragmentation); the creation 
of new markets and niches; market size and growth rate; entry barriers; trade barriers, 
etc. For example, some sectors such as hair dressers and restaurants have a high natural 
degree of fragmentation, and while this fragmentation typically reduces entry barriers 
(and enhances firm births), it may have a negative impact on firm growth. By contrast, 
firms facing larger markets tend to be larger (Kumar et al. 1999), and when successful, 
new firms in these sectors will naturally be able to grow faster. The fact that a small 
market size negatively impacts firm growth thus emphasizes the need for 
internationalization for firms in small domestic markets.
In addition to sector-level factors, opportunities are also influenced by factors on the 
national level, such as the economic environment, economic growth and the level of 
innovation. National-level factors also include demographic and geographical factors 
such as the population size, age structure, and the degree of consumer sophistication, all 
of which in turn influence the dynamics of markets and ultimately opportunity.
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2.2.1.4 Perceived ability, need and opportunity
The actual ability, need and opportunity all directiy affect actual growth. But in order to 
affect also growth motivation, these factors need to be perceived by the entrepreneur. 
Thus, it is the entrepreneur’s subjective perception of his own and his firm’s ability, 
need and opportunity to grow - rather than his ability, need and opportunity in a purely 
objective sense - that will determine the entrepreneur’s motivation to grow and thereby 
the his behavior.
For example, even though a firm may have a significant growth potential due to some 
special ability or an opportunity in the market, the entrepreneur may not necessarily 
perceive this opportunity or recognize his firm’s ability, e.g. due to an overly pessimistic 
attitude. On the other hand, if the entrepreneur is overly optimistic, he may have a 
significant growth motivation based on his interpretation of the opportunity and his 
ability to grow; but if his actual ability and the actual opportunity in the market do not 
also support growth, motivation alone may not be enough for successful growth. In 
other words, in order to achieve successful growth, it is important that the 
entrepreneur’s perception of his ability and the opportunity somewhat matches the 
actual opportunity and ability. Even so, a slight over-optimism may actually be beneficial 
as a boost to motivation.
2.2.1.5 Motivation
Small firms are usually intimately tied with and often even indistinguishable from the 
entrepreneur. In any case, a firm hardly has a will of its own, and the firm will not grow 
unless the entrepreneur has a motivation to grow his business.
However, there may be several reasons why an entrepreneur may not want to grow the 
business. Common reasons include a fear of loss of control and independence, a 
difficulty to combine growth with personal goals, or a lack of business skill.
Furthermore, the entrepreneur may not necessarily attach a sufficient desirability to the 
potential monetary returns of growth to justify an increased effort, but rather prioritize 
e.g. family, independence, self-actualization through some other means, or work 
satisfaction over growth (KTM 2004b). Also the entrepreneur’s work content, his ability 
to retain control and independence, the expected effect on personal finances, and the 
risk of failure are factors that the entrepreneur need to assess.
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Even so, it is clear that economic gain is often the most obvious motivator for growth. 
Provided that a business survives the start-up phase, continued growth often generates 
significant returns to the entrepreneur. Furthermore, growth can also in the longer run 
have a favorable effect on the same lifestyle factors listed above as potentially 
conflicting priorities to growth. As the firm grows, the entrepreneur is usually able to 
disengage or sell the firm and thus move away from actively managing the firm himself 
(Churchill and Lewis 1983).
2.2.2 Growth stages
In order to explain the growth process of firms, organization theorists have often used 
the biological analogy of the life cycle (e.g. Kimberly and Miles 1980; Hanks and Chandler 
1994). Numerous theories have thus been put forth to describe a number of distinct 
generalizable “growth stages” or phases that firms pass through as they grow.
A common growth-stage pattern for firms includes three stages: start-up, expansion, 
and consolidation. For firms in the knowledge-, technology- or science-based sectors, 
the start-up phase is often further divided into two distinct stage: first, a technology 
development or innovation stage, followed by a commercialization stage, making a total 
of four stages.
Furthermore, each stage or phase in the life cycle can also be associated with a set of 
challenges and hurdles that need to be overcome in order to enable continued growth. 
Hanks and Chandler (1994) synthesized the theories from 8 relevant studies concerning 
the dominant management problems related with each life-cycle stage, including Dodge 
and Robbins (1992), Flamholtz (1986), Galbraith (1982), Greiner (1972), Kazanjian 
(1988), Kazanjian and Drazin (1990), Scott and Bruce (1987), and Smith el al. (1985).
I have compressed Hanks and Chandler’s (1994) analysis in Table 2, and in the 
continuation of this section, I will briefly describe each stage and its associated 
dominant problems.
26
Chapter 2. Firm birth, growth, and internationalization
Table 2. Firm life-cycle stages and dominant management problems (based on Hanks and 
Chandler 1994)
Stage Conception & 
Development
Commercialization Expansion Consolidation
Dominant • Innovating and • Gearing up • Acquiring • Maintaining
problems developing marketing resources for growth,
technology • Obtaining managing and momentum and
• Transforming idea customers financing growth market share
into a business • Managing cash • Developing • Initiating change
venture flow operating systems • Taking advantage
• Identifying and • Fine-tuning and for making, selling of market position
defining market developing and distributing • Enhancing
• Building prototype products and product in volume productivity
• Developing services • Avoiding shakeout • Improving cost
product • Hiring a capable due to controls
• Selling product manager ineffectiveness or • Developing
and business idea • Formalizing inefficiency management
to financial organization and • Delegation and systems
backers task structure
• Scaling up 
processes 
efficiently









In the conception and development stage, an immediate challenge is to develop a 
product or service and define a market. Firms at this stage are typically small and the 
organization is mainly focused on R&D. Two crucial activities in this stage include 
proof-of-concept activities and prototyping. Since external financial backing often is 
needed for the ramp up to commercialization and other subsequent stages, it may be 
necessary to sell the business idea to venture capitalists or other financiers as a seed- 
stage investment to ensure sufficient capitalization.
In the commercialization stage, firms face several problems related to the ramp up of 
the business. The firm must quickly build a customer base and achieve market 
acceptance, and simultaneously ramp up the production process to match demand while 
further developing and fine-tuning the product or service. The organization of the firm 
also calls for more structure and definition, and firms in this stage often will include a 
separate sales and marketing force. In this stage, it is common for technology-based 
firms to face a ‘leadership crisis’ (Greiner 1972) where an experienced manager may be 
needed to replace the formerly technology-focused management to run the business. 
Additional external financing is typically needed for this stage.
In the expansion stage, firms will face challenges in amassing resources and capabilities 
for continued, often very rapid, growth that happens after the firm has achieved 
acceptance in the market. Securing adequate capacity for manufacturing, sales and 
distribution, enhancing production efficiencies, as well as maintaining adequate
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financing for growth will be among the major priorities. It is equally important to 
overcome any emergent ‘autonomy crisis’ (Greiner 1972) through increased delegation, 
since the management team can no longer control all activities of the expanding firm. 
New functions typically include customer service, payroll, purchasing, finance, quality 
control (Hanks and Chandler 1994).
In the consolidation stage, the growth rate of the firm typically slows and focus will shift 
to making the business profitable through enhanced productivity and cost controls. 
Productivity can often be increased by addressing and eliminating any inefficiencies in 
the organization and processes which may have been overlooked during the expansion 
stage. Firms may also need to overcome a ‘control crisis’ (Greiner 1972) through 
increased coordination and more sophisticated internal controls and management 
systems. In order to maintain continued growth after this step, changes are often 
required in terms of the firm’s product portfolio, choice of market, and processes; and 
support for restructuring must be amassed in the organization to allow for this growth. 
However, firms may now generate cash flows internally and are therefore less 
dependent on external financing.
2.2.3 Steady-state stages
Why do firms seize to grow? In an empirical study, Hanks et al. (1993) find two types of 
steady-state stages where firms have seized to grow. The first type of these firms is what 
Hanks et al. (1993) call ‘life-style firms’. These firms are both very small and mature and 
have a high degree of centralization; and they are thus examples of firms where owners 
seem to consciously have kept their firms small. As Davidsson (1989) notes in his study 
on Swedish SMEs, many small business owners with firms at a size of 5 to 9 employees 
— a size that approximately corresponds to that of Hanks et al’s ‘life-style firm’ - feel that 
the negative effects of growth outweigh the potential positive effects. Churchill and 
Lewis (1983) also suggest that external factors such as a small market niche may explain 
why firms stop growing.
The second type of firms that have stopped growing in Hanks et al.’s (1993) empirical 
sample are what McMahon (1998) later refer to as ‘capped growth firms’. These firms 
are typically also very mature but significandy larger than the previous category of life­
style firms, with an average size of around 25 employees. The state of these firms is 
similar to what Churchill and Lewis (1983) have described as the “Success-
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Disengagement sub-stage”, where a company has survived start-up phase and achieved 
sufficient size and market penetration to be viable as a running business, and whose 
owner now chooses to concentrate on other priorities, such as starting a new business, 
pursuing hobbies, etc, while preserving the firm in status quo instead of using the 
achieved success as a platform for yet further growth.
Thus, what firms at these steady-state stages mainly seem to lack is growth motivation. 
Reasons for this lack of motivation may include personal life-style choices as well as a 
reluctance to surrender control (McMahon 1998). However, the current literature offers 
few solutions as to how to encourage firms in steady-state to resume growth.
2.2.4 Barriers to growth
Other studies have pointed to barriers that can hinder firms from growing. A study by 
the Ministry of Trade and Industry in Finland (KTM 2004b) pointed to the following 
barriers to growth: limited demand or fierce competition; risk averseness; limited 
financial resources; limited growth-related skills; or that the entrepreneur considers the 
current size to be optimal. Applying these factors to Davidsson’s (1991) model above, 
the last factor, a current optimal size, implies that the entrepreneur considers that he has 
no need to grow. Lack of financing and growth skills will decrease the perceived ability 
to grow, while limited demand and fierce competition implies a low perceived 
opportunity to grow. Finally, risk-averseness may be a sign of a low perceived growth 
need, where the entrepreneur rather prefers status quo over an uncertain growth 
venture.
Furthermore, Aldrich and Auster (1986) point to two general disadvantages of start-ups 
as they want to grow: a liability of smallness and a liability of newness. The liability of 
smallness means that small have a disadvantage compared to larger firms in terms of 
efficiently raising capital, complying with regulation, and employing specialty staff. The 
liability of newness means that new firms face challenges in establishing their credibility 
in the marketplace and thus attract employees, customers, and suppliers who may fear 
that the new venture will fail. This liability is thus particularly severe for high-risk 
ventures.
Firms in high-R&D sectors may also consider the risk of expropriation as a cap for the 
growth rate. Especially in industries where the critical resource of the firm is easy to 
replicate and where employees have low job switching costs, owners may want to limit
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the rate of employee growth in order to prevent a situation where former employees 
may set up a competing business (Kumar et al. 1999).
2.3 Internationalization
Internationalization can broadly be defined as a process of a firm’s increasing 
involvement in international operations (Welch and Luostarinen 1988). While 
international activities traditionally have been mainly the domain of large companies, 
international expansion is an increasingly common vehicle for growth also for small- 
and midsized companies. As a result, several policy measures have been designed to aid 
these companies in their internationalization process.
Internationalization is especially important for firms with innovative products and 
services in small economies where the domestic market is limited. Nevertheless, as the 
previous sections have illustrated, most small firms do not want to grow, and likewise, 
the majority of small firms neither have a motivation to internationalize. As Acs et al. 
(1997) put it: “small firms tend to be homebodies”.
This section will look into the international processes of firms and the constraints that 
internationalizing firms face. The section will start with an examination of the ‘traditionat 
view of gradual internationalization, followed by a discussion on the rapid 
internationalization processes used by so called ‘bom globals’. Bom globals constitute a 
quite recent breed of firms that internationalize very quickly after start-up, and the 
internationalization processes of these firms thus differ from those of traditional 
domestic-based companies.
2.3.1 The traditional model of internationalization
The most commonly referred to model of internationalization is the so-called TJppsala 
model’, first described by Johanson and Wiedersheim-Paul (1975). According to this 
model, there are two types of choices that internationalizing firms need to make; these 
choice concern 1) the entry mode, and 2) the market. These choices are pictured in 
Figure 8, and will be discussed in separate sections below.
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Figure 8. The theoretical and operational dimensions of the Uppsala model on firm 
internationalization (from Andersen 1993)
2.3.1.1 Entry mode
In terms of entry mode, Johanson and Wiedersheim-Paul (1975) found that firms tend 
to follow a step-wise approach to internationalization within each foreign market, which 
consists of the following four steps:
1. No regular exports,
2. Exports via agents,
3. Establishment of a sales subsidiary, and
4. Production ig the foreign market.
This sequence of an evolutionary and incremental process is called the ‘establishment 
chain’, where each link in the chain represents a larger commitment of resources to the 
new market. This gradual pattern can be explained by two underlying reasons: a lack of 
knowledge about the foreign market, and uncertainty associated with the decision to 
internationalize.
Another reason why firms may choose to internationalize following a gradual pattern is 
that the process is expensive. Internationalizing firms face high costs and challenges 
related to establishing sales channels, obtaining market information, as well as for 
providing customer service in other languages and on different continents. Thus, firms 
tend to expand slowly in order to enable incremental learning and to mitigate risks 
associated with the internationalization process (Ghauri 2000). Due to the high costs, a 
firm would typically be able to enter international markets only after the firm has already 
established itself in the home market and thus can afford an expansion outside its 
domestic borders.
The choice to enter international markets is typically a consequence of a series of several 
incremental decisions to expand (Ghauri 2000). A common trigger to start exporting
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consist of unsolicited requests from foreigners to sell products overseas (Bilkey and 
Tesar 1977), and internationalization is often in that sense more opportunistic than part 
of a deliberate strategy. That is, unlike firm birth and firm growth which are typically the 
result of intentional strategic choices, the typical internationalization process in this 
traditional view seems to be one of small, often opportunistic steps that lead a firm to 
increasingly export more and later also base some operations abroad.
Since the model was constructed, intermediary or hybrid approaches to 
internationalization such as joint ventures, franchising, licensing, etc, have also become 
increasingly popular modes of internationalization; these approaches would fit in 
between the four modes listed above. Yet another approach to internationalization that 
is becoming increasingly common is to internationalize through networks. This 
approach means that firms internationalize as a consequence of other firms in their 
network (e.g. their main customer) internationalizing. The network mode is especially 
common for small firms who are subcontractors to large international firms, and these 
firms’ networks will affect both their choice of market as well as entry mode. For these 
firms, internationalization through networks can be highly effective; e.g. Acs et al.
(1997) argue that small firms’ innovations may be diffused globally more efficiently 
when they are channeled through existing multinationals.
2.3.1.2 Choice of market
In terms of the choice of market(s) - according to the traditional view - firms will tend 
to first expand to foreign markets that are better known, e.g. in terms of customer 
preferences and business practices in the foreign market. These markets are typically 
close in either physical or cultural distance (Kogut and Singh 1988). For example, 
according to the traditional view, Finnish firms that expand internationally would first 
tend to expand to e.g. Russia (close physical distance), Germany (close cultural distance), 
or Sweden (close physical and cultural distance). As firms continue their international 
expansion, they sequentially move to countries that are increasingly farther away.
The Uppsala school introduces the concept of ‘psychic distance’ to describe the firm’s 
proximity to a foreign market. Psychic distance can be defined in terms of factors that 
prevent or disturb the flow of information between the firm and the foreign market. 
These factors include differences in language, culture, political systems, level of 
education, and level of industrial development (Johanson and Vahlne 1977).
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2.3.1.3 Barriers to internationalization
Firms going through the internationalization process face many challenges related to 
their establishment in foreign markets. These barriers may be especially difficult to 
overcome for small firms, and internationalization processes of small firms have also 
been shown to be more prone to failure than those of large firms (Newbould et al.
1978). Typical challenges include:
Lack of knowledge about the foreign market. As we noted in the previous section, market 
knowledge is one of the main reasons why firms choose to internationalize sequentially, 
starting from the most psychically proximate countries. Internationalizing small firms 
e.g. need to overcome challenges in terms of understanding the foreign market and how 
it is different from the domestic one (Ghauri 2000). There may often be differences in 
customer preferences, legal systems, cultures, languages, and national market conditions, 
and small firms do not typically have this knowledge in-house.
Lack of resources. Firms may need plenty of resources to overcome the barriers to entry 
to international markets. In addition to the lack of knowledge already mentioned above, 
barriers to entry can include issues such as financial market imperfections, entry barriers 
that are erected by entrenched firms (e.g. through collusion and by building up war 
chests for predatory pricing), and entry barriers erected by governments (e.g. through 
regulations, restrictions, safety and environmental standards, etc) (Acs et al. 1997). Small 
firms in particular may not have the resources required to afford delays that the 
internationalization process may encounter due to these barriers (Acs et al. 1997).
Protection of property rights. Small firms, especially in technology-based sectors, also need 
protection of their property rights such as patents and trademarks in order to be able to 
profit from their innovations internationally. Nevertheless, property rights may be more 
difficult to enforce in international markets, and small firms typically have a less power, 
clout and resources to protect their rights globally than do large firms.
Cultural shift. Firms also need to manage the cultural shift that is required to move from 
a domestic to an international perspective. In many firms, internationalization may also 
be met with skepticism or even resistance; especially if the process involves establishing 
some operations abroad. Therefore, a strong perseverance and determination is required 
for any small firm that wants to internationalize (Rennie 1993).
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2.3.2 The born global
The concept born global firm was first introduced by Rennie (1993). In a study by 
McKinsey & Company, Rennie found that some Australian firms established themselves 
successfully in international markets without first building a base in the firms’ domestic 
market. A ‘born global’ thus came to connote firm that follows a global business model 
from inception, and does not enter international markets slowly or merely as a 
complement to the domestic market. While large domestic-based firms still typically 
follow a gradual step-wise process to internationalization, e.g. Coviello and Munro 
(1995) found that the internationalization process of small high-technology firms in 
particular did not fit the traditional model.
Like the pet child that has many names, born global firms have also been called ‘born 
internationals’, ‘instant internationals’ (Preece et al. 1999), or ‘international new 
ventures’ (Wilson 2000). Nevertheless, the concept of the born global has become the 
most established term for these firms within the entrepreneurship research literature 
(Knight and Cavusgil 1996; Madsen and Servais 1997), although the term is most often 
used in the Nordic countries. Nevertheless, the Nordic countries are characterized by 
small but open domestic markets - traits that characterize a natural breeding ground for 
born globals (Luostarinen and Gabrielsson 2004) - and it is therefore not surprising that 
much of the discussion around bom globals is carried out in these countries.
2.3.2.1 Characteristics, entry mode, and choice of market
Bom globals represent a new phenomenon in the anatomy of firms, and their business 
model has been made possible due to two trends: technological advancements and 
globalization (Knight and Cavusgil 2004). Technological advancements have decreased 
the previously high costs of managing operations, marketing and sales on a global scale, 
thus enabling small firms to simultaneously enter multiple international markets. Rennie 
(1993) observed that a key tool in enabling small firms to operate globally in the 
beginning of the 1990’s was the use of the fax machine; today, email and electronic 
commerce is further shrinking the world and opening up opportunities for small firms 
to operate globally.
Although customer demands are becoming more specialized, there is also a trend 
towards global convergence of customers’ tastes (Levitt 1983), which is creating a more 
homogenous global market in certain products and services, and thus reducing the need
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for firms to tailor products to each national market. Technological advancements and 
globalization have together also reduced the ‘psychic distance’ between markets, further 
enabling the rapid expansion of firms.
Bom global firms have a significant potential to account for a large share of an 
economy’s export growth through SMEs. Nevertheless, the internationalization 
processes and strategies that born globals utilize differ significantly from those of 
traditional domestic-based companies (Luostarinen and Gabrielsson 2004) and cannot 
be explained by standard theories of internationalization (McDougall et al. 1994). Bell et 
al. (2003) offer a comprehensive comparison of the characteristics of ‘traditional’ vs. 
‘born global’ firms, which is presented in Table 3. "While a discussion around all of these 
characteristics would be excessive for the purpose of this study, I will briefly examine a 
selection of these issues below.
Table 3. Characteristics of'traditional' internationalization vs. 'born globals1 (Bell et al. 2003)
‘Traditional’ ‘Born global’
Motivation • Reactive • Proactive
• Adverse home market • Global ‘niche’ market
• Unsolicited orders/enquiries • International from inception
• Cost of new production processes 
force export initiation
• Active search
Objectives • Firm survival/growth • Competitive advantage
• Increasing sales volume • ‘First-mover’ advantage
• Gaining market share • ‘Locking in' customers
• Extending product life-cycle • Rapid penetration of global niches
or segments
• Protecting and exploiting proprietary 
knowledge
Expansion patterns • Incremental
• Domestic expansion first
• Focus on ‘psychically proximate’ 
markets
• ‘Low-tech’/less sophisticated 
markets targeted
• Limited evidence of networks
• Concurrent
• Near-simultaneous domestic and 
international expansion
• Focus on ’lead' markets
• Some evidence of client 
‘followership’
• Strong evidence of networks
Pace • Gradual/slow
• Small number of markets
• Single market at a time
• Adaptation of existing offering
• Rapid
• Large number of markets
• Many markets at one time




• Use of agents/distributors or 
wholesalers
• Direct to customers
• Flexible and through networks
• Use of agents or distributors
• Also evidence of integration with 
client channels, use of licensing, 
joint ventures, overseas production
International strategies • Ad-hoc and opportunistic
• Evidence of continued reactive 
behavior to new opportunities
• Atomistic expansion, unrelated new 
customers/markets
• Structured
• Evidence of planned approach to 
international expansion
• Expansion of global networks
Financing • ‘Boot-strap’ into new markets • Venture capital
• Initial public offerings
In terms of entry mode and process, the born global enter foreign market quickly and as
a result of deliberate planning.
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Born globals enter international markets soon after entering the domestic market, 
simultaneously with the domestic market, or even before entering the domestic market. 
For example, Bell (1995) describes the phenomenon of software companies that first 
enter foreign markets and only later establish themselves in the domestic market. 
Furthermore, the born global, contrary to the traditional internationalizing firm, often 
establishes itself in several foreign markets simultaneously. By moving rapidly to 
introduce their innovations in key markets, born globals seek to obtain a first-mover 
advantage in these markets.
Furthermore, bom globals tend to adopt a more structured approach to 
internationalization based on an active search, in contrast to the opportunistic, ad-hoc 
approach of ‘traditional’ companies. Careful planning is important because entering 
several foreign markets rapidly limits the opportunity for learning and gathering 
experience in a smaller, more sheltered market. Instead of proceeding slowly through 
the typical 4 stages of internationalization as depicted in Figure 8, born globals often 
jump stages; and they also commonly use networks and hybrid modes of 
internationalization (such as joint ventures, licensing, etc).
In terms of the choice of market, born globals seek out international niche markets 
where they successfully can satisfy highly specialized customer needs with limited 
competition from incumbent firms. Born globals can be found in all sectors, even in 
industries that are considered to be declining (Rennie 1993). However, as their 
competitive advantage is typically knowledge-based (McKinsey & Company 1993), born 
globals are usually concentrated in the following five sectors: high-tech, high-system, 
high service, high know-how, and high design (Luostarinen and Gabrielsson 2004).
Instead of focusing expansion to psychically close markets, born globals will focus on 
lead markets (Alahuhta 1990), and thus prioritize potential new markets primarily based 
on customer potential rather than psychic proximity. If the born global already has 
important domestic customers, it tends to follow its domestic customers to international 
markets without regard to the proximity of these markets (Bell 1995).
The born global does also differs from the traditional domestic-based firm in that it is 
more open-minded about where to base its operations. While the founders may be of a 
specific nationality they will often consider basing their company close to their 
customers or wherever these firms may so obtain a competitive advantage, be it due to 
skilled labor, low cost, or any other combination of factors. The base country for the
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born global may or may not be the ‘home country’ of the firm, if the concept of a home 
country indeed even is relevant to these firms. In fact, bom globals often have R&D, 
manufacturing, and administrative functions on separate continents (Bell et al. 2003).
Finally, born global firms are very young, and the entrepreneurs in these firms are 
typically also very young and thus relatively inexperienced. In one Finnish case that 
Luostarinen and Gabrielsson (2004) examined, the average age among the 35 employees 
was 25. Since the management of a bom global may require bolder and less incremental 
action that that of the traditional internationalization firm, the role of the entrepreneur 
is perhaps even more important to the bom global than that of the entrepreneur in the 
traditional firm. In fact, it is often the unique competences and personal network of the 
entrepreneur that give rise to the opportunity of the born global to rapidly expand 
globally (McDougall et al. 1994).
2.S.2.2 Challenges for born globals
The hurdles faced by born globals through their internationalization process are very 
similar to the hurdles faced by traditional internationalizing firms; i.e. lack of knowledge, 
limited resources, difficulties in protecting property rights, and challenges of cultural 
change. More specifically, Rennie (1993) outlines a typical timeline for bom global and 
identifies associated constraints that born globals face as they grow. Rennie’s model is 
depicted in Figure 9.
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Figure 9. The bom global firm's profile (Rennie 1993)
The first challenges that born globals face even before starting their internationalization 
process include the issues of credibility, finance, and international outlook. In order to 
build credibility, bom globals may often benefit from piggy-backing on established 
network partners. In terms of finance, while traditional companies often use internally 
generated funds to finance international expansion, born globals will need considerable 
external funding, often in terms of VC, to finance rapid growth. Finally, the speed and 
deliberateness with which born globals enter international markets require an early 
international oudook in terms of a clear internationalization strategy and a global xdsion 
for the firm.
Later on, when building the international market position, additional challenges include 
management of sales channels, obtaining more detailed market information, and 
expanding the product range. The challenges in managing the rapidly expanding firm 
will often require a relatively early management transition by which the typically young 
founding entrepreneurs are replaced or complemented with more experienced 
managers. Finally, while the initial strategy of the firm typically is to focus on small 
niches, the continued growth of the firm may require an expansion of the product range 
and in so doing, the firm will face fiercer competition with incumbents in the new 
market segments.
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2.3.2.3 Success factors
While the trends of globalization and technological advancements have enabled bom 
globals to operate as new breed of firms, only very few young firms with an 
international vision and intent are able to translate this intent into successful 
international growth. Thus, we need to look at the capabilities and resources of these 
firms in order to identify the success factors of born globals (Knight and Cavusgil 2004). 
A number of these success factors are presented below:
Innovation. A culture characterized by innovation is a prerequisite for successful rapid 
internationalization (Knight and Cavusgil 2004). In order to expand globally, the firm 
will need also need a capability to mm innovation into commercial products and 
services for a global market. Nevertheless, internationalization can also be a driver for 
continued innovation as the firm is exposed to new cultures, tastes, customers, 
suppliers, and business practices.
Managerial attitudes. In order to be able to expand rapidly to international markets it is 
important that the firm has an international vision from inception, and this vision must 
come from a determined management attitude to target global markets. If this attitude is 
not present from the beginning, the path-dependent nature of business decisions may 
make it difficult to develop international capabilities at a later date (McDougall et al. 
1994; Preece et al. 1999).
Managerial expertise. Born globals require competent leaders with international experience. 
While born globals typically have necessary technical expertise to succeed in the 
marketplace, their managers may have very limited experience and may therefore need 
external assistance. As noted by Rennie in Figure 9 above, born globals will in fact often 
go through a change of management very early after entering international markets. 
Nevertheless, given the often inherent uncertainty in their business, these firms may face 
a challenging in recruiting experienced management. This is also why the support of VC 
funds may often be needed to attract and channel experienced managers.
Speed to market. Speed to market is critical for born globals in order to build credibility 
early, tie up lead customers, and get a head start in lead markets. For example, 
penetration pricing may be required in order to attract customers early (Luostarinen and 
Gabrielsson 2004).
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Finandal resources. In order to enable the strategy of moving quickly into several 
international markets, it is not typically sufficient to finance the expansion with merely 
internally generated revenue. Again, given high uncertainty of the prospects and high 
failure rates, also loan funding will be difficult to attain. Therefore, a significant amount 
of venture capital is likely to be needed in order to support the growth strategy of bom 
globals.
Networks. As have seen in the previous section, born globals often use networks and 
strategic alliances and thus rely more heavily on network partners for growth than do 
‘traditional’ internationalizing firms (Bell et al. 2003; Luostarinen and Gabrielsson 2004). 
These networks and hybrid structures can be used to compensate for the resource 
scarcity that characterize young firms (McDougall et al. 1994), and networks are thus 
especially important in the case when a firm cannot raise sufficient venture capital for 
single-handed expansion.
Brand and IP. Finally, the development of a strong global brand in its niche may also be 
required for success in order to capitalize on the firm’s innovation and reduce the risk of 
imitation (Luostarinen and Gabrielsson 2004).
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3 SME policy and Innovation policy
High-growth policy exists in the intersection between two policy areas: Innovation 
policy and SME policy. These two policy areas have the same ultimate goal, i.e. 
employment and growth, but they use somewhat different types of measures to 
contribute towards this goal.
This section will examine the goals of Innovation policy and SME policy and the typical 
measure types employed by these policies, with the purpose of outlining the scope of 
each of these policy areas. Further, I will briefly examine how these policy areas 
complement and differ from each other. Thus, this section will outline the greater 
“playing field” where high-growth policy acts, and thus serve as a map for the empirical 
investigation on high-growth policy measures to follow.
3.1 Market failure and market intervention 
approaches
Before we closer examine the various types of support measures employed by SME 
policy and Innovation policy, it is useful to recognize the rationale behind public policy 
intervention, i.e. the concept of market failure. Broadly speaking, market failure happens 
when the voluntary market exchange on its own does not allocate resources efficiently. 
There are four main types of market failure: 1) limited information and uncertainty, 2) 
external costs and external benefits, 3) monopoly power, and 4) public goods (Parkin et 
al. 2000:433).
A concrete example of market failure often referred to in SME policy and Innovation 
policy is the fact that the market may allocate too little resources to early-stage ventures 
than is socially and economically desirable. This example of market failure is arguably 
due to limited information (it is difficult to assess the merits of an early-stage firm) and 
externalities (funding even a loss-making early-stage enterprise may benefit society as a 
whole e.g. through the new ideas and spin-offs).
To correct for market failure, there are four basic approaches that policy can take when 
supporting firms. These approaches (illustrated in Figure 10) are based on the type and 
level of government intervention in the market.
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Publicly provided services Market-based, subsidized Friction-reducing Regulatory and legislative 
and resources services and resources (Information brokering measures
and networks)




Figure 10. Market intervention approaches for public support measures 
The first approach is for the government to supply the service or resource itself. Using 
the example of early-stage financing above, this could involve setting up a government- 
run venture capital fund. The second approach is to subsidize the market to provide 
more of the services and resources; an example would be to encourage venture capital 
funds to allocate greater amounts of capital to early-stage ventures through subsidized 
(e.g. with asymmetrical payoff) co-investments. The third approach is to reduce friction 
in the market, i.e. help to match supply with demand. To support early-stage venture 
capital, this could involve setting up networks between business angels and 
entrepreneurs. The fourth approach is to help the market work better through e.g. laws 
and regulations; an example could involve easing the restrictions on pension funds to let 
them invest a larger part of their capital in early-stage ventures.
The types of approaches taken can thus range from the very interventionist “hands-on” 
approach of public provision, to the “hand-off’ approach of fostering a suitable 
environment for the market work in. Countries may take different approaches to 
providing services and resources to firms, and the appropriate approach will depend 
both on the nature of the service or support to be provided as well as on the national 
context. Furthermore, these approaches are not mutually exclusive, and many different 
measures with different market intervention approaches may be employed 
simultaneously to correct for the same market failure.
3.2 SME policy
SMEs constitute a fundamental part of the economy in both industrialized and 
developing nations. According to the OECD (2005b), 95% of all manufacturing 
enterprises in the organization’s member countries are SMEs, and these SMEs provide 
two-thirds of the total employment in private companies and they are also the principal 
creator of new jobs. SMEs are also increasingly seen as an important source of 
innovation. Thus, not surprisingly, there are many governmental programs and 
initiatives that seek to promote the SME sector; these are typically jointly referred to as
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SME policy. But policies related to SMEs also span other policy areas, such as 
environment policy and fiscal policy; as a result, e.g. the EU has introduced a so-called 
“think small first” principle, intended to be implemented across all EU policies, 
implying that the needs of small firms are to be a primary concern for all types of policy 
decisions (CEC 2005a).
The objective for SME policy is to encourage growth and employment through the 
formation of new enterprises and the growth of small firms. The main types of actions 
that are directed towards accomplishing this goal consist of regulatory measures, 
provision of appropriate support to SMEs, and promotion of an entrepreneurial culture 
(CEC 2005a).
SME policy has undergone significant development over the last decade, and it is 
therefore challenging to map the whole field of measures. Nevertheless, one of the most 
comprehensive international catalogs of SME policy measures is that of OECD (2004), 
which tracks activities that governmental- and non-governmental organizations employ 
to support SMEs and entrepreneurship. Relevant categories of activities include:
Financing. Finance has been recognized as one of the largest barriers to firm birth and 
growth. Measures in this category try to improve SME access to capital throughout the 
life-cycle of the firm; be it through e.g. bank loans or private equity markets (CEC 2000, 
CEC 2005c). Measures can facilitate access to various types of financing through either 
government-run funding schemes or by encouraging private financiers through 
guarantees, tax benefits, subsidies, and risk-sharing arrangements. Among the recent 
developments in this category we find e.g. relaxed restrictions on the investments in 
venture capital by pension funds and support for business angels networks (OECD 
2005b)
Entrepreneurship andfirm creation. These measures support the formation of new firms by 
e.g. improving the general business environment for start-ups. Relevant issues include 
access to markets, availability of skilled labor, and access to financing. Since red tape 
arguably has a more severe effect on small firms than on large firms, another important 
goal is to ease the cost and time required to start-up and run a small firm. This can be 
achieved through e.g. lighter reporting requirements, lower fees, and special assistance 
for SMEs. Also structural policies including those related to labor markets, tax design, 
competition, and bankruptcy laws have been recognized to impact entrepreneurial 
activity.
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Employment and human resources. While SMEs are responsible for 60-70% of private 
employment in most western economies (OECD 2005b), a large part of SMEs employ 
no-one but the entrepreneur himself. Thus, several countries have policy measures 
directed towards encouraging ‘micro-SMEs’ to employ, through e.g. lower employment 
taxes for these firms. Another area of policy activity concerns the promotion of the skill 
level of the labor force. SMEs need to be able to access qualified labor in order to grow; 
however, on the other hand, SMEs tend to invest less in the continued training of their 
employees than do large firms. Therefore, it is important to both promote both good 
basic education as well as life-long learning of the work force. Finally, in order to foster 
an “entrepreneurial culture”, entrepreneurship training is increasingly included in all 
levels of education (CEC 2000).
Innovation and technology. Although SMEs are often innovative in knowledge-based service 
sectors such as business and financial services and strong in ‘informal innovation’, i.e. 
the further development, refinement and adaptation of products and processes (OECD 
2004), the innovative capability of SMEs is still lagging compared to that of large firms 
in most sectors (OECD 2005b). Thus, the aim of these types of measures is to support 
innovation by SMEs and develop a culture of innovation within these firms. Typical 
measures include programs that seek to: strengthen the technological capability of small 
firms, e.g. through support for investments in manufacturing technologies and ICT; 
improve SME access to finance for innovation; provide infrastructure, e.g. in the form 
of incubation centers; or encourage innovation networks and cooperation with larger 
firms. Since SMEs still have a weak understanding of the rights that are possible to 
obtain through IP (OECD 2005b), programs that disseminate information about 
patents and property rights and assist SMEs in obtaining these rights are also part of this 
type of measures.
Clusters, networks and partnerships. SMEs rely to a great extent on external cooperation with 
other firms and experts in order to access markets, information and know-how; this is 
especially true in technology-based sectors (OECD 2005b). A typical way to foster this 
collaboration between firms is to encourage the formation of clusters. A cluster can be 
defined as a sectoral and geographical concentration of firms which produce and sell 
complementary products (OECD 2004). Also other partnership types can be supported, 
such as those between SMEs and the public sector or large firms around innovation, or 
cooperation between firms around issues related to internationalization.
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SMEs in specific industries. These measures specifically target SMEs in sectors that are 
regarded as strategically important. Such sectors typically include biotechnologies, 
environment-related technologies, and services. SMEs in these sectors can be supported 
through e.g. improved access to finance or support for increased cooperation around 
research.
SMEs and globalisation. SMEs are still under-represented in world trade, but are 
increasingly growing their share. These types of measure support the internationalization 
processes of small firms. Measures may include support for financing or strategy 
formation for internationalization, support for the creation of SME networks for 
international trade or partnerships with global firms, or help with compliance with 
international rules or requirements. Also measures that improve access to information 
on e.g. foreign tax, regulatory requirements, and dispute resolution are common (OECD 
2004).
Local development and social entrepreneurship. Entrepreneurship and small firms are 
considered important tools to foster social and regional development. This principle 
applies in both economically prosperous and depressed regions, although policy 
measures tend to focus on fostering entrepreneurship specifically in depressed regions 
through targeted support for regional or local development. Measures include 
supporting the formation of firm networks, improving the access to finance for local 
SMEs, and building the skill level of the work force within these regions. 
Entrepreneurship is thus seen as one of the principal vehicles to alleviate poverty and 
drive development in specific regions or cities by “helping people help themselves” 
(CEC 2000; OECD 2004).
Women and minority entrepreneurs. Women are still underrepresented in entrepreneurial 
activity as they are also in the work force at large; but self-employment is often 
considered one of the most important potential job options for women (OECD 2004). 
Thus, some SME policy measures target women specifically and encourage women to 
create new firms, e.g. by facilitating the financing of these businesses or assisting with 
child care. Also other minority groups often receive targeted attention by SME policy 
for similar reasons, including young people, older people, unemployed or foreigners.
SME policy is focused on the whole range of small firms, i.e. from micro-enterprises 
and family SMEs to high-growth “gazelles”, and seeks to unlock the potential of all 
these types of firms in all stages of development (CEC 2005a). Nevertheless, there is a
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trend that SME policies increasingly emphasize growth factors and growing firms.
These factors principally include those above related to innovation, financing, training, 
and access to international markets.
3.3 Innovation policy
An ‘innovation’ is commonly described as a new process, product, or service that can be 
commercialized. An innovation is distinct from an ‘invention’, which relates to the 
earlier discovery of the process, product or service or the scientific result or idea behind 
these discoveries, but which is not yet at the stage of commercialization. Innovations 
bring increased welfare and growth through new goods and services, as well as through 
improvements in price, quality, or more economical of use resources.
The goal of innovation policy is thus to increase the overall level of innovation in 
society. Formally, the aim of this policy is often said to improve the “innovation 
system”, i.e. the national infrastructure that supports innovation. Nevertheless, 
innovation policy act on both the macro and micro level; e.g. it may influence both the 
national syllabi in secondary education math as well as provide direct support to specific 
firms for the adoption of broadband internet.
The role of innovation policy started to increase in the 1980s, especially in Western 
Europe, where innovation was increasingly seen as a tool to improve the region’s 
competitiveness and economic development. The policy commitment to innovation has 
been continuously reinforced since, e.g. through the Lisbon strategy in 2000. Nowadays, 
all industrialized countries pay close attention to innovation policy, and thousands of 
programs to support innovation have been implemented throughout the western world.
A number of initiatives and bodies track and catalog innovation policy measures. 
Examples include the OECD (2005a) and the European TrendChart on Innovation.
The latter is an initiative of the Innovation Policy Development unit at the European 
Commission which tracks over 2000 innovation policy measures in European countries, 
and is thus one of the most comprehensive databases on innovation policy. Other 
projects that track innovation policy measures on specific themes include the Europe 
INNOVA and PAXIS initiatives, which focus on innovation policy measures targeted at 
a number of specific sectors and SMEs respectively.
Innovation policy measures can broadly be divided into 8 groups or themes as below. 
These themes are based on Amndel and Hollanders (2005).
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R&D programs. R&D programs typically make up the main part of total spending on 
innovation policy. These programs provide financial resources for the research in public 
research organization and also provide direct or indirect support for research and 
development within private firms. Program can also use public procurement of new 
innovative products and services to drive innovation (CEC 2005b). The goal of these 
programs is to increase the spending on R&D as a percentage of GDP in both public 
and private organizations across all sectors, and to increase the share of firms that 
innovate. One specific goal within the EU is to raise the spending on R&D from 1,9% 
of GDP in 2002 to 3% of GDP by 2010 (CEC 2002), however, thus far there has been 
very little progress towards that goal. Nevertheless, a problem with these programs has 
been that governments have tended to view innovation as a pipeline. As The Economist 
noted, “if public money is stuffed into basic research in universities and national 
laboratories at one end, they reckon, new technology and commercial applications 
should pop out the other” (Economist 1999:8).
IPRpoliäes. IPR, including patents, trademarks, design registration, and copyright, are 
increasingly in focus for innovation policy measures since IPR is considered an 
important driver of innovation and competitiveness. IPR has a clear link to firm growth: 
with better protection of intellectual property, brand names, and innovative processes, 
firms may raise venture capital more easily as well as grow confidently without fear that 
their critical resources may be expropriated (Kumar et al., 1999). The broad goals of 
innovation policy measures related to IPR are to promote the protection and optimize 
the exploitation of intellectual property as a driver of innovation. To this end, both 
legislative measures, e.g. defining what types of inventions and innovations that are 
patentable, as well as directed programs to increase the patenting rate can be employed. 
Common types of the latter type of programs include: 1) measures that encourage SMEs 
to apply for patents; 2) measures that encourage universities and other public research 
institutions to apply for patents, and 3) programs that disseminate information about 
IPR.
Commerdali^ation of public research. The basic and applied research carried out at public 
research organizations such as public research centers and universities is commonly 
considered an untapped potential of valuable innovations. A number of measures have 
been taken in Europe to encourage commercialization of public research, including: 1) 
measures that support collaboration between private firms and public research
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organizations; 2) measures that encourage researchers at public research organizations to 
be more entrepreneurial and patent or otherwise commercialize their research through 
spin-offs or licensing agreements; 3) measures that focus public research on the most 
promising areas for commercialization. One typical example of combining the first and 
third goals would be to set up joint private-public research networks or clusters to work 
on applied research within a field that has been identified as promising for new 
innovation. In order to encourage researchers to become more entrepreneurial, support 
programs can provide grants that enable researchers to develop their innovations 
towards commercialization. Nevertheless, commercialization of public research is a slow 
process and the results of these measures typically take a very long time to realize.
Innovation collaboration. Collaboration around innovation is important in order to achieve 
the critical mass of expertise required to develop new innovations and bring them to 
market. Many of the measures taken to this end are similar to the ones that seek to 
commercialize public research, e.g. support for collaboration between industrial and 
public research. In addition, these measures may seek to increase collaboration between 
private firms around innovation activities, e.g. through science parks, technology 
transfer and knowledge exchange programs.
Innovation finance. Limited access to financing for research and innovation is seen as one 
of the major obstacles to innovation, especially for early-stage ventures. Therefore, 
many measures seek to support financing of early-stage ventures by encouraging a more 
active venture capital market for these types of investments, e.g. through government- 
owned seed funds or through direct or indirect support for private VC funds. Also 
regulatory or fiscal measures that improve the conditions for venture capital financing 
or reduce the cost of research fall under this scope, as well as programs that facilitate 
contacts between investors and innovators/entrepreneurs.
Human resources for innovation. In order to encourage broad-based innovation, it is 
important to promote a well-educated workforce as a whole. Thus, the goal of policies 
under this theme is to increase the overall level of education. These include measures 
related to: 1) elementary and secondary education, in order to guarantee basic skills; 2) 
tertiary education, often with an emphasis on the sciences and engineering; and 3) adult 
education, with the aim of encouraging life-long learning and re-skilling the workforce if 
necessary. These measures thus seek to facilitate the access to skilled personnel, and
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ensure that the future skill base in the region/sector/country will correspond to the 
needs of enterprises for innovation.
Targeted technolog) support. These programs target support to specific fields or technologies 
that are considered to be of strategic importance; typically advanced technologies such 
as biotech or ICT. On the supply side of innovation, programs can e.g. assign 
earmarked funds to research and development in these strategic fields. On the demand 
side, programs can encourage firms and individuals to adopt new technologies, e.g. 
through subsidies for manufacturing equipment or broadband internet.
General innovation policy. Innovation policy is a broad and constantly evolving field. In 
Arundel and Hollander’s (2005) theme-based framework, this theme catches those 
measures that do not fit neatly into any of the themes above, such as measures that seek 
to increase the rate of non-technological innovation in enterprises. This type of 
innovation is important to recognize, as innovation policy often has an implicit focus on 
technological innovation, although other types of innovation may be equally important, 
most notably in the service sector.
All the above themes are naturally interrelated. For example, without the protection of 
intellectual property, it is difficult to increase the commercialization of research. 
Furthermore, as with SME policy, innovation policy has strong links to a range of other 
policy areas.
Innovation policy measures are typically targeted at firms of all sizes. A concrete 
example is the support of innovative industrial clusters, in which typically both big and 
small companies take part. Nevertheless, another discrete category that potentially could 
be added to Arundel and Hollanders’ (2005) thematic framework above would include 
directed measures related to the support of innovation in smallfirms. For these firms, the 
above categories of IPR and financing are naturally important, but measures can also be 
directed at increasing the number of new innovative firms, by reducing the bureaucracy 
involved in setting up these firms; providing infrastructure to facilitate their growth, e.g. 
through incubation centers, and favoring the entry of these firms into specific markets, 
e.g. through public purchasing of innovative products and services from small firms. 
Such a category would thus contain many measures similar to those of SME policy as 
discussed in the previous section.
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3.4 Relation between SME and Innovation policy
While the ultimate goals of SME policy and Innovation policy are similar, the 
philosophies and methods of these policies are somewhat different. Innovation policy 
sees the “knowledge economy” as a principal driver of growth (CEC 2002). By 
comparison, SME policy would consider the “entrepreneurial economy” as a principal 
driver. Nevertheless, while these policies are not the same, they are neither mutually 
exclusive.
In fact, it is evident in the sections above that several of the themes and types of 
measures employed by SME policy and Innovation policy respectively are remarkably 
similar. Figure 11 illustrates related themes.
.......... Related measures
SME policy Innovation policy
Financing
Entrepreneurship and firm creation 
Employment and human resources 
Innovation and technology 
Clusters, networks and partnerships 
SMEs in specific industries
R&D programs 
IPR policies
Commercialization of public research 
Innovation collaboration
Innovation finance
' Human resources for innovation
SMEs and globalization
Local development and social 
entrepreneurship
Women and minority entrepreneurs
Targeted technology support 
General innovation policy
Figure 11. Related measure types between SME policy and Innovation policy 
In terms of financing, both SME policy and Innovation pokey seek to and provide seed 
funding for young ventures and encourage both the formal (venture capital funds) and 
informal (business angels) venture capital market. In fact, within innovation pokey, the 
principal measures related to financing often target early-stage ventures specificaUy. 
Nevertheless, SME poEcy also has a strong focus on supporting bank loans for smaE 
firms that do not target rapid growth and innovation, while innovation poEcy also 
support large firms through e.g. tax breaks for R&D.
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In terms of the relation between firm creation in SME policy and commercialization of 
public research in Innovation policy, the (admittedly somewhat weak) connection lies in 
that both encourage the creation of spin-offs from universities and other public research 
institutions. Nevertheless, as university spin-offs constitute only a very small part of all 
start-ups, SME policy clearly takes a broader view by supporting all types of start-ups, 
e.g. through the reduction of red tape and a range of other structural policy measures.
Both SME and Innovation policy encourage R&D and technological development 
through various programs, although SME policy is more limited in focusing on solely on 
technological development within SMEs while innovation policy seeks to support 
research in both public institutions as well as in all types of private firms. Both types of 
policies also try to encourage a more active use of IPR, although innovation policy also 
here takes a somewhat broader perspective, both policies have a particular focus on 
supporting SMEs due to the typically low patenting rate of small firms.
Concerning human resources, an almost identical goal for SME and Innovation policy is 
to promote the general skill level of the population, particularly in the sciences and 
engineering. Furthermore, SME policy has an additional focus on training current as 
well as potential future entrepreneurs and managers, supporting micro-SMEs to grow, 
and encouraging an “entrepreneurial culture”.
An additional identical type of measures between SME policy and Innovation is the 
promotion of collaboration around innovation in clusters and networks. These clusters 
may be most effective when both large as well as small firms collaborate, and both types 
of policies also realize that there may be an important role to play for public research 
institutions within these clusters. Furthermore, both SME policy and Innovation policy 
employ the practice of targeting specific strategically important sectors - typically 
industries with high technology content - with additional support.
However, the largest differences between these types of policies lie in the focus of SME 
policy on social development and minority entrepreneurship, which have no equivalents 
in innovation policy, and in the broader view on innovation that innovation policy takes 
compared to SME policy.
Finally, it is unfortunately common to both SME policy and innovation policy measures 
that their effectiveness is very difficult to access. As a result, there are very few 
publications that would evaluate these policies. The publications that do exist and that
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also have been referred to above rather tend to list all practices instead of identifying or 
evaluating best practices.
3.5 High-growth policy
While no comprehensive definition of “high-growth policy” exists, it seems clear that 
this type of policy has its foundation in both SME policy and Innovation policy and can 
be argued to exist in the intersection of these policies. In fact, there is a convergent 
trend towards a greater cohesion between SME policy and Innovation policy that tends 
to strive towards what we may define as high-growth pohcy. SME poUcy is increasingly 
recognizing the importance of innovation, risk financing and clusters as important 
drivers of growth; while Innovation poEcy increasingly emphasizes the support of 
innovation driven by SMEs. For example, the European PAXIS program is aimed at 
identifying measures for supporting start-ups within the realm of innovation poEcy.
Nevertheless, based on the body of knowledge on firm growth and the current portfoEo 
of programs in SME and Innovation poEcy, it is possible to identify certain features that 
high-growth poEcy arguably should have in relation to SME and Innovation poEcy.
First, what should characterize high-growth poEcy is a high degree of selectivity. Since a 
majority of jobs are created by only a smaE group of aH SMEs and start-ups, high- 
growth poEcy programs should focus on these few “potential high-growth firms” 
instead of spreading resources equaEy to all firms. A concrete example concerns 
government seed funds that potentiaUy could apply stricter criteria when selecting 
investments, and thus e.g. invest 200.000 EUR in 10 firms instead of investing 10.000 
EUR in 200 firms. In terms of financing, governments should also put a greater 
emphasis on promoting equity financing (e.g. venture capital) in contrast to supporting 
bank loans, due to the high-risk nature of high-growth start-ups. The principle of 
“picking winners” could be appEed to other types of business support services as weE. 
Furthermore, it is important that business support services such as advice on growth or 
intemationaEzation are of a very high quaEty and thus relevant to high-growth firms.
A higher focus could also be appEed when encouraging people to pursue an 
entrepreneurial career. High-growth entrepreneurs are Ekely to have a higher than 
average education and more Ekely to be currently employed (GEM 2005). Thus, poEcy 
should to a higher degree prioritize encouraging also currently employed people to
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pursue an entrepreneurial career; a practice, however, which may be in conflict with 
common SME policy values such as social and regional development.
Another feature of high-growth policy would be to accept a high degree of dynamism 
and accept firm failure and bankruptcy. While SME policy often may focus on 
increasing entry rates and decreasing exit rates of firms, high-growth policy by 
comparison should focus on the quality and growth potential of new firms and accept 
firms exits as a normal consequence of an innovative and dynamic economy. Thus, 
potential high-growth entrepreneurs that have failed should be provided with a genuine 
chance to try again, e.g. through personal bankruptcy laws.
3.6 Key themes in high-growth policy
Based on the process of firm growth as well as the focus areas of SME policy and 
Innovation policy, a number of distinct themes emerge as key to high-growth policy. 
These themes concern financing of early-stage ventures, research and development, 
commercialization, internationalization, as well as the motivation of the entrepreneur. 
This section will briefly discuss the issues that need to be considered for effective 
policy-making within each of these themes.
3.6.1 Motivation
As we have seen in the previous chapter, motivation is a major determinant of the 
growth of firms. Therefore, high-growth policy measures will need to address 
entrepreneurs’ growth motivation. These measures are most likely to be effective if 
young firms and young entrepreneurs are explicitly targeted, since growth motivation 
tends to decrease substantially with the age of the firm (Evans 1987) as well as with the 
age of the entrepreneur (Boswell 1972).
Policies can also act on the environmental level and encourage a more positive attitude 
towards risk-taking and entrepreneurship through for example legislation and tax 
reforms (KTM 2004b; CEC 2006a).For example, tax incentives can be used to enable a 
larger economic upside to entrepreneurship and policies involving social security and 
bankruptcy laws can be important in order to limit the downside.
3.6.2 Financing
An adequate supply of capital is essential if high-growth firms are to be bom and grow 
in an economy. Not surprisingly, financial market development has been shown to have
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an effect on both the rate of new-firm births as well as firm growth (Rajan and Zingales 
1998; Kumar et al. 1999). While finance is crucial to any early-stage firm, firms that want 
to grow quickly can face disproportionately large obstacles due to the relative scarcity of 
risk financing.
Broadly, there are three stages of financing that entrepreneurs and firms need for 
growth: first, seed financing to establish a business plan and develop a product or 
service; second, start-up financing for start-up related costs such as investments in 
production and initial marketing; third, growth stage financing for expansion costs and 
continued development of new follow-on products or services (KTM 2004a). Of these, 
seed financing is typically the most difficult to obtain, due to the very high uncertainty at 
this stage.
Due to the high-risk of young ventures, business angel and venture capital financing are 
the most appropriate sources of capital for these firms. Nevertheless, it is often argued 
that there is a market failure in the supply of early-stage funding (e.g. CEC 2005d), a so- 
called “equity gap”. Studies in Finland (LTT-Tutkimus 2005), the UK (HM Treasury 
2003), and Australia (Australian Institute for Commercialisation 2004) have put the 
equity gap at 200.000-1M EUR. Proposed reasons for the equity gap include historically 
low returns on early-stage investments, at least in Europe (LTT-Tutkimus 2005); a high 
degree of uncertainty and information asymmetry between the entrepreneur and the 
financier (LTT-Tutkimus 2005); a lack of a sufficiently large business angel community 
(CEC 2006a); and a lack of venture capital funds in Europe that specialize in financing 
early-stage investments.
In order to address a scarcity of supply of early-stage financing, governments often start 
VC funds of their own. For example, in Finland, the government is the largest venture 
capitalist. Nevertheless, governments need to be careful not to crowd out private 
investment or distort prices in the market (Buss 2001). The EU has therefore argued 
that governmental VC funds should explicitly have a counter-cydical role in order to 
not crowd out private investment in early-stage ventures (CEC 2006a). Alternatively, 
governments can subsidize the private VC market through e.g. public/private co­
investments schemes (CEC 2005d; LTT-Tutkimus 2005) or tax incentives for private 
individuals that invest directly in early-stage firms. An asymmetric profit model has been 
argued to be the support principle with the highest effectiveness and the least distorting 
effect on the markets (Maula and Murray 2003). An asymmetric profit model also seems
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appropriate since private investors usually take a bigger role in the management of the 
funded firm than do the public investors. Another often-used approach is to arrange 
training and networking events for business angels and set up forums where potential 
investors can meet with entrepreneurs.
Governments can also address the demand-side of early stage financing by providing 
entrepreneurs with the skill and experience to make their firms “investment-worthy” 
(KTM 2004a). Typical training for entrepreneurs involves information on financing 
alternatives and on how to approach finance providers such as banks, business angels 
and venture capitalists (CEC 2005c).
3.6.3 Research, commercialization and technological 
development
In order to remain competitive in the global market, growing firms continuously need to 
innovate and thus generate novel products and services. This high-growth theme 
generally involves three goals: to create wholly new innovative firms through the 
commercialization of new technologies and spin-offs; to encourage existing firms to 
become more innovative; and more broadly, to improve the technological and 
innovative level of the society as a whole.
Spending on these types of R&D measures typically represents the largest share of 
public financing to support innovation, and this support can be in the form of direct 
financial support for applied R&D in the public research sector, or either direct or 
indirect financial support for business sector R&D and innovation (Arundel and 
Hollanders 2005)
In order to support new technological-based firms, measures can e.g. support the IP 
protection of technologies, proof of concept or prototyping activities, as well as market 
analysis activities for the innovation. These activities in may be particularly important 
for policy measures to target since these typically are carried out at an early stage where 
technologies are unproven and the market uncertain, and thus a valuation of the firm is 
extremely challenging which in turn makes raising external equity financing difficult.
The protection of its intellectual property in particular has been put forth as a critical 
issue for small firms to secure a competitive advantage through their innovations and 
thus be able to raise risk capital (CEC 2006a; Arundel and Hollanders 2005).
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To support the commercialization of research, universities should be given larger 
incentives to license their technologies to firms (CEC 2005d). For example, in Finland, 
research-derived business ideas emerge at universities at an annual rate of around 500 
(Speech by Minister of Trade and Industry, Mauri Pekkarinen, 30.9.2004). However, 
European countries have traditionally been quite weak in turning this research into new 
innovative products and services (CEC 2006a). Support measures can also improve the 
infrastructure for innovation, e.g. through incubators, science parks and knowledge 
transfer organizations.
To support industrial innovation, smart use of directed R&D grants and fiscal incentives 
for industry seems to be the most effective support measure — especially if these 
incentives are used in the context of coordinated innovation initiatives and clusters 
(CEC 2006a). While it has been argued that tax incentives can provide a simpler way to 
support firm research and innovation than grants (CEC 2002), the use of tax incentives 
can lead to less flexibility in targeting specific innovations and technologies, while they 
are also unlikely to favor small high-growth firms since these firms typically do not 
make a profit. Tax incentives have also been suggested to be “addictive” and create 
subsidy-dependent firms (Buss 2001).
Support measures can also address the demand-side of innovation. According to a 
report by the European Commission, “demand-side deficiency is the primary barrier to 
investment in research and innovation in Europe”, and policy has a role to play by 
acting as a lead user and thus encouraging an innovation-friendly market (CEC 2006a).
3.6.4 Business development
It will arguably be important for high-growth policy to not only target technological 
capabilities, but also support the business capabilities of the firm. The entrepreneur or 
the original management team of a high-growth firm are not uncommonly technically 
oriented and may not possess the skills required to lead the firm through a growth 
process. Therefore, these firms need to be able to attract competent management 
personnel as well as access professional business advice.
In order to attract good management and employees, high-growth firms will need to use 
financial instruments such as options. Therefore, in order to support these firms, the 
taxation and regulatory treatment of employee options should be favorable so that
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options are seen as a feasible and efficient tool for attracting and retaining high-quality 
human resources in the firm.
High-growth firms will typically need highly sophisticated professional business sendees 
that are customized for the needs of each firm. To facilitate access to professional 
business services, these sendees can be subsidized e.g. through “service checks” (KTM 
2004b). This approach may contribute towards a related goal for policy to develop the 
small-firm specific capabilities and competencies of private-sector providers of 
professional business services, such as consultants, accountants and bankers. Business 
coaching programs constitute another common way to support the business 
development of firms and broker access to professional business services.
3.6.5 Internationalization
Firms that want to grow quickly — especially those in countries with small domestic 
markets - often need to go through an early internationalization process. Meanwhile, 
trading internationally can be expensive for young firms due to high fixed costs of 
internationalization activities. Costs accrue for attending trade shows, establishing sales 
and market channels, customer support, attracting internationally competent employees, 
and adapting products to the tastes of customers in a different market.
Many countries have so-called Export Promotion Organizations (EPOs) that are 
exclusively dedicated to promoting the international activities of domestic firms. The 
specific goals for EPOs, according to Seringhaus and Botschen (1991), are: 1) to 
develop a broad awareness of export opportunities and to stimulate interest for export 
in the business community; 2) assist firms in the planning and preparation for export 
market involvement; 3) assist firms in acquiring the needed expertise and know-how 
successfully to enter and develop export markets; and d) support such foreign market 
activity tangibly through organizational help and cost-sharing programs.
Internationalization support measures that can be considered the most crucial for bom 
global firms include support for concept testing in major markets (KTM 2004a) as well 
as support that facilitates access to managers with international experience.
Nevertheless, many national EPO provisions are geared towards the internationalization 
needs of ‘traditional’ domestic-based firms, and do not cater to the specific needs of 
born globals (Bell et al. 2003). For example, bom globals typically have little need for 
‘export stimulation’ while any standardized market information may not specific enough
57
Chapter 3. SME policy and Innovation policy
to serve the needs of these global niche-players. Furthermore, the need for financing of 
born globals that often enter several international markets simultaneously may be 
greater than the offered levels of EPO support.
Policy measures can also work to reduce barriers to entry for small firms by 
harmonizing national regulations. A related issue is the need to harmonize and simplify 





The goal for the empirical part of this study is to identify and analyze the characteristics 
of successful support measures for high-growth firms. For this purpose, support 
measures from 9 different countries have been collected, filtered, analyzed and 
compared.
This study largely follows the tradition of qualitative research. Since the phenomena of 
support measures, their context and effects are highly complex, I considered a multiple- 
case study to be the most appropriate research method. A case study can be used when 
investigating a phenomenon within its real-Hfe context when the boundaries between 
phenomena and context are not clearly defined (Yin 1994), it is an appropriate method 
in new topic areas (Eisenhardt 1989) and in coping with situations where there will be 
many more variables of interest than data points. The unit of analysis for the case study 
is the individual policy support measure.
While it might have been possible to generate some relevant results also using more 
quantitative methods, any results or conclusions of such an analysis would still need to 
be explained through in-depth analyses of the successful measures to verify and 
understand the apparent success factors. Using regressions was not considered a viable 
alternative, since it is extremely difficult to identify and code all relevant variables for 
such an analysis to be sufficiendy robust; the researcher would not only need to identify 
all relevant variables of the support measure itself, but also capture those of the national 
environment or context of the support measure. Another alternative method would 
have been to carry out a case study on successful high-growth firms while identifying 
and analyzing what policy support measures these firms have benefited from. However, 
such a method was not considered to yield as relevant results as the employed method, 
since many support measures for high-growth SMEs are very new and considering that 
the time from firm birth to success typically is as long as 5-7 years (Hanks et al. 1993).
Nevertheless, consistent with the case study research tradition, I will employ 
triangulation between several methods. I will use within-case analyses of the most 
successful measures as the principal method of analysis. Within-case analyses have been 
recognized as central to the generation of insight (Eisenhardt 1989; Pettigrew 1990),
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since they offer a structured way to deal with and gain a close familiarity with enormous 
amounts of data. Second, I will compare these successful measures and identify 
commonalities (across-case analysis). Furthermore, all support measures, including those 
that were not separately described and analyzed, will be grouped in emergent categories 
of similar measures for a subsequent across-case analysis between measures within the 
same category. Third, when appropriate, I will also employ statistical analysis of various 
coded variables. This method will mainly serve to provide indicative evidence and 
illustration of insights and claims. By using multiple methods, I have thus sought to 
combine both qualitative and quantitative data in order to create a more synergistic view 
of the evidence (Eisenhardt 1989).
4.1 Data collection
In order to develop comprehensive data on relevant support measures from a 
sufficiently broad range of countries, the study was organized as a collaborative effort 
between research teams participating in the Global Entrepreneurship Monitor (GEM) 
consortium fwww.gemconsortium.org). The selection of countries from which cases 
were sampled was opportunistic as national teams volunteered to participate in the 
study. The following countries and teams participated:
Table 4. Participating countries and teams
Country Participating institution Team leader Team
researcher
Main sponsor
Australia Swinburne University of 
Technology
Kevin Kindle John Yencken Westpac Banking
Corporation














Ministry of Trade and
Industry




Hugh Thomas Trade and Industry 
Department
Hungary University of Pecs Laszlo Szerb Csapö
Krisztiån
Ministry of Economy and 
Transport
Italy Bocconi University Guido Corbetta Alexandra
Dawson
Bocconi University






Dutch Ministry of Economic 
Affairs
Spain Instituto de Empresa Ignacio de la 
Vega
Alicia Coduras Fundaciön cultural Banesto
UK University of Glamorgan David
Brooksbank
Elin Aaron Welsh Development
Agency
Within each individual country, the samphng of cases was based on theoretical sampHng 
through a network approach (a “snowbalhng” technique). That is, cases were rather 
purposely than randomly chosen. This method does not portend to produce a 
representative sample or a complete portfoho of all measures that are directed at high- 
growth SMEs, but rather generate a selection of a number of measures that poEcy
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makers themselves consider important, successful or novel. Thus, although the sample 
is neither random nor exhaustive, it ensures a good representation from the “top-end” 
of the policy spectrum.
While the non-random choice of countries and cases may raise some questions in terms 
of the generalizability of the approach, the voluntary participation of national teams in 
the GEM research consortium and the purposeful sampling of cases were considered 
extremely valuable in order to better access and leverage the expertise and experience of 
domestic researchers and policy makers. For example, Patton (1990) notes that the main 
benefit of purposeful sampling is that it may lead to more information-rich cases. Thus, 
on the whole this approach was considered to lead to better constructs and insights.
Since the study mainly takes a Finnish perspective, support measures from countries 
which are similar in economic structure and development to Finland were assumed to 
be the ones that would produce insights with the highest external validity and relevance. 
Nevertheless, support measures from other countries were also considered valuable 
given that caution always must be exercised when transferring support measures and 
lessons learned across regional and national boundaries.
The teams were given significant freedom in independently identifying and choosing 
support measures that were targeted at high-growth firms in their country. This was 
done in order not to influence the sampling e.g. towards any particular type of measure.
The following instructions were provided to the teams for guiding the process:
• Identify 4-5 policy measures directed at high-growth entrepreneurial companies 
and interview policy makers about each policy measure. Use a snowballing 
technique to identify relevant high-growth policy measures and knowledgeable 
policy makers.
• Provide a detailed description of each identified policy measure. Also collect 
relevant background materials, including reports, brochures, interview notes and 
weblinks.
In order to collect comparable data from all countries, the most important data for each 
measure was described and reported in the form of a centrally designed summary sheet. 
The summat)' sheet used by the majority of teams is included in Appendix 1.
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The material was collected between October 2005 and June 2006. There was an overlap 
of data collection and analysis, which part was intentional in order to focus the research, 
and part necessary as the teams reported their data at different times throughout the 
project. Nevertheless, this overlap provided an opportunity to make some helpful 
adjustments to the data collection process based on the emergent finding and feedback 
from the teams. Thus, during the course of the study, some changes were made to the 
summary sheet in response to feedback from the teams to clarify any ambiguous terms 
or to include additional information on the measures that was considered relevant.
The information that was collected for each measure included the following:
1. Basic information: name of measure; year started; contact information; website
2. Organization of the measure: participating institutions; budget; main financiers; 
number of staff
3. Operational data: description of the form of support; focus of the support, including 
targeted resource bottleneck, firm life cycle stage, and industry/sector
4. Results: number of firms or projects processed in total and annually; other relevant 
quantitative performance data; a qualitative evaluation of the measure (not 
successful / somewhat successful / successful / very successful); notable success 
stories
5. Lessons learned: what was found to work well, what was changed, how the initiative 
would be changed today; comments
While some of the data was “hard” and thus could be easily obtained from published 
materials and interviews, some of the data required a certain level of discretion and 
analysis of the teams, e.g. in order to evaluate the successfulness and the lessons learned 
for each measure.
The reported data on the measures was triangulated with archival data, using the web as 
the principal source. I also took comprehensive field notes while analyzing the measures 
as well as in multiple discussions with researchers from the other national GEM teams, 
which provided important additional insights.
I also opportunistically checked and discussed emerging insights, ideas and constructs in 
interviews with other researchers and in the semi-structured interviews that I carried out 




Table 5. Interviewed experts in Finland
Interviewee Date Organization Support measure
Kimmo Hyrsky March 16, 2006 Finnish Ministry of Trade and Industry n/a
Pertti Valtonen March 20, 2006 Finnish Ministry of Trade and Industry AISP
Juha Saapunki and 
Jusa Susia
March 23, 2006 SME Foundation PKT Growth Firm Service
Heli Kukko May 24, 2006 National Technology Agency TEKES Research into Business 
(TULI)
Risto Kalske June 6, 2006 Finnish National Fund for Research 
and Development (Sitra)
INTRO
Stock exchange data was also requested from the teams for the country’s top 20 firms in 
1984, 1994, and 2004, and from the history of the country’s “new market”. Originally, I 
intended to use this data for making assessments on the volatility and growth of 
innovative firms in the different countries. However, this data was dropped from 
further analysis since relevant data could be obtained from only very few countries, due 
to e.g. a lack of a “new market” or a limited history of the market.
4.2 Data analysis
Data for a total of 88 cases was collected in the data collection phase. Of these, 41 cases 
were dropped from further analysis. The reason for leaving these cases out was either 
due to too limited data which made an analysis impossible (36 measures); or that a case 
was not relevant as an example of a public policy support measure - these included 
private sector initiatives or governmental laws and decrees (5 measures).
I also assessed whether some cases should be further filtered out on the grounds that 
they were not necessarily relevant to high-growth SMEs. Such cases would include 
support measures that targeted mainly larger firms or measures that benefited all small 
firms regardless of growth ambition. However, I chose not to make this further 
distinction since there would be no grounds on which to draw a line that would be 
sufficiendy non-arbitrary, and with respect to the teams that had already sampled these 
cases as relevant examples of support measures for high-growth firms.
After filtering, 47 cases remained for the analysis. The number of cases per participating 
country ranged from 2 to 9, as illustrated in Table 6.
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Table 6. Number of measures per participating country 










For the analysis, I used a tabular form for arranging and providing an overview of the 
data (as suggested by e.g. Miles and Huberman 1994). For this purpose, I codified as 
much of the relevant data as possible - including data from the summary sheets, 
background materials, and interviews - in an excel sheet. The rows in the sheet 
represented individual measures, while the columns represented relevant dimensions of 
the data. In addition to facilitating within-case analyses, the tabular form facilitated 
comparison of the data across measures. When appropriate, I also carried out frequency 
and other statistical analyses on the data to facilitate the generation of insight.
I compared similar measures from different countries and made some adjustments in 
order to ensure a good level of consistency across countries. Furthermore, in order to 
facilitate construct validity for the cases, the codified information was re-distributed to 
each team and the teams were given a chance to confirm or make edits to the 
information (as suggested by Yin 1994). A number of minor changes to the codified 
data were suggested by the teams and the data was updated based on this feedback.
The resultant sheet of measures is attached in Appendix 2.
In case research, there is always a trade-off between analyzing a few very detailed cases 
in-depth or analyzing a larger number cases in less detail. This trade-off was dealt with 
using the approach that out of the 47 cases, the 25 support measures that were 
considered the most successful were described and analyzed separately (within-case 
analysis) in section 5.1 and compared with other successful cases (across-case analysis) 
and used for generating successful characteristics of measures in section 5.2. The 
remaining measures were not described and analyzed separately but nevertheless used 
for the generation of aggregate categories of measure (in the beginning of section 5.3). 
Furthermore, all measures within each category were compared with each other and 
analyzed as a group in order to generate good practices for each type of measure.
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The choice to separately describe and analyze only the most successful measures was 
made in order to concentrate on best-practice measures, which is coherent with the 
goals of the study to identify good practices. One of my underlying assumptions is thus 
that good measures have more in common than poor measures (in Tolstoy’s words, 
“happy families are all alike; every unhappy family is unhappy in its own way”), and that 
we therefore can learn more from looking at the commonalities of successful cases.
However, by doing this, I somewhat limit the opportunity to compare and contrast 
successful measures with less successful measures. Nevertheless, this opportunity was 
regarded as rather small, since the snow-balling method used for data collection was 
assumed to skew the distribution towards more successful measures as interviewees 
were assumed to generally be inclined to talk about success stories and not failures. This 
is also confirmed by the distribution of the successfulness of the measures, as illustrated 
in Table 7. Out of the 47 measures, 16 were regarded “very successful”, 21 as 
“successful”, 3 as “somewhat successful”, and 2 as “not successful”; 5 measures were 
not evaluated by the teams, due e.g. to the newness of the measure or lack of data.
Table 7. Success of reported measures_______






The 25 cases that were selected for detailed study contain all 16 measures that have been 
classified as “very successful” and 9, or about half, of those classified as “successful”. 
The measures classified as “successful” have been sampled as to first include measures 
from countries that classified none or few measures as “very successful”. Where very 
many equally successful measures existed, the measures were sampled based on the 
degree to which they focused exclusively on high-growth SMEs.
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5 Analysis and results
The analysis starts with a within-case description and simultaneous analysis of each of 
the 25 support measures that were selected for detailed study. After this, I will discuss 
across-case commonalties, success factors and lessons learned for the selected cases. 
Next, I present a categorization and a thematic framework for high-growth policy 
measures, and analyze and compare the measures within each theme separately. This 
categorization and related across-case analysis is based on all measures, i.e. not only 
those selected for detailed study. Finally, I will apply all measures to selected 
frameworks from the previous sections.
5.1 Case descriptions and within-case analysis
This section will present a case descriptions and concurrent analyses for the 25 support 
measures that were selected for a more detailed analysis. It was necessary to limit the 
cases as a separate analysis of all 47 measures that were reported for this study was not 
possible. Yin (1994) proposes that when selecting cases to study, the researcher should 
focus on critical cases, extreme or unique cases, or revelatory cases. For this study, I 
chose to concentrate on the 25 most successful cases. Furthermore, in order to simplify the 
structure of the thesis and group all relevant information for each case in one place, I 
have chosen to combine the case description with the with-in case analysis for each 
each.
Each case description contains the basic characteristics of the measure followed by an 
account of the results and a brief analysis of good practices and lessons learned. The 
descriptions vary in length since the information that was obtained for different cases 
varied.
5.1.1 Australia
5.1.1.1 Commercial Ready Program
www.ausindustrv.gov.au
The Commercial Ready Program was started in 2004 by the Australian Department of 
Industry, Tourism and Resources. The program offers grants to SMEs for 
commercialization activities, and it has been regarded as very successful.
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Description
The commercial ready program provides competitive merit-based grants to SMEs for 
commercialization activities, for R&D activities with high commercial potential, and for 
proof-of-concept activities. The program supports both R&D in new ventures as well as 
applied research leading to new innovations by established SMEs.
The aims of the program are to support Australian businesses in the technology sector 
to develop innovative products and processes, and to encourage collaboration between 
industry and research institutions.
The grants range from 30.000 EUR to 3 MEUR, and they require matching 
contributions by the receiving firms. Thus, the grants can be considered subsidies for 
commercialization activities. The program is exclusively targeted at SMEs in any stage of 
development and projects can be supported for up to 3 years.
The program was started in 2004 by Auslndustry, which is part of the Australia 
Department of Industry Tourism and Resources. The budget of the program is 120 
MEUR annually until 2011.
Results and Lessons Learned
In 2005-06, 600 firms were supported through the program. The average support was 
approximately 200.000 EUR per firm.
The program is generally considered very successful. It is highly regarded by firms and 
there are more applicants than funds available.
However, due to the requirement of matching contributions, access to the program is in 
effect limited to firms that already have significant financial resources. It is thus rarely 
accessible for very young firms that do not already have a steady cash flow. An 
exception is start-up firms that have already received some type of VC financing, for 
whom the Commercial Ready program can function as a supplementary source of 
funding.
Nevertheless, the program is particularly useful to SMEs in the expansion stage, e.g. to 
support the funding of product customization activities for a new market. The program 
can thus contribute to an increased growth motivation for established SMEs by 
promoting the continued development of new products and product lines.
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5.1.1.2 Commercializing Emerging Technologies (COMET)
http://www.ausindustrv.qov.au/index.cfm
The COMET program is a very successful program started by the Australian 
Department of Industry, Tourism, and Resources in 1999. The program sponsors 
commercialization of new technologies by subsidizing business development services 
for technology-based ventures.
Description
The program provides subsidies of 80% for business development activities such as 
marketing, commercialization, and IPR management services to individuals (e.g. 
researchers) and small firms in their early stages who want to commercialize a new 
technology and target significant growth. Examples of supported activities include 
market research, product trials, and patenting. The program is competitive and the 
services are offered through a network of affiliated private sectors advisors. The criteria 
by which applicants are selected are that the firms: (1) must be looking to grow 
substantially through the commercialization of an innovative product, process or 
service; (2) have identified weaknesses that are preventing them from implementing a 
commercialization strategy; and (3) are unable to fund activities to address these 
weaknesses.
The annual budget for the program is 6,5 MEUR, and the typical size of support is 
50.000 EUR per firm or project. A 50% subsidy for an additional 50.000 EUR can be 
obtained in a second stage of the program. The program targets all technology sectors.
Results and Lessons Learned
Thus far, the program has assisted 300 firms. The program has been extended and 
expanded and was rated as very successful in an independent review prior to its 
continuation. For example, in the five years to July 2004, firms supported under 
COMET raised around 215 MEUR in capital and created over 500 strategic alliances, 
licenses, and other agreements. The program has also been shown to increase the 
motivation of participating firms. However, there has been a shortage of experienced 
people in specialist areas that can assist the firms over the full 12 months of support. 
The network of affiliated advisors is currently being expanded to cover a larger area of 
expertise.
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5.1.1.3 Co-Operative Research Centres
www.crc.qov.au
The Co-Operative Research Centres program was started by the Australia Department 
of Education, Science and Training in 1990. The program attempts to bridge the gap of 
research commercialization by sponsoring partnerships between public research 
institutions and the research units of private firms.
Description
The program works by establishing joint private-public research partnerships in select 
strategic sectors and technologies. There are approximately 70 established co-operative 
research centers in 6 sectors: environment, agriculture, ICT, mining, medical science, 
technology and manufacturing.
The CRC program addresses the issue of turning research into innovations and 
marketable products and services. The fundamental idea is to “bring together 
researchers and research users” in the form of universities and private firms respectively, 
and thus function as a bridge from basic research, via applied research, to 
commercialization. An example of a CRC is the Cooperative Research Centre for 
Greenhouse Gas Technologies. In the centre, researchers from 7 universities and public 
research institutions collaborate with researchers from 6 private firms such as BHP 
Billington, BP, as well as from governmental agencies to create a leading research 
organization in the field for developing technologies that reduce carbon-dioxide 
emissions.
The CRC program also has a strong education component through which it seeks to 
train skilled graduates in the targeted technologies.
The government is the main financier of the research, but private firms also participate 
in the funding of the program. Over 12 years, 5.8 billion EUR has been committed to 
the program and approximately 600 projects have been supported.
Results and Lessons Learned
A recent rigid and conservative review of the program showed that “the Australian 
economy's overall performance has been considerably enhanced when compared to the 
performance that would have incurred in its absence".
The program can be seen as a step towards establishing a certain critical mass of 
researchers and resources in order to successfully develop new technologies in strategic
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sectors. While the research centers typically do not involve small firms or new start-ups, 
the program has a solid record of generating spin-offs with high survival and growth 
rates.
However, while some important steps towards more effective research 
commercialization have been taken with the program, the evaluation noted that in 
“submissions, discussions and consultations there was a strong view that the CRC 
Program should have a much greater orientation towards commercialization” and thus 
have a greater focus on delivering industrial, commercial and economic outcomes. 
Therefore, for the selection rounds in 2006 and 2008, CRC applicants are required to 
demonstrate clear paths to commercialization and utilization and strong industry 
commitment; contributions by partner organizations must at least match program 
funding; and CRCs are also required to describe their contribution to achieving the 
National Research Priority Goals.
5.1.1.4 Innovation Investment Fund
http://www.ausindustrv.aov.au/index.cfm 
Innovation Investment Fund is a venture capital scheme created by the Australia 
Department of Industry, Tourism and Resources in 1998. Through this program, the 
government co-invests in early-stage equity companies together with private venture 
capital funds. The scheme has been considered very successful.
Description
Under the program, the government has licensed nine licensed private sector venture 
capital managers that provide venture capital to small, technology-based firms at the 
seed, start-up or early expansion stages of development. About one third of the capital 
is provided by private investors or VC funds, while the government provides the 
remaining share.
The aim of the scheme is threefold: first, to encourage the growth and development of 
new technology-based firms through the supply of venture capital; second, to develop a 
self-sustaining early-stage VC market in Australia; third, to develop experienced fund 
managers that are knowledgeable in early-stage VC investments.
The program provides for asymmetrical payoff, benefiting the private-sector investors. 
When distributing returns, both the government and the private-sector investors first 
receive an amount equivalent to their subscribed capital and interest on that capital. Any
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further capital gains are shared on a 10 per cent to 90 per cent basis between 
government and private-sector investors. The private-sector investors’ returns are 
shared with the fund manager as a performance incentive for the fund manager.
The total size of the funds is currently 65 MEUR, of which the government has 
contributed the equivalent of 44 MEUR. The government plans to invest an additional 
7,8 MEUR during 2006.
Results and Lessons Learned
Approximately 75 firms have received funding through the program. The program is 
currently being evaluated but can generally be considered successful. The government 
has made a profit on its share of investment.
Nevertheless, although the program has been designed to be a scheme that supplies 
venture capital to early-stage firms, in practice, most participating firms have been in 
later stages of development. The program has established criteria for what type of firms 
that can funded through the scheme, but due to investor risk averseness, the invested 
capital has tended to go towards more mature ventures. Therefore, for the continuation 
of the program, the scheme is being redesigned in order to provide strong support for 
earlier-stage firms.
5.1.2 Brazil
5.1.2.1 Pappe - Program for Supporting Research in Enterprises
www.finep.qov.br/proqramas/pappe.asp
The Pappe Research Support Program was started by FINEP (the Brazilian Financing 
Agency for Studies and Projects) in 2004. This successful program promotes innovation 
and commercialization by providing grants to researchers and individuals in small firms 
for product development activities.
Description
The program provides grants to researchers for collaborative efforts with small 
companies around new product or process development. The receiving researcher does 
not need to supply matching funds. The program is similar to the Small Business 
Innovation Research Program (SBIR) in the US.
The supported researcher must be affiliated with a small firm in a technological sector, 
and the supported projects should be in a ‘pre-commercialization’ phase. By fostering
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interaction between researchers and small firms, these firms can function as vehicles for 
bringing innovations to market. The program targets the manufacturing sector with an 
emphasis on high-technology products.
The annual budget for the program is 66 MEUR. FINEP carries out the program in 
collaboration with the S&T Foundations in 20 states, which locally select the projects to 
be funded and provide matching funds.
Results and Lessons Learned
The program has generally been regarded as successful. In the year from 2004 to 2005, 
537 firms were supported.
Compared to other research commercialization programs in Brazil, which often benefit 
large firms, Pappe focuses on supporting the development and the innovative activities 
of small firms. Another somewhat unusual aspect is that the grant is provided to the 
researcher and not to the firm.
While a national program, the execution of the Pappe program is administered at the 
regional level. This collaboration between state- and regional-level innovation support 
activities has been considered an important goal in the project. Thus, besides fostering 
interaction between researchers and high-tech based firms for developing innovative 
projects, it is expected that Pappe will contribute to the convergence and consolidation 
of the local and national innovation systems.
5.1.2.2 PROGEX - Export Technology Support Program
www.cetec.br/proaex/
The PROGEX export technology support program was started by the Brazilian 
Ministry of Science and Technology in 2001. The program seeks to improve the 
technological capabilities of export-oriented SMEs. The program has been successful in 
significantly increasing the value of exports of participating firms.
Description
PROGEX is a federal program established to stimulate Brazilian exports through micro- 
and small companies by improving the technological capabilities of these firms. The 
goal is to increase Brazilian exports and substitute imports. The program targets firms in 
all industrial, arts and crafts sectors, which are in the expansion and maturity stages of
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development and that already export or are planning to expand into international 
markets.
The goal of the program is to ‘reduce technical barriers’ to trade by subsidizing various 
technology-related activities that are required to enter foreign markets. Examples of 
supported activities include technology consulting, logistics planning, and product 
modifications to meet the requirements of foreign markets. For example, the program 
can provide approximately 8.000 EUR per product adjustment for a particular market. 
These adjustments include e.g. changes to design and packaging as well as adaptation 
and compliance to international technical and quality standards.
The annual budget for the program is 7.8 MEUR, and more than one hundred firms are 
supported annually.
Results and Lessons Learned
The program appears to be successful in significantly increasing exports of the 
participating SMEs, in opening up new international markets, and in generating new 
exporting companies. So far, the program has assisted 270 firms.
The program may be considered successful in that it in a very concrete way can support 
firms to reach new markets with their products by e.g. meeting required quality 
standards. A lesson learned is that federal programs need to be able to reach into 
different country regions in order to have a larger impact.
Nevertheless, the program takes a traditional approach to internationalization and does 
not as such seem to recognize the special needs of born global firms. Furthermore, this 
type of measure may be most suitable in emerging economies where the technological 
capability of SMEs is still catching up with that of firms in the most technologically 
developed nations.
5.1.3 Finland
5.1.3.1 Growth Firm Service
No website
The Growth Firm Service program was started in 2003 by the Finnish Ministry of Trade 
and Industry. The program seeks to proactively identify firms and entrepreneurs with a 
high growth potential and direct these to appropriate services offered by various public 
agencies that support SMEs and innovation. This successful program is implemented as
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a cooperative effort between these agencies, and it is coordinated by the independent 
SME foundation PKT.
Description
The goal of the program is to act as a ‘one-touch shop’ for public services relevant to 
growing firms. Four major public agencies that offer services to SMEs in Finland 
participate in the program, and through the contact with a business consultant in one of 
these agencies, a firm can get information about and be referred to appropriate services 
offered by all four institutions. These institutions are Finpro (Internationalization 
services), Finnvera (State-owned financing company), Sitra (Finnish National Fund for 
Research and Development), and TE-keskus (Regional Employment and Development 
Centers).
Consultants in all of the agencies proactively seek to identify promising growth firms. 
When identified, the consultant offers a growth analysis session with the firm, and based 
on the growth analysis, specific needs for achieving growth are prioritized and the firm 
is referred to appropriate services offered by the four participating institutions.
In total, there are approximately 100 different support services that can be offered by 
the participating institutions to the firms. The majority of these support measures 
concern financing, since financing is the main activity for 3 of the 4 participating 
institutions, while the fourth institution is focused on support for internationalization.
The target group of firms consists of SMEs with a high-growth potential, regardless of 
sector or industry. Nevertheless, most participating firms are technology companies, 
since these companies may often be more interested in the offered services. These firms 
are often in the expansion stages of development since firms younger than this may not 
yet be recognized (“on the radar screen”) of the public business consultants. The 
youngest firms are often born globals or firms with a particularly strong technology- 
focus.
Each consultant or service is financed by the institution offering that consultant or 
service. It is estimated that approximately 300-400 people spend around 10-15% of their 
time on offering growth services. The cooperation between the institutions is 
coordinated by the private SME Foundation PKT and is financed by the Finnish 
Ministry of Trade and Industry. The budget for the coordination and follow-up of the 
program is 0,5 MEUR per annum.
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Results and Lessons Learned
The growth firm service is distinctive because of its explicit focus on high-growth firms. 
The program is still being phased in, and it has been approximately one year in 
operation. So far, 300 growth firms have been identified and received a growth analysis 
through the program. This corresponds to approximately one firm per business 
consultant. It is thus clear that the number of firms that are supported through the 
program has room to grow significantly, although no target for the number of firms to 
be processed has been set. The total population of potential growth firms in Finland is 
estimated to be in the range of 2.000 - 30.000, depending on the definition of growth. 
The growth rates of the participating companies has not been analyzed yet, but an 
analysis will be carried out when enough time series data is available.
The program is generally considered to be successful. The participating firms have been 
very happy with the service, especially with the aspect of being approached proactively 
and provided with only one contact person who can broker all services. Very few of the 
approached firms have declined a growth analysis,; those few firms that have done so 
have argued that they do not need any of the services that the four participating 
institutions have to offer.
A key lesson has been that the coordination of four public institutions is quite 
challenging. Each institution has different working methods, values, and they may also 
have different objectives. It has also proven difficult to engage all of the regional 
institutions and business consultants in the program, and diere has been a large variation 
in the degree of activity. Furthermore, the skill of consultants varies significantiy; this is 
important to realize, as the success of the program to a large degree depends on the 
quality of the consultants who approach the firms.
The current focus in developing the program is on further building buy-in throughout 
the participating institutions, spreading joint best practices, and thus evening out 
regional differences. Efforts are also being made to approach also companies that do 
not belong to the natural group of clients of the four participating institutions; these 
include e.g. more traditional mature companies that have a renewed motivation to grow. 
In the future, the concept could be further developed to cover not only financing for 
R&D/technology which is the current focus, but also e.g. marketing/sales and other 
needs of firms.
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In all, the measure is quite original in that it acts as an interface to all the services of 
major public support institutions and is proactive in finding high-growth potentials and 
directing these firms to the appropriate services. The practice can thus be recommended 




The INTRO program was started in 2002 by Sitra, the Finnish National Fund for 
Research and Development. This very successful program seeks to correct a perceived 
market inefficiency in the financing of early-stage ventures by functioning as an interface 
between entrepreneurs and private investors (business angels). The program offers an 
online marketplace and a trade-show for business ideas that are available to private 
investors, advice on business plans, and courses and workshops in private equity 
investments for both entrepreneurs and investors.
Description
The main purpose of the program is to facilitate contacts between investors (primarily 
business angels) and entrepreneurs. This is realized through a contact forum online and 
tradeshows where young firms and new entrepreneurs can present their business ideas 
to potential financial backers. All entrepreneurs and investors are required to sign non­
disclosure agreements. In order to participate, potential investors must be classified as 
‘professional investors’. The program also provides training in e.g. early-stage financing, 
contracting, and valuation for entrepreneurs and investors.
In addition to facilitating contacts between investors and entrepreneurs, the program 
can also co-invest with business angels in firms to up to 50% of the total investment. 
When needed, the program can also support the formation of syndicates between 
several private and public investors.
One aim of the program is to promote the investment readiness of early-stage 
businesses and facilitate their access to early financing rounds. The program also seeks 
to promote the development of a private venture capital and business angel market in 
Finland. A secondary goal is to reduce the cyclicality of the venture funding market.
The program supports growth-oriented firms in knowledge-based sectors, including 
technology-based sectors and professional services. Participating firms are typically in
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the seed or start-up stage. Some early-growth stage companies have also participated, 
but a criterion is that the firms have not yet received external funding.
The program was started in 2002 and is run and funded by the Finnish National Fund 
for Research and Development (Sitra). The budget for the program is 1,2 MEUR for 
coordination, and in addition, the fund invests 1 MEUR annually in start-ups. This 
funding is matched annually by approximately 4 MET JR of private investments.
Results and Lessons Learned
So far, 150 firms have participated in the program, of which 30% have raised funding. 
Last year, 40 firms participated in the program, and 14 of these firms received financing. 
On average, the firms raise an average of 350.000 EUR. This equity investment is 
typically supplemented with public capital loans and research grants, bringing the typical 
total financing up to approximately 1 MEUR per firm.
In total, 300 business angels participate in the program. Of these, about 200 participate 
actively in screening deals. As a group, the business angels have declared that they are 
prepared to invest up to 40 MEUR in young firms.
The program is considered very successful. One measure of success is that 5 
participating companies have raised over 10 MEUR in subsequent private financing 
rounds. One example is the mobile game software firm Sumea Interactive.
One success factor has been a relatively high degree of selectivity in the program. Only 
40 companies are chosen annually for the program. The program estimates that this 
number represents virtually all new ventures that may be attractive to business angels as 
high-growth potentials in Finland. The program has recognized that the most promising 
entrepreneurs and the most promising business ideas tend to get access to venture 
financing right away without the help of the support program. Nevertheless, there is a 
need for a program for the high-growth potentials that are “just below” the star firms, 
and these may be appropriately funded by business angels.
Furthermore, the program has recognized that it is not enough to get just any financing; 
firms need enough financing to realistically enable growth in the markets they target. 
Therefore, the goal of the program is to raise at least 300.000 to 500.000 EUR per firm.
The program considers private investment by business angels as superior to public 
funding of young firms. Business angels have been recognized as more effective in
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screening and picking the firms that have the highest potential for growth. In addition 
to contributing capital, business angels also often have much to contribute to young 
firms in terms of business knowledge. The program also suggests that there exists no 
“financing gap” of early-stage firms as long as the firms are of high enough quality. This 
is illustrated by the fact that for 80% of the deals that the program brokers, the business 
angels contribute all of the capital. In only 20% of the deals, a syndicate between 
business angels and public investments is needed in order to raise enough equity 
financing.
The program has also recognized the importance of being quick, flexible, and relatively 
independent in its decision-making. This is accentuated by the fact that the time-to- 
market is critical in many of the targeted sectors, and firms therefore need to access 
funding quickly in order to achieve success. Furthermore, all employees involved in the 
execution of the program have been recruited from industry. As a result, they have a 
good understanding of what both firms and investors require in terms of finding 
mutually agreeable deals.
Another lesson learned is the need to train both entrepreneurs and business angels in 
early-stage financing and valuation. The program initially focused on training 
entrepreneurs, but due to the complexity of many private equity investments, also 
business angels require training in order to fund new start-ups. In the program, 
entrepreneurs and investors attend the same training sessions, which facilitates the 
formation of mutual understanding and standards.
Business angels have also, contrary to conventional wisdom, been found to not be 
home-biased. Therefore, there has been no need to divide markets regionally. On the 
contrary, the program sees a future with Nordic/Baltic cooperation around early-stage 
financing.
While the program is seen as ongoing, consolidation with other support measures is 
expected in the future. A further development of INTRO itself would be to introduce 
an early-stage firm merger service.
5.1.3.3 Research into Business (TULI)
www.tuli.info
The Research into Business (TULI) program was started in 2002 by Tekes, the National 
Technology Agency in Finland. The program provides grants of up 10.000 EUR to
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researchers and research teams for obtaining private sector advice and consultancy 
services on the commercialization prospects of their research. The program has recently 
been extended to a second 4-year period and is considered successful.
Description
The Research into Business program is a competitive program that provides grants to 
researchers and research teams for the evaluation of the commercialization potential of 
their research. A grant of maximum 10.000 EUR is provided to cover the full costs for 
private-sector experts’ advice on various issues related to the commercialization (legal 
advice, market analysis, IP, financing, creation of business plan, etc) of a research result 
or an innovation. Support cannot be used towards the researchers’ own salaries.
The grants target publicly financed research; in practice, most applicants are from 
universities of technology or industrial design. Potential researchers and teams are pro­
actively identified by the universities’ technology officers, who then broker the grant to 
the teams.
The aim of the program is to promote the commercialization of research through 
licensing and the creation of new firms. All technology-based sectors are eligible for 
support.
The program has been extended and is currently funded for a 4-year period. For this 
second phase of the program, a regional operational model has been implemented to 
ensure improved flexibility and speed. The implementation of the program is carried out 
via 16 technology centers by Tekel, the Finnish Science Park Association.
The program is financed by Tekes, the National Technology Agency in Finland, and the 
annual budget of the program is 2,7 MEUR.
Results and lessons learned
So far, 1201 projects have been supported through the program out of 2299 proposals. 
Last year, 389 projects were supported out of 670 proposals.
The program is generally considered successful. Out of the 1201 supported projects, 112 
firms have been created and over 70 technologies have been licensed. This corresponds 
to a hit rate of about 15%, which must be considered in relation to the very early stage 
of the supported projects. The supported technologies are often new and their 
commercialization potential is thus vety uncertain. Growth rates for the created firms
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are not available; nevertheless, the optimal outcome for a supported project is clearly to 
result in the creation of a firm, since there is very little value for the researchers in 
license deals. The longer-term effects of the program are difficult to evaluate.
The strengths of the program have been the flexibility and speed of operation, the low 
overhead and bureaucracy in the organization, and the brokered use of private sector 
experts for providing advice. The program has also benefited from the network of 
cooperation between the universities’ technology officers and the regional science parks.
One of the perceived weaknesses of the program has been a low level of funding which 
limits the usefulness of the provided grants. Another problem has been to find enough 
knowledgeable private-sector consultants that are able to support the researchers. 
Furthermore, the program may be too focused on the earliest stage of the 
commercialization process, while leaving a gap between the activities supported by the 
program (such as making the commercialization plan of the research result) and actually 
bringing new innovative products or services to market.
5.1.4 Hong Kong
5.1.4.1 Hong Kong Applied Science and Technology Research 
Institute (ASTRI)
www.astri.org
The Applied Science and Technology Research Institute was founded by the 
Innovation Technology Commission of the Hong Kong Government in 2000. The 
institute supports technological innovation in Hong Kong and stimulates spin-offs by 
conducting ‘mid-stream R&D’ in 5 select technological fields.
Description
ASTRI conducts R&D with the aim of commercializing new technologies. The institute 
currendy focuses on five research areas: photonic technologies, integrated circuit design, 
Internet software, wireless communications, and biotechnology. ASTRI currendy 
employs 250 researchers, and the number of researchers is expected to grow to 800 
within a few years. While the institute is primarily funded by the government, it 
cooperates with private firms in the select industries in order to commercialize 
technologies through licensing.
ASTRI has been explicidy set up to do ’midstream R&D’, i.e. be a link for technology 
transfer from basic research carried out at universities to commercialization in the local
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industry. Through its R&D activities, the institute strives to elevate the technological 
level of industry in Hong Kong, and, by encouraging spin-offs, function as a spawning 
ground for technology entrepreneurs. By directly involving industry in the R&D process 
and in licensing the results, ASTRI strives to conduct research that has a high degree of 
customer-focus and applicability in industry.
Other goals of ASTRI include enhancing Hong Kong's technological human resource 
level and functioning as a focal point for attracting outside R&D personnel to work in 
Hong Kong; researchers at ASTRI with knowledge in a specific technology domain are 
expected to eventually transfer to industry.
The annual budget for the institute is 9,5 MEUR.
Results and Lessons Learned
Previously, ASTRI focused on incubating and spinning off start-ups with the support of 
venture capitalists. However, the mode of operation has since changed towards being a 
R&D institute involving industry participants. This change was called for since the 
institute did not want to compete with the incumbent firms in the market through its 
own start-ups.
Under the new model, which has been in operation since 2004, the focus is on 
developing new technologies and supporting the commercialization of these 
technologies through licensing agreements. The institute under this model has generally 
been considered successful. For example, 15 technology licenses have been transferred 
to industry; mainly technologies related to photonics. The target is to reach 100+ 
licensing deals per year.
ASTRI is quite similar to the Cooperative Research Centres program in Australia in that 
it brings together researchers from various public institutions and collaborates with 
private firms in order to target innovation in a number of select industries. Nevertheless, 
although the institute enhances the technological level in Hong Kong, the link between 
the ASTRI program and small firm growth is hard to explicate. For example, there have 
hardly been any spin-offs created as a result of the new technologies. Furthermore, the 
model of operation to carry out ’midstream R&D’ assumes a linear model of innovation. 
There is also a danger that public research in these technologies only substitutes private 
investment in R&D. Finally, the program has considered it important to carefully
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balance the issues of public accountability and public management in order not to stifle 
the program through over-bureaucratization.
Although the institute has strived towards cooperating with universities, this 
cooperation has not met expectations. One suggested explanation for this lack of 
cooperation has been that ASTRTs research focus is on application, and universities 
have few incentives to conduct applied research since their funding is based on doing 
basic research and training students. Nevertheless, ASTRI illustrates the importance of 
concentrating efforts around select sectors in order to create a critical mass of R&D in 
these technologies.
5.1.4.2 Hong Kong Science & Technology Parks (HKSTP)
www.hkstp.org
The Hong Kong Science and Technology Parks (HKSTP) is a result of mergers between 
several incubation centers and technology parks in Hong Kong. HKSTP in its current 
form was founded in 2001 and is sponsored by the Hong Kong government. The 
program has been successful in combining incubation and technology park facilities and 
thus promoting clusters with both young and established firms around several 
technologies.
Description
HKSTP is run as a government-owned corporation, which manages an incubation 
centre and a science park. There are currently 216 tenants in the science park and 90 in 
the incubation center. The industries represented include electronics, biotechnology, 
precision engineering, and information and communications technology. While the 
incubation center targets firms in the start-up and early growth phases, the science park 
caters to firms that are already in the expansion or maturity stages of development. In 
addition to infrastructure and facilities, HKSTP also offers management, marketing, and 
consultancy services to tenants.
HKSTP is funded mainly through rents and other income; nevertheless, HKSTP 
incurred an operational loss of 4 MEUR in 2004.
Results and Lessons Learned
HKSTP has been successful in supporting the growth of young firms and in promoting 
clusters of technology firms. Of the incubatees, about 10-15% tend to do quite well. 
Nevertheless, very few high growth firms have emerged from the incubation program;
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out of 201 companies listed on the Hong Kong Growth Enterprise Market (GEM), only 
3 are graduates of the predecessors of HKSTP: the HK1TCC and the Incu-Tech 
programs.
What the HKSTP seems to do well is that it co-locates both young and more mature 
companies by providing both incubation facilities as well as facilities for mature firms 
(e.g. Philips is one of the more recent new tenants). HKSTP is currently also expanding 
its facilities to be able to house more tenants.
A lesson learned during the course of the program is that all services must be charged 
for appropriately or they will be abused by the housed firms. In addition, the incubatees 
should be monitored in order to ensure that they continue to perform well.
The HKSTP is almost self-sustaining, and so it may be considered an efficient use of 
governmental funds. However, HKSTP has suffered from management problems. The 
most visible symptom is a frequent change of top management; within the last 5 years, 
there have been 3 CEOs for HKSTP. The changes in management may be an indication 
of other underlying problems, for example over-bureaucratization.
5.1.5 Hungary
5.1.5.1 Corvinus International Investment
www.corvinusen.siteset.hu
The Corvinus International Investment program was started in 1997 and was taken over 
in 2005 by the Hungarian Development Bank. This program primarily provides funding 
for Hungarian firms that wish to expand internationally. The program is considered very 
successful.
Description
Corvinus International Investment provides funding for co-investments with Hungarian 
companies abroad. Corvinus can either co-invest in Hungarian firms’ subsidiaries 
abroad, assist Hungarian firms to develop appropriate business strategies in order to 
facilitate access into international markets, and contribute capital towards investments 
that enhance the competitiveness of these firms. The aim of the investments is to 
facilitate foreign direct investments by Hungarian companies, and thus promote the 
creation, acquisition, and development of venture abroad.
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The funding is provided primarily in the form of equity investments, but also loans or 
guarantees may be available. Prior to making the investment decision, the program may 
also assist the applicant firms in developing their business plans.
The fund addresses innovative high-growth SMEs that already have a registered patent. 
The fund helps these firms to bring these innovations to market and alleviate the 
problem of a lack of venture capital supply that many of these firms face.
The maximum investment in each firm is around 1 MEUR, for a stake representing 10 
to 49 per cent of the firm. The planned duration of the investment is up to 10 years.
The fund seeks to be self-sustaining and only finances “economically feasible projects” 
at “market conditions”.
A total of 6,8 MEUR is planned to be invested this year. The fund employs 7 staff.
Results and Lessons Learned
In 2005, the fund received 50 applications for funding. Of these, 12 business plans have 
been developed further, and 7 projects have been approved for funding. In the future, 
the fund expects to finance 8-10 projects per annum.
The program has been regarded as very successful, since it fills a gap in the funding of 
firms that want to expand internationally. Venture capital has been almost completely 
absent in the Hungarian economy, stifling the pace of innovation and new firm creation.
A selection criterion of the program is that the supported firms must have a patent- 
protected technology. The program does not provide funding for pre-patent R&D or 
for the patenting process.
While the fund initially concentrated on the biotechnology sector, it is now open to 
firms in all sectors and industries and may thus have a larger reach.
5.1.5.2 Information Technology Venture Capital Fund
www.rfh-rt.hu
The Information Technology Venture Capital Fund is a venture capital fund for 
investments in ICT firms. It was founded in 2002 by Regional Development Holding, a 
state-owned company. The program has been successful in filling a financing gap for 
young technology-based companies and in encouraging the expansion of these firms.
Description
84
Chapter 5. Analysis and results
The Information Technology Venture Capital Fund provides VC capital for equity 
stakes in firms in the ICT sector. The fund explicitly targets ICT firms in the start-up or 
early growth stages of development which have a high potential for growth. While die 
fund primarily provides capital, it also can offer limited management assistance to the 
supported firms.
When making the investment decision, the fund prioritizes investments that may create 
employment, improve technology infrastructure, or create export opportunities. The 
fund is profit-oriented and state-owned through Regional Development Holding.
Since 2002,10,7 MEUR has been invested. The fund employs 4 staff.
Results and Lessons Learned
In 2004 and 2005, there have been a total of 40 applicant firms, of which 8 have been 
supported (4 per annum).
The program has been regarded as successful in providing capital for high-growth firms. 
A success story is game software development firm Stormregion Ltd. Nevertheless, the 
fund has a strong regional development focus which may conflict with the aim of 
finding the highest potential firms.
Another interesting aspect is that Hungary has considered two venture capital programs 
to be the most successful measures for supporting high-growth firms in the country. 
This can be an indication of that the supply of capital, especially in early-stage 
investment, may be scarcer in Hungary than in other more economically developed 
countries.
5.1.5.3 VIVACE program of the Hungary Patent Office
www.hpo.hu/Enalish/
The VIVACE program was founded in 2004 by the Hungary Patent Office and is 
funded by the Hungarian government. The program offers mentoring and advice on 
patenting and intellectual property, and it has been considered successful in raising the 
patenting rate of SMEs.
Description
The VIVACE program provides mentoring and advice by IP experts on patenting for 
SMEs. The advisory services include information on e.g. patents, supplementary 
protection certificates, utility models, trademarks, geographical indicators, designs, and
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copyrights. The program also provides a telephone help-line on IP protection, education 
schemes in intellectual property for attorneys and other courses, an e-learning package, 
and conducts promotional activities for patenting.
The goal of the VIVACE program is to heighten the awareness of the intellectual 
property system SMEs and develop an “IP culture” among firms in any life cycle stage. 
In so doing, the program seeks to alleviate a perceived growth bottleneck caused by 
inadequate protection of intellectual rights.
The program is targeted at all SMEs in all sectors. Nevertheless, a focus on the 
technology sector is implicit.
The program was founded in 2004 is administered by the Hungarian Patent Office and 
funded by the government. The annual budget for the program is 419.000 EUR, and it 
employs 5 staff.
Results and Lessons Learned
So far, 1500 firms have been assisted through the program. Last year, 500 firms were 
supported.
The program is generally regarded as successful. The program has increased the 
patenting rate among SMEs, which is important as patents are considered increasingly 
critical for the growth of technology-based SMEs. For example, with protected 
intellectual property, SMEs and entrepreneurs can more easily obtain venture capital or 
business angel funding.
The program has also been successful in increasing the awareness among SMEs about 
the rights that are possible to obtain through intellectual property. An expected goal for 
the program is also to increase the technology licensing activity among SMEs. 
Nevertheless, while patenting is seen as an important driver of innovation and 
competitiveness for SMEs, the direct influence of the program on growth has been 
difficult to measure.
A lesson learned has been that although the Hungarian patent activity has dropped since 
the 1980s, it is possible to positively influence the patenting trend through directed 
measures.
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5.1.6 Italy
5.1.6.1 I3P (Incubator of the Turin Politecnico)
www.i3p.it
The I3P incubator was started at the Torino Politecnico in 1999. It is co-financed 
between 6 partner institutions. The program is a successful example of a university- 
affiliated incubator based on broad regional cooperation.
Description
The incubator is linked to the Torino Politecnico and targeted at students, recent 
graduates, and employees of the university. I3P was the first incubator in Italy linked to 
a university. The incubator provides infrastructure in terms of offices, seed capital 
through an affiliated VC fund, professional business services, as well as visibility for its 
tenants. The physical space consists of offices in the Torino Politecnico and the 
business services are offered at a subsidized price. The incubator also organizes a ‘Start 
Cup’, i.e. a business plan competition.
The incubator is targeted at ‘knowledge-based firms’, which are in practice technology 
firms with an emphasis on ICT. The incubator upholds a high degree of selectivity for 
the incoming firms. Approximately 10% of all applicants will eventually enter the 
incubator. Incoming firms must demonstrate an ability to develop knowledge-based 
projects and need to be less than one year old, i.e. in the start-up stage. The firms can 
stay in the incubator for up to 3 years.
The funding of the incubator is shared equally between six public or non-profit 
institutions: Politecnico di Torino, Provincia di Torino, Camera di Commercio di 
Torino, Finpiemonte, Comune di Torino and Fondazione Torino Wireless. The seed 
capital is provided through the Piemontech VC fund, which is part of Fondazione 
Torino Wireless.
Results and Lessons Learned
So far, 69 firms have been housed in the incubator, and 8 new incubatees are expected 
in 2006. As of May 2006, there were 36 firms in the incubator. In addition, 18 projects 
have been offered training and mentoring as part of a ‘pre-incubator program’ lasting 3- 
6 months.
87
Chapter 5. Analysis and results
The incubator is regarded as successful. In 2004, it received the ”Best Science-Based 
Incubator Award” by the Dutch Science Alliance organization. The incubator has 
spawned many new firms with an exceptional survival rate in the technological sector: 
out of the 50 firms that were created in the period 2000-2005, only 4 have gone out of 
business. One may wonder if this survival rate may even be too high, given that high- 
growth ventures also typically are highly volatile. In total, the firms have created 220 
new jobs and have a combined annual turnover of 8 MEUR.
The key strengths of the program have been the closeness to the university as well as 
the high selectivity of the program, which may be one reason behind the high survival 
rate for the firms. The program is also a good example of broad cooperation between 
various regional institutions.
5.1.6.2 Piemontech VC Fund
www.piemontech.it
The Piemontech VC fund was started in 2004 to support ICT start-ups in the Piedmont 
region. The fund provides capital of up to 200.000 EUR for start-up funding. 
Fondazione Torino Wireless, a publicly funded foundation, is the principal institution 
behind the fund and the fund is also associated with the I3P incubator. The fund applies 
strict criteria for financing and the program has so far been considered successful.
Description
Piemontech is a small venture capital fund, which invests between 20.000 and 200.000 
EUR for a 20-35% equity stake in start-up companies in Piedmont. The fund also 
provides advice and consulting support, e.g. regarding strategy formulation, new 
customer identification, and human resource management. The aim of the fund is to 
promote innovation and foster growth and development in the high technology industry 
in Piedmont while generating acceptable financial returns to the fund.
The Piemontech fund concentrates its funding and non-financial efforts selectively on a 
relatively small number of firms. The fund targets innovative start-ups and young firms 
in the technology sector; mainly ICT, but also to some degree biotechnology, advanced 
mechanics, and high-value added services. In order to obtain funding, firms must have a 
high growth potential and aim at international markets. Investments are expected to 
typically last 4-5 years.
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The fund is associated with the I3P incubation centre and operated by Fondazione 
Torino Wireless, a publicly funded foundation, which owns around 50% of the fund. 
Many other partner foundations and firms own minority shares and participate in the 
management of the fund, including the I3P incubation centre, Eurofidi, and Unione 
Industriali di Torino.
The annual budget is 2,5 MEUR, and this is expected to increase to 5 MEUR in the next 
year and a half. Two full time staff work with administration, while the fund involves its 
network partners for evaluating proposals.
Results and Lessons Learned
So far, the fund has made 12 investments out of 600 proposals. This implies a 2% 
funding ratio, which is quite similar to that of private VC funds. The goal is to grow the 
portfolio to 40-50 firms in total.
The fund has been regarded as successful in enabling firm growth through the capital it 
provides.
Although it is too early to evaluate the growth rates of the funded firms since the first 
investments were made 1,5 years ago, there are many positive signs. Out of the 8 first 
funded firms, 6 have transitioned from the R&D stage and are now generating revenues, 
and none of the funded firms have gone out of business. There have also been 
negotiations about second-round financing with some firms, which is another positive 
signal.
Another sign of the success of Piemontech is an increasing number of applications and 
an increased interest among entrepreneurs who apply to the fund. This goes hand-in- 
hand with a growing general awareness of VC funding in Italy and the Piedmont region. 
Entrepreneurs who apply to the fund appear to be better trained and prepared when 
they approach VC funds than they were 1,5 years ago, which also indicates an 
improvement in the quality of demand for venture capital.
Compared to many other public policies in Italy, which fund a larger part of the 
applicants, Piemontech can apply stricter criteria and thus uphold a higher quality level 
among the funded firms. This ensures that the resources of the fund are spent 
effectively on firms that have a clear growth strategy and target international markets, 
and the fund should thus realize greater returns.
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Another key to success has been the network of public and private partners cooperating 
around the fund. Although Piemontech is a relatively small fund, the network around 
the fund is continuously growing, e.g. in terms of universities and research centers from 
which the fund receives proposals.
5.1.7 Netherlands
5.1.7.1 Mastering Growth Program
No website
The Mastering Growth Program is one of quite few programs that focus on the 
initiation and management of growth from a managerial perspective. This program was 
started in 2006 and is financed by the Ministry of Economic Affairs. The program 
arranges training events for entrepreneurs who have growth expectations.
Description
The program supports “master-classes”, in which ambitious entrepreneurs who manage 
growing companies learn from each other (through interactive case studies and 
experience sharing) about how to achieve high growth, e.g. in terms of funding, human 
resource management, strategic planning, and growth management. These workshops 
provide an opportunity for entrepreneurs to share notes and ideas, and the workshops 
are combined with tailored lectures on growth. The classes are run by the management 
academy De Baak and the national innovation agency Syntens.
The goal of the program is to improve both the motivation to grow as well as the 
management skills of the participants. The classes are aimed at leaders of firms of all 
sizes and in all stages of development, but the common denominator is that the 
entrepreneur should be ambitious and aim for growth. The courses are carried out in 4 
different regions, and there are four different modules that target firms of different 
sizes: start-up (<15 employees); moderate growth (15-35 employees); fast growth (> 35 
employees); and large firms (>250 employees). The program focuses specifically on a 
few select sectors, including human health, agriculture and food, manufacturing, 
logistics, construction, and creative industries
Each participant is charged 3.000 EUR for participation in the program, and the courses 
are further subsidized by the Ministry of Economic Affairs. The budget for the co- 
financing is 250.000 EUR.
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Results and Lessons Learned
Although the program has just started, high expectations are attached to the program. 
An innovative aspect of the program is that the participants primarily learn from one 
another. The program thus seeks to facilitate sharing of tacit skills and experiences, 
which is often overlooked in formal training programs. The program divides 
entrepreneurs that manage firms of different sizes and growth prospects into different 
groups, as each group is expected to have somewhat different needs and face different 
growth constraints. The program expects 10-15 firms to participate in each of the 4 
modules in every region, i.e., a total of approximately 200 firms in the country as a 
whole.
To a larger degree than many other programs, this program aims to improve the skill 
level and motivation of the entrepreneurs. It could be argued that more programs could 
benefit from focusing on the motivation and the sense of self-efficacy of the 
entrepreneurs instead of focusing on firm-level resources, since it is mainly the 




The TechnoPartner program was started in 2004 as a joint initiative between the Dutch 
Ministry of Economic Affairs and the Ministry of Education, Culture, and Science. The 
program is a result of merging and substituting a number of earlier support initiatives 
into one, comprehensive program. The program attempts to increase both the supply 
and demand of venture capital, and it has been regarded as very successful.
Description
The TechnoPartner program is a comprehensive program which seeks to promote 
access to venture capital and business angels for technology-based firms. The program 
consists of four subprograms, each contributing to this end:
1. Knowledge Exploitation funding program - Provides grants for research 
commercialization, such as help with patents and pre-seed financing for researchers.
2. Seed facility — Provides a subsidized loan to venture capital funds for co­
investments in early stage firms, which improves the risk-return ratio for these 
funds.
3. Certificate - Assesses the business outlook for young firms and may award a 
certificate for the firm combined with a loan guarantee of 80% for up to 100.000
91
Chapter 5. Analysis and results
EUR loans to firms that qualify for the certificate. The program thus reduces the 
risk for banks that finance these SMEs.
4. Business Angel Program — Upholds an information service for Virgin angels’, for 
example, on contracting and monitoring rights. Virgin angels are potential new 
business angels that want to invest in young SMEs.
The program is thus targeted at promoting the supply of early-stage capital, whether
through public grants, banks, business angels or venture capital funds. The budget for
all of the four subprograms is a total of 85 MEUR over 4 years. 6-7 staff are direcdy
working with the program.
Results and Lessons Learned
In 2005, 7 venture capital funds (out of 14 applicants) were supported through the seed 
facility. Similarly, seven research ideas were sponsored through the Knowledge 
Exploitation program. A total of 23 firms were certified for loan guarantees.
The major advantage of the program is that it takes a multi-angle view on promoting 
financing for technology-based SMEs, and seeks to promote investments in start-ups by 
both business angels, banks, as well as venture capital funds. For the earliest stage ideas 
(research commercialization), the only appropriate mode of financing is considered to 
be public grants, since the risk-return ratio in these types of investments is the least 
attractive for private investors.
5.1.8 Spain
5.1.8.1 Contest of Ideas for the Creation of Technological or 
Science-Based Industries
www.parauedentifico.uc3m.es/emprende/
This contest is a competition for technology-based business ideas in the Madrid region. 
The competition is targeted mainly at young university students. The initiative was 
started by the University Carlos III and Technological Park of Leganés in 2004.
Description
The contest consists of an annual competition for technology- or science-based business 
ideas. The aim of the contest is to promote innovative business concepts and young 
entrepreneurs in Madrid and encourage the commercialization of R&D.
The prizes for the winning concepts consist of three components. First, there is a 
money prize for the top four concepts. Second, the top concepts will be offered the 
incubation services of the Leganés Technological Park for free for 6 months, including
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supplementary services such as training, legal consulting, tax assessment, administration, 
and access to financial channels. Third, the top concepts will gain visibility through 
media coverage.
The competition is mainly addressed at university and MBA students in their final year. 
The program targets the seed stage of forming a new business venture, and there is an 
explicit focus on business concepts in the technology sector.
University Carlos III and the Technological Park of Leganés arrange the competition, 
and the competition involves around 20 part-time staff. The yearly monetary prizes total 
30.000 EUR, of which the number one concept receives 12.000 EUR.
Results and Lessons Learned
Between 2-4 business ideas are promoted annually in the competition. Thus far, 12 
business ideas have been promoted. Some new firms have been created based on these 
ideas, and the program is generally considered very successful. However, there exists 
very limited data on the growth of these firms.
Also the externalities of the initiative are deemed to be significant. Most important is the 
degree to which the competition can raise the awareness of and interest in an 
entrepreneurial career. These effects have been considered very important in Spain, as 
very few young people in Spain seem interested in an entrepreneurial career.
5.1.8.2 Embryo Project - Program for University Entrepreneurs
http://observatorio, umh.es/embrvo
The Embryo Project is a program started in 2000 by the University Miguel Hernandez. 
The program seeks to encourage students to become entrepreneurs, by providing 
courses on entrepreneurship, mentoring, and seed financing. The program is co­
financed by the European Commission.
Description
The Embryo project provides training, advice, and access to entrepreneur networks for 
potential technology entrepreneurs at the University Miguel Hernandez. The university 
provides both the infrastructure needed to develop an “Embryo firm” as well as courses 
and counseEng in business skiHs for students and researchers.
The program focuses on three issues: (1) identification of entrepreneurs with a 
university background; (2) promotion and development of their entrepreneurial skills;
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and (3) development of a local expert infrastructure for new technology ventures. The 
program takes an integrative view on entrepreneurship and tries to address a range of 
aspects from opportunity identification and motivation to issues of monitoring and 
control once a firm has been set up.
The program has been in effect since 2000 at the University Miguel Hernandez de Elche 
and is financed mainly by the European Commission. There are two full time employees 
involved in managing the program.
Results and Lessons Learned
Since its inception, the program has spawned 74 (in 2005: 14) start-ups and 4 (1) spin­
offs. The start-up firms have in turn created 150 new jobs. There are 7412 students 
enrolled in an entrepreneurial club at the university, and the program has had 1068 
participants in its motivation and training activities.
The program is regarded as very successful. It has spawned new entrepreneurs, 
increased their motivation to grow, and improved their skill level. What sets this 
measure apart from many other measures is that it focuses on the individual level by 
identifying and motivating potential future entrepreneurs.
One lesson learned is the importance of developing a local network of partners in the 
form of experts, mentors, and partner firms. By doing so, the impact of the program 
can be leveraged in a cost-efficient way. The program has also recognized the 
importance of gaining the acceptance of the university board to develop the program to 
suit the needs of entrepreneurs and network partners.
5.1.8.3 Prestecs Participatius del CIDEM - Participative Loans
www.ddem.com/cidem/cat/actualitat/notides/20Q6/
03/306prstecscapitalconcepte.isp
Prestecs Participatius del CIDEM is a new public venture capital fund for young firms 
and spin-offs in Catalonia. The fund is a collaborative effort between six universities. It 
is funded by die Catalonia Investment Promotion Agency. The fund offers seed-stage 
loans and start-up equity investments.
Description
The venture capital fund offers two types of financing for the seed, start-up, and early 
growth stages for technology-based firms. First, firms can be granted a so-called 
‘concept capital’ of up to 100.000 EUR as a subsidized participative loan. Second, firms
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can get seed capital of up to 300.000 EUR as an equity stake in the firm in order to 
accelerate growth during the early growth stage. The program can also refer firms to 
venture capitalists for additional funding.
The target group of firms consists of high-growth start-ups in the technology sector. 
There is a maximum age Emit of 2 years for the participating firms.
Six universities in Catalonia cooperate around the venture capital fund. The main part of 
the capital comes from the public Catalonia Investment Promotion Agency. The annual 
budget of the fund is 2,6 MEUR, and the program involves more than 25 staff.
Results and Lessons Learned
As of May 2006, 3 firms had been funded. The expectation for the full year is that 26 
firms will receive funding. It may be too early to evaluate the success of the program; 
nevertheless, the expectations are high. A supported company that already has 
experienced growth is Activery Biotech.
The fund represents a good example of cooperation between universities, government 
agencies, and entrepreneurs. As such it may also give participating universities an 





The Gateway2Investment (g2i) program was started in London in 2005. The program 
helps innovative firms become “investment-ready” through a three-stage program that 
involves self-assessment, training, and mentoring. All 42 universities in London 
participate in this very successful program which is administered by Grant Thornton 
and financed by the London Development Agency.
Description
The program provides help and assistance to innovative firms to become investment- 
ready. The program consists of three stages, where after each step some of the firms are 
selected for more comprehensive support. The program starts with entrepreneurs 
making a self-evaluation of their firms’ investment-readiness. This self-evaluation is 
aided by the diagnostic software package Gauntlet. Later-stage support is provided
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through individual and group workshop sessions as well as through mentoring sessions 
where e.g. investment propositions and business plans are developed. No grants are 
provided, but the aim of the program is to aid participating companies to become viable 
and attractive investment opportunities for private investors.
The program targets firms in the technology sector (e.g. biotech, ICT, energy, 
environmental technologies), which have passed the seed stage and are looking for 
investors to finance growth. Typically, companies that participate in the program are not 
new. The goal of the program is that each firm would be expected to raise financing of 
at least 800.000 EUR within a 12-month period.
The program is a 3-year project which is principally financed by the London 
Development Agency. The financial advisory firm Grant Thornton is the lead delivery 
partner and thus in charge of the day-to-day execution of the program. Private-sector 
partners provide advisory services and software at a discounted price or for free, which 
reduces costs.
The budget for the 3-year period from 2005 to 2008 is approximately 2 MEUR in total. 
There are 2,5 core staff members at Grant Thornton who are working exclusively on 
g2i, and around 20 others are drafted when needed.
Results and Lessons Learned
So far, 169 companies have received at least 2 hours of support while a smaller number 
of firms have received more intensive support. 13 companies have raised outside capital, 
10 MEUR in total (between 0,2-2 MEUR per firm); the target for the program is to raise 
50 MEUR for the participant firms by 2008. Thus far, the participating firms have 
created 117 new jobs.
The program is considered very successful. It has a proven success of promoting VC 
financing for firms. As there are new big investments currently in the pipeline, the 
program expects that it will meet its targets.
The program has recognized that a lack of financing supply is not a problem in London, 
but rather the knowledge and skills about how to access the finance is the bottleneck. By 
acting as a gateway for firms to access financing, the program thus represents a good 
example of how to improve demand for venture capital in an area where fewer or no 
measures are needed to improve the supply side. This philosophy is similar to that of 
the INTRO program in Finland, which is also built around the idea that there is no
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supply-side financing gap, but that the cause of the scarcity of early-stage investments is 
on the demand side as entrepreneurs are not aware of how to turn their firms into 
attractive investments.
Another lesson learned is the importance of managing the participating firms’ 
expectations concerning the firms’ journey through the program. A related lesson is the 
importance of making sure that programs are fully thought through and robust at the 
time of launch in order to generate goodwill and momentum.
5.1.9.2 High-growth Start-up
www.vorkshire-forward.com
High-growth Start-up is regional project (Phase 1: 2001-2004; Phase 2: 2004-2009) 
started by the Business Link organization in South Yorkshire in 2001. The program is 
co-financed by the EU and the Yorkshire Forward Development Agency. The program 
provides coaching and mentoring by former entrepreneurs to growth-oriented start-ups 
in the region. The program is generally considered very successful.
Description
The program provides up to 18 months of pre-start and start-up mentoring and 
coaching support for high-growth start-up firms. A mentor will assist the firm in making 
a plan for growth, and also broker appropriate professional support for the firm in order 
to overcome any identified challenges. The mentors are usually experts in the particular 
business sector and have experience from starting and growing their own businesses.
The program broadly seeks to stimulate the “enterprise culture” by helping to identify 
and develop business opportunities, supporting businesses that are capable of achieving 
high levels of growth, and removing barriers to growth for these firms. The goal of the 
regional program is to make South Yorkshire the best place to start and grow a business 
in the United Kingdom.
The program is targeted at ‘high-growth companies’, which are defined as start-up firms 
that target a turnover of approximately 400.000 EUR by year two. The prioritized 
sectors are technology (e.g. biotech, advanced manufacturing, environment, and energy 
technologies) and professional services.
The current second phase of the program will run from 2004 to 2009. Nine private 
sector organizations based in South Yorkshire have been contracted for the delivery of 
the support. The program employs 7 staff and the total annual budget is 2,5 MEUR.
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The program is co-financed by the Yorkshire Forward Development Agency and the 
European Regional Development Fund.
Results and Lessons Learned
During the first phase of the program (2001-2004), 595 start-ups were supported, and 
these firms have created a total of 2010 jobs. For the second phase of the program 
(2004-2009), the target is to support 295 start-ups creating 1744 jobs. Last year, 150 
firms were supported.
The South Yorkshire region has historically had a low rate of entrepreneurship, but the 
program has generally been considered very successful in increasing the number of 
growing new firms. One success story is the DVD software company ZOOtech.
A reason for the success has been that the program focuses on unblocking progress and 
providing firms with the managerial skills and insight that they need for growth. 
Another important success factor is that mentors have personal experience from 
entrepreneurial activities. In many other programs, business coaches tend to be publicly 
employed and do not necessarily have previous experience from starting and running a 
firm.
A lesson learned has been that entrepreneurs need to be shielded from data collection 
requirements and bureaucracy that often may accompany national and European 
support programs. The program also must ensure that all interaction with entrepreneurs 
is timely and based on the client’s time and availability and not on the needs of the 
support organization.
For the development of the project, the program is trying to design and implement a 
new diagnostic process that allows the program to identify certain entrepreneurial traits 
that characterize successful projects.
5.1.9.3 Mustard.uk.com
www.mustard.uk.com
The Mustard.uk.com program was started in the West Midlands, UK, by the two public 
organizations Advantage West Midlands and BusinessLink in 2000. The program is co­
financed by the EU, and it offers business coaching and subsidized private consultancy 
services to nascent entrepreneurs and young start-ups. The program has been regarded 
as very successful.
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Description
The program refers firms to and subsidizes private consultancy services (e.g. in 
management consulting, law, accounting) for nascent entrepreneurs and start-up firms. 
The firms should target a turnover of at least 400.000 EUR in their second year and be 
willing to locate in the West Midlands region.
In addition to access to subsidized consultancy services, available support includes 
workshops for start-ups and nascent entrepreneurs, access to a business opportunity 
database, and mentoring services for young firms through a dedicated business coach. 
Support is normally provided for up to 18 months, but can be extended for up to 36 
months.
The program seeks to support the start-up process of new growth-oriented firms by 
facilitating access to business expertise for entrepreneurs and firms in the seed and start­
up stage. While the program is not limited to firms in any specific sectors, the priority 
sectors are creative industries, food, and tourism.
The program was started in 2000, and it is run by Advantage West Midlands and the 
Business Link organizations in the West Midlands, and co-financed by the European 
Regional Development Fund. The budget is 2,6 MEUR per annum, and the program 
employs 3 full time staff in the central management team and 15 managers working as 
business coaches across the region, plus contracted private sector consultants.
Results and Lessons Learned
Since the inception of the program, approximately 2000 firms have been supported.
Last year, 300 firms were supported. The current average size of the companies that 
have participated in the program is 8 employees and 650.000 EUR in turnover. Some 
star companies have grown to over 100 employees.
The program is generally considered very successful. The reasons for success have been 
a clear and independent brand identity for the program, a focus on nascent 
entrepreneurs who are currently in employment, a co-pay system for the services, and a 
strict quality control of the private sector partners.
A brand identity is especially important since many entrepreneurs in the target audience 
have traditionally had a skeptical or even negative perception of government support 
programs. It is thus of great importance to let the program be quite independent from
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government and have a high degree of interaction private sector partners such as banks, 
financial advisors and consultants who are well respected by the target audience.
Another important insight is that potential high-growth entrepreneurs may often be 
employed, and they will therefore need support and guidance on their career change 
path to self-employment. Having a co-pay system for the subsidized services challenges 
and motivates the clients.
Finally, only private sector partners that have passed a quality assurance process are 
involved in the program. This ensures that the clients get value for their money and time 
investment in the program.
A lesson learned has been the importance of looking at the needs of each individual 
business and entrepreneur and tailor the support for that business. This involves 
packaging the right solutions, with the right consultant and appropriate coaching. There 
is no one-size-fits-all for supporting new growth-oriented firms.
5.1.9.4 West Yorkshire Ventures
www.wvventures.co.uk
The West Yorkshire Ventures program was launched by the West Yorkshire Enterprise 
Partnership organization in 2005; the program is co-financed by the EU. The program 
provides business coaching for firms with high-growth potential through its own 
consultants. The program is considered very successful.
Description
The program offers business coaching through its own consultants and provides 
financial support for private-sector professional services based on a diagnostic analysis 
of the firm’s needs. The level of funding for the services depends on the firm’s likely 
level of growth and the type of activities to be undertaken. Advice and coaching is 
provided for up to 24 months, and financial support for professional services is 
provided for up to 12 months. The program also arranges training and networking 
events for entrepreneurs.
In order to be eligible for support, the firm must be an SME based in the West 
Yorkshire region, which targets a turnover over 1,5 MEUR within 3 years. There is an 
implicit focus on the start-up and early growth stages of development. The program is 
open to all sectors, with the exclusion of franchisees, real estate, and professional 
services.
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The program is similar to the High-growth Start-up program in South Yorkshire, with 
the difference that this program relies to a greater extent on its own consultants for 
coaching while the South Yorkshire program contracts private-sector consultants for 
coaching.
The annual budget of the program is 1,78 MEUR, and it is co-financed between the 
Yorkshire Forward agency and the European Regional Development Fund.
Results and Lessons Learned
So far, 566 businesses have been supported through the program. These firms have 
created 920 jobs.
The program is generally considered very successful in assisting firms to achieve growth. 
However, the number of jobs created per firm is quite small, or on average less than two 
per firm. Nevertheless, the program is still new, and it may thus be too early to evaluate 
the development of supported firms.
A lesson learned is the need for the program to be flexible and adapt to the varying 
needs of high-growth entrepreneurs and understand entrepreneurs’ dislike of 
bureaucracy. It has also been important to manage intermediaries (i.e. organizations that 
refer firms to the program) in order achieve a flow of high-caliber clients, and ensure 
that advisors are competent and thus able to build credibility with clients.
5.2 General commonalities of cases
I have used two principal methods when generating the following commonalities of the 
cases: first, I have scanned the tabular matrix of the 25 measures and looked across 
rows for patterns, and second, I have read the case descriptions multiple times in order 
to notice re-occurring themes (Miles and Huberman 1994). After initially recording 
these patterns and themes, I have re-checked them with the data to ensure that the 
patterns hold up for a closer review. Second, I have scanned my interview notes and 
field notes for commonalities and success factors that policy makers and other 
researchers have suggested, and then looked specifically for these issues in the case 
descriptions to confirm whether these proposed commonalities also are evident in the 
data.
A common denominator for almost all of the successful measures listed is that they are 
quite new. Although some date from the 1990’s, the large majority of the measures
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listed have been implemented within this decade. This feature is probably due to three 
main factors. First, the teams may have been inclined to focus their sampling on 
initiatives that are novel, as novel initiatives are easily perceived (for good reasons) as 
more innovative. Second, the novelty of the cases may be due to the natural life cycle of 
policy measures. Policy adjusts continuously, as illustrated by the fact that many of the 
successful measures are as new as from 2005 or 2006. Thus, except for permanent 
institutional structures such as export promotion agencies, policy measures tend to have 
a limited life cycle. In fact, many of the new successful measures have been introduced 
to replace older measures, and in doing so represent good examples of policy learning. 
While the newest measures still may not have proven themselves, the expectations for 
these new measures is high which in mm indicates a high level of ambition among 
policy makers. Third, the newness of the initiatives reviewed is probably also partly due 
to an increasing awareness among policy-makers of the importance of high-growth 
entrepreneurship in general, as well as of the need addressing the special needs of high- 
growth firms.
However, in spite of recent interest, the initiatives focusing explicitly and exclusively on 
high-growth firms were surprisingly few. Such focused cases were reported to a larger 
degree in the more ‘mature’ policy-making contexts, such as the United Kingdom, the 
Netherlands, and Finland. For example, we may consider programs such as Finland’s 
Growth Firm Service, the Netherlands’ Mastering Growth Program, and United 
Kingdom’s High-Growth Start-Up initiative to represent more ‘advanced’ policy 
measures, in the sense that they draw on the experience and learning of several 
generations of measures. Even so, national contexts differ, so it is not surprising that in 
Brazil, the emphasis is more on strengthening the technological base of entrepreneurial 
ventures, and in Hungary there are several programs geared at kicking off the national 
venture capital industry.
Furthermore, the more successful cases appear to more actively solicit private-sector 
participation. This is important, because much of the knowledge required to actually 
solicit and manage rapid organizational growth in entrepreneurial firms is tacit and 
difficult to simulate (e.g., experience-based knowledge; contacts to key industry players; 
ability to identify and mobilize key external resources). It is difficult for public-sector 
operators to develop such knowledge and resources, because their public-sector
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mandate effectively prevents them from participating in the day-to-day management of 
growing ventures.
Finally, it is evident that some of the measures have been founded as a result of 
available funding from the European Union. While European funding has given good 
results, policy-makers should be mindful of ensuring sufficient local responsiveness. The 
most innovative policy initiatives often seem to have been initiated at a local level, and 
they appear highly tailored to local specific needs (see, e.g., the Red de Pymes 
Innovadoras of Spain). However, also the European Union funding can give rise to 
successful, well localized programs, such as the Mustard.uk.com program in the UK.
5.2.1 Examples of good practices
The reviewed successful cases of high-growth entrepreneurship display a large range of 
diversity in terms of their operation and goals, and therefore, it is difficult to identify 
universal success factors. Nevertheless, the reviewed cases do offer a number of 
intriguing details and insights, some of which may be applicable also in other contexts. I 
summarize these below.
From the cases, as well as the preceding literature review, it appears that any initiative 
seeking to promote rapid entrepreneurial growth must be highly selective when 
choosing participating firms and individuals - even to the point of exclusivity - since 
only a minority of all entrepreneurial ventures has the motivation and ability to achieve 
rapid growth. Many of the reviewed initiatives were indeed selective and apply quite 
rigorous criteria for qualification. An example is the Piemontech venture capital fund 
and the I3P incubator in Italy. Compared to other similar measures in Italy which target 
a larger number of firms, these two measures have proven more successful by focusing 
their resources on a much smaller portion of firms.
Some successful support measures, such as Finland’s Growth Firm Service, proactively 
approach potential high-growth firms for support. That is, instead of waiting for the 
firm to approach them, the program actively scans the environment for potential high- 
growth firms and offers individually developed support packages for these firms. A 
proactive approach enables the agency to be selective as well as address emerging needs 
even before these are necessarily perceived by the client firm. A proactive approach is 
also consistent with the fact that only a small minority of all entrepreneurial ventures are 
motivated and able to achieve rapid growth.
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Another characteristic that seems to characterize some of the successful measures is a 
relatively high degree of flexibility and independence from government. This 
independence and flexibility has given the measures room to deal quickly with the ever 
changing needs of client firms and the demands of the environment. An example of this 
is the Mustard.uk.com program in the UK, which also claims to benefit from an 
opportunity to independently build up its own image and thus avoid a type of “PR 
deficiency” that many public support programs have suffered from in the UK By 
contrast, in some cases where this independence has been too limited, the result has 
been frustration and outputs below potential; an example is ASTRI in Hong Kong.
Another related characteristic for successful policy measures is an active participation of 
private-sector actors. While the majority of programs are largely government-funded, 
they do not need to be government-mn through the government’s own agencies. For 
example, a third party may be contracted for delivering the program or for providing 
professional services to client firms. This private-sector participation not only serves to 
introduce experience-based, often tacit skills in instilling and managing rapid 
organizational growth, but it also serves to enhance the street credibility of the initiative. 
Examples of privately executed programs include Gateway2Investment in the UK 
which is delivered by consultancy Grant Thornton, the Growth Firm Service in Finland 
which is coordinated by the SME foundation PKT, and the Mastering Growth 
Programme in the Netherlands which is mainly run by management academy De Baak. 
Programs that actively involve third parties in delivering services include 
Mustard.uk.com and the Start-up programs in West Yorkshire and South Yorkshire in 
the UK, while e.g. the EMBRYO project in Spain involves experienced entrepreneurs as 
mentors.
5.2.2 Lessons to be learned
There are a number of notable things we can learn from these cases. First, high-growth 
firms need to be dealt with flexibly and quickly. Entrepreneurs are short on time and 
don’t want to be standing in line waiting for bureaucratic processes to take their due 
course. Furthermore, long application lead times may reduce the credibility of support 
programs and have the counter-productive effect of prolonging the increasingly 
important time-to-market for the client firm’s products and services. Therefore, 
programs need to have sufficient autonomy to reach their objectives, and be able to 
address as large a range of needs as possible for the entrepreneur and firm. While it is
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clear that entrepreneurs do not want to deal with many separate offices and programs, 
and equally evident that one measure cannot do everything for all types of 
entrepreneurs, a suitable organization of programs would be that each support 
organization would cater to a specific group of entrepreneurs (e.g. nascent 
entrepreneurs) or firms (e.g. technology start-ups) and through their own targeted 
portfolio of programs or through referrals to other agencies handle all needs of this 
target group.
It is also important to effectively make use of networks of both private and public 
organizations when designing and implementing support measures. By doing this, the 
measure can benefit from the expertise, reach, and reputation of all the organizations 
and thus gain a higher visibility and credibility. Network-building seems especially 
important when implementing regional measures — Piemontech in Piedmont and the 
Participative Loans program in Catalonia are good examples — but cooperation between 
a range of public and private partners should be utilized to a higher degree also on the 
national level. Thus, private-sector participation is important, and the question is usually 
to find the correct form for it. For example, the private sector can be involved 
successfully in screening deals (e.g. in INTRO in Finland), providing credibility to the 
programs (e.g. TechnoPartner Program in the Netherlands), or offering discounted 
professional services for young firms (e.g. Mustard.uk.com in the UK).
Because the management of organizational growth is very demanding, a major emphasis 
should be placed on the development and sharing of managerial competencies, based on 
an interactive approach and the participation of seasoned managers with a deep 
experience in the management of growth ventures. The skills of managing rapid growth 
cannot easily be taught without first-hand experience, and getting access to the right 
resources requires contacts and social capital — assets that are not easily acquired by 
public-sector organizations.
A related issue is the importance of improving the perception of government support 
programs generally, as they may often have a poor image in the eyes of entrepreneurs. 
Steps towards an improved credibility include the need to make programs more 
independent, flexible, and, as noted above, involve respected private-sector partners that 
contribute with their expertise. Public programs should also aim to recruit and involve 
more people from industry, especially former entrepreneurs, in the planning and
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execution of the programs in order to ensure that support measures have a thorough 
understanding of the entrepreneur’s other private partners’ needs.
A problem in some countries may be that the range of the portfolio of programs is so 
large that entrepreneurs can have difficulties to assess what services from what 
institution may be right for them. An example includes the multitude of venture capital 
funds for start-ups in many countries, e.g. in Finland and Hungary. In addition to 
increasing the difficulty that clients have in grasping the offered portfolio of support 
measures, a large number of programs also add to the risk of inefficiencies due to 
overlaps between measures. Therefore, it may be important to streamline the number of 
measures, and effectively communicate the role of each measure to potential high- 
growth entrepreneurs.
5.3 Measure categories and themes
Many of the measures used in various countries are very similar. One understandable 
reason for this is that there exists a relatively high level of interaction between policy 
makers in different countries, and they exchange through common forums and 
organizations such as the OECD. Second, the EU through e.g. its regional funds offer 
co-financing for certain types of measures, which also encourages countries to 
implement these particular measures.
While the previous section analyzed the 25 most successful measures exclusively, the 
following sections (5.3 and 5.4) will draw on data for all 47 reported and codified 
measures. I have chosen to include all measures in this analysis in order to better 
leverage all the available empirical data for the development of categories of measures 
and the generation of aggregate finding for which a larger number of measures clearly 
will yield more complete results.
For the development of categories, I have used an iterative method of ongoing inclusion 
of groups (Glaser and Strauss 1967). When thus grouping similar measures, I have 
sequentially examined and assigned all measures to categories based on the measures’ 
description of offered services; consistent with Glaser and Strauss (1967), when a 
measure could not be included in any of the existing categories I have created a new 
category. Hence, within each category, measures tend to have similar aims, address firms 
in similar stages of development, and address similar types of bottienecks. These 
categories and associated measures are listed in Table 8.
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Table 8. Categories of high-growth support measures
Category Support measures
BA and VC access • Gateway2Investment (g2i) [UK / London]
• INGVAR Venture capital program [Brazil]
• INTRO [Finland]
• TechnoPartner Programme [Netherlands]
Business coaching • Commercialising Emerging Technologies (COMET) [Australia]
Enterprise Hub [UK / South East]
Growth Firm Service [Finland]
High-growth company support programme [UK / East Midlands] 
High Growth Programme [UK / Wales]
High Growth Start-up [UK / South Yorkshire]
Mustard.uk.com [UK / West Midlands]
West Yorkshire Ventures [UK / West Yorkshire]
Business idea competition • Contest of ideas for the creation of technological or scientific-based industries [Spain / 
Madrid]
Commercialization subsidies • Commercial Ready program [Australia]
• Small Enterprise Research Assistance Program (SERAP) [Hong Kong]
Consulting subsidies • Emprecan (Programa Emprendedores de Cantabria) [Spain / Cantabria]
• Support of access to advanced level consultancy services - ECOP 2.2.2 [Hungary]
Entrepreneur training • Mastering Growth Programme [Netherlands]
• Red de Pymes Innovadoras (Innovative SME Network) [Spain]
Entrepreneur clubs • Embryo Project - Programme for University Entrepreneurs [Spain / University Miguel 
Hernandez]
Incubation and science parks • Hong Kong Science and Technology Parks (HKSTP) [Hong Kong]
• I3P (Incubator of the Turin Politecnico) [Italy / Piedmont]
• Incubatore Tecnologico Genova [Italy / Liguria]
Internationalization financing • Corvinus International Investment [Hungary]
• Export Market Development Grant [Australia]
• PROGEX National program of technology support for export [Brazil]
Loan subsidies • For the prosperous Hungary enterprise development credit program [Hungary]
One-stop information shop • BIC (Business Innovation Centres) [Italy]
• Information Industries Bureau [Australia]





• Co-operative Research Centres [Australia]
• Hong Kong Applied Science and Technology Research Institute (ASTRI) [Hong Kong]
• PAPPE - Program for Supporting Research in Enterprises [Brazil]
• Research into Business (TULI) [Finland]
Technological development 
subsidies (equipment)




• VIVACE program of the Hungary Patent Office [Hungary]
Venture capital (equity) subsidies • AISP - Strategy for the financing and service system of innovative start-up companies 
[Finland]
• Innovation Investment Fund (IIF) [Australia]
• Southern Italy Hiqh-tech Fund [Italy / Southern Italy]
Venture capital (tax) subsidies • Pooled Development Funds (PDF) [Australia]
Venture capital fund • Applied Research Fund (ARF) [Hong Kong]
• Information Technology Venture Capital Fund Manager [Hungary]
• KVFP Venture capital investment [Hungary]
• Piemontech VC fund [Italy / Piedmont]
• Pre-seed fund [Australia]
• Prestecs Participates del CIDEM - Participative loans [Spain / Catalonia]
• SME development capital program [Hungary]
Furthermore, I have separated and grouped these categories into yet broader themes.
The first thematic separation of measures that I make is between measures that target 
the process before a firm has been created (pre start-up), and measures that target firms 
post start-up.
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The second broad separation of measures I make is between measures that focus on 
innovation and technology, and thus measures that traditionally have been the focus of 
innovation policy — I will refer to this as the “innovation perspective”; and those that 
focus on the business side and traditionally have been the focus of SME or industrial 
policy — I will refer to these as the “business perspective”. Further, 1 define an additional 
type of measures that focuses solely on the provision of financing, and cannot as such 
be considered to part of either the innovation or business perspectives, and thus form a 
third “financing perspective”. While some measures within both the innovation and 
business perspective also provide money for various activities, measures within the 
financing perspective typically provide non-earmarked capital that e.g. can be used as 
equity. A final type of measures consists of those that focus on internationalization, be it 
from the innovation/technological perspective, the business perspective, or the finance 
perspective. It may be difficult to draw the line between e.g. venture capital financing 
and internationalization financing, since these often go hand in hand (especially for bom 
globals); likewise, it is difficult to draw a line between technological development and 
business development that is carried out for the domestic market and that which is 
carried out for the international market. Thus, internationalization support can be 
considered merely as an extension of the “normal” innovation, business, and financial 
support; and a type of support that therefore does not necessarily need to be delivered 
through separate programs.
When thus grouping the categories, six measure “themes” emerge, as illustrated in 
Figure 12. These themes will be discussed below.
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Figure 12. Emergent themes of categories of support measures
The support measures in each of these broader themes will be further analyzed and 
discussed separately in the next sections. The first of these themes, which focuses on 
supporting innovation and commercialization prior to firm births I will call “Research”; 
the second theme, “Technological development” focuses on supporting innovation 
within firms, e.g. in terms of product development. The third theme, “Business 
creation”, focuses on business plan creation and support for potential and nascent 
entrepreneurs prior to start-up. The fourth theme, “Business development”, focuses on 
developing the business capabilities of firms, including growth-related capabilities. The 
fifth theme, “Seed, start-up, and growth financing” is focused on facilitating firms’ 
access to capital for the various growth stages. The financing for each of these stages 
may overlap, and it is thus not necessary or even relevant to separate measures in the 
financing perspective into pre- and post- start-up measures. Also other types of 
measures can contribute to the seed stage of financing in particular, e.g. business idea 
competitions provide prize money that can be used for early financing, and research 
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seed financing. Finally, although there are different types of support measures for 
internationalization, I have chosen to group all internationalization support into one 
discrete theme as these measures are typically organized by a single organization, e.g. an 
export promotion agency.
The purpose of the themes is to provide a relatively simple map of the various policy 
support measures that can be undertaken to address high-growth entrepreneurial 
activity. That is, while policy measures do not need to cover every category as listed in 
Table 8 (there are many ways to go about addressing the same problem), policy makers 
should make sure that there is a sufficient amount of support in each of these themes, 
i.e. that there exists support both pre- and post-startup support for the development of 
both innovation and business capabilities as well as appropriate support financing and 
internationalization. The themes also illustrate how policy measures that address high- 
growth entrepreneurship can appropriately be (re-)organized within the traditional 
boundaries of Innovation policy and SME policy. For example, all measures in the 
research sphere (including the creation of commercialization-oriented applied research 
institutes) should quite naturally fall into the realm of innovation policy. Similarly, 
business development activities, such as business coaching and entrepreneurship 
training, should naturally fall into SME policy. Nevertheless, it is clear that policy areas 
would still need to cooperate across traditional policy boundaries and be coordinated at 
a high level. For example, the encouragement of new entrepreneurs in should entail 
close collaboration with education policies. Furthermore, measures in the financing 
perspective aimed at e.g. catalyzing a functioning venture capital market needs to be 
broad-based and e.g. entail also fiscal policies.
5.3.1 Theme 1: Research (R)
Within the Research theme, there are a total of 4 measures from 4 countries. These 
types of measures broadly seek to improve the innovative capability of the economy, 
encourage the commercialization of new research-based innovations and spur the 
creation of new technological- or science-based firms. In this study, there were two 
types of these measures, research commercialization centers and research 
commercialization grants. Research commercialization centers act on the sector-level of 
analysis, typically targeting specific industries or technologies with increased funding for 
joint research projects between industry and public research organizations; a good 
example is Co-operative Research Centers in Australia. Research commercialization
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grants act on the entrepreneurial level of analysis, targeting individual researchers with 
grants for the commercialization of new technologies; an example is Research into 
Business in Finland.
These measures are publicly funded and generally quite expensive, ranging from 
approximately 3 MEUR (Research into Business, Finland) to 500 MEUR (Co-operative 
research centers) annually. Research centers for cooperation between industry and 
public research organizations tend to benefit mostly the mature firms that typically 
participate in these centers, but these centers also often aim to encourage the creation of 
industrial or research-based spin-offs. Research commercialization centers seem to 
typically focus on a few select sectors that have the highest potential to spur growth 
within the country.
However, it has provided somewhat challenging to encourage spin-offs through either 
research commercialization centers or research commercialization grants. For example, 
for the Research into Business program in Finland, approximately 10% of the supported 
projects have resulted in new firms. Although the Co-operative Research Centers in 
Australia have had some success in generating spin-offs, ASTRI in Hong Kong has even 
reversed its focus from promoting spin-offs to instead focusing on generating new 
technologies for licensing. In all, it seems safe to say that although measures within the 
Research theme can have some effect on the creation of new high-growth firms, the 
effect is likely to be smaller than that which can be achieved from measures within the 
Business Creation theme which focus more on the motivational rather than the 
technological dimension of new firm creation.
5.3.2 Theme 2: Technological development (D)
Within the Technological Development theme, there are a total of 8 measures from 4 
countries. These types of measures seek to support the technological and innovative 
capabilities of existing firms and thus help generate e.g. higher levels of value-added as 
well as new innovative products and services.
There are four different types of measures within this theme: commercialization 
subsidies, incubation and technology parks, R&D tax cuts, and technological 
development subsidies. Commercialization subsidies provide dollar-for-dollar grants for 
commercialization activities, such as proof-of-concept and prototyping; a good example 
is the Commercial Ready Program in Australia. Incubation and technology parks
111
Chapter 5. Analysis and results
provide infrastructure to new and sometimes also established technology-based firms; a 
successful example is the I3P incubator in Italy. R&D tax cuts let firms deduct over 
100% of R&D expenses from their income, thereby lowering the effective cost of R&D 
for profitable firms; an example is R&D Concessions in Australia. Technological 
development subsidies provide subsidies and support for investments in e.g. 
technological equipment and IP protection; an example is the VIVACE program in 
Hungary.
Commercialization subsidies and R&D cuts both tend to be very expensive. For 
example, the annual budget of the Commercial Ready program and the R&D 
concessions in Australia are 120 MEUR and 240 MEUR respectively. Furthermore, 
both these types of measures tend to benefit mainly mature firms and not high-growth 
SMEs. That is, while CommerciaHzation subsidies can have a clear effect on the growth 
motivation and success of a small established firm that may want to introduce a new 
product range, the requirement of dollar-for-dollar matching makes these measures less 
applicable to high-growth start-ups that may not necessarily have corresponding funds. 
For high-growth firms, equity financing could be a better form of financing than 
subsidies or loans for commercialization activities. Similarly, R&D tax cuts will mainly 
benefit large, mature firms, since young firms typically have no taxable income, while 
established small firms do considerably less research than do large firms. Furthermore, 
the effect to which R&D tax cuts actually increase innovation is difficult to evaluate.
Incubation and technology parks tend to be relatively cheaper instruments or even self- 
sustaining through rents. While incubation and technology parks can be categorized in 
either the Technological Development theme or in the Business Development theme 
below, they are included here as they are traditionally within the domain of innovation 
policy. These programs provide infrastructure to technology-based firms, and may either 
cater exclusively to start-ups or also provide space for established firms. The upside of 
science parks for firms of all sizes, which are typically structured around specific 
technologies, is that they may encourage the formation of clusters around innovation 
that benefit all firms; the downside is that the specific growth needs of young firms may 
receive less attention in this environment. Success factors for incubators include a high 
degree of selectivity of tenants, close proximity to a university and other firms in the 
same sector, and a strong reputation in the business community which makes the 
incubator attractive to the highest-potential firms.
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Both measures in our sample that provide technological development subsidies are from 
Hungary, which suggests that these measures may be most appropriate in countries that 
are catching up with the most developed economies.
A common characteristic within this theme is an exclusive focus on technology- and 
knowledge based innovation, even though there are also other types of innovation that 
high-growth firms can leverage. One reason behind this technology-focus may be a 
perceived “technology deficiency”, where countries consider themselves to be 
underdeveloped in terms of technological innovation. However, this can become a 
program when most policy initiatives emphasize technology sectors almost to the 
exclusion of innovation in other sectors, such as in business services. This emphasis 
does not seem consistent with the fact that rapid growth is not confined to technology 
sectors — by contrast, an emphasis on technology may cause programs to neglect 
potential growth ventures in other sectors. One may wonder if, for example, Hong 
Kong might not benefit from a more explicit and sustained focus on developing 
business service activities so as to leverage its gateway role in relation to the Chinese 
market. While a number of initiatives did include knowledge-intensive services in their 
focus, not a single initiative specialized in these. Perhaps for this reason, not a single 
initiative had a specific focus on franchising, a sector that provides important growth 
opportunities for service businesses.
Nevertheless, a joint problem for several measures within this theme is that it seems 
challenging to explicitly target high-growth start-ups, since subsidies for development 
activities are likely to benefit mainly established firms that already have a good cash­
flow. Activities related to infrastructure such as incubation activities and science parks 
are therefore likely to be the most effective type of measures for high-growth SMEs 
within this theme.
5.3.3 Theme 3: Business creation
Within the Business Creation theme, there are a total of 2 measures, both from Spain. 
These types of measures seek to support the creation of new high-growth firms by 
enhancing the entrepreneurial intent among potential entrepreneurs. The two measures 
within this theme are the Contest of Ideas for the Creation of Technological or 
Scientific-based Industries in Madrid and the Embryo Project at University Miguel 
Hernandez.
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There are many apparent benefits of these programs. First, they have relatively modest 
budgets, although in this sample, this may be pardy due to the regional focus of the 
measures. Second, they effectively target the seed level of new ventures for which there 
is relatively fewer effective measures compared to the later start-up and growth stages. 
Third, they primarily target the motivational component of growth, i.e. that of the 
entrepreneurial intent, which we have recognized as the most important component for 
the birth and growth of high-growth firms. While there is a clear technology-focus for 
both of the measures in this study, this type of measures could be expanded to also cater 
to potential entrepreneurs in non-technological sectors.
Both measures are closely tied with universities. As we have seen, high-growth 
entrepreneurs are more likely to be highly educated, but while university graduates in 
particular commonly are typically less interested in an entrepreneurial career, these 
measures demonstrate that growth-oriented entrepreneurs can be cultivated at 
universities. Arguably, these types of measures that target the entrepreneurial intent and 
motivation are even more effective in spawning research-based ventures than measures 
that provide researchers with grants for commercialization.
It is somewhat surprising that there were not more measures of this type in the sample, 
but this scarcity may also be symptom of a selection bias from the snowballing method 
towards measures on the firm-level of analysis. There are indeed similar measures also in 
other countries; e.g. in Finland, the Venture Cup program is similar to the Contest of 
Ideas in Madrid, and an increasing number of universities are introducing courses in 
venturing and entrepreneurship, although these indeed often are implemented on a 
smaller scale than at University Miguel Hernandez.
5.3.4 Theme 4: Business development
Within this theme, there are a total of 14 measures from 7 countries (all countries except 
for Brazil and Hong Kong). These types of measures seek to support the business- 
related capabilities of existing firms and thus increase the growth motivation and 
improve the growth success of these firms.
There are four different types of measures within this theme: business coaching, 
consulting subsidies, entrepreneur training, and one-stop information shops. Business 
coaching programs provide firms with a mentor, who offers advice and often performs 
a diagnostic growth analysis of the firm, and broker and/or subsidize professional
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business services based on this analysis. Typical subsidized/brokered services include 
market research and business planning services. An example of this type of measures is 
High-growth Start-up in the UK. Consulting subsidies are similar to business coaching 
programs in that they also subsidize private-sector business services, but these measures 
do not provide a dedicated mentor and the firms can typically decide more 
independendy what services to buy; an example is the Support of Access to Advanced 
Level Consultancy Services in Hungary. Entrepreneur training programs offer courses 
to entrepreneurs and managers, and also encourage networking among entrepreneurs; a 
successful example is Master Growth Programme in the Netherlands. One-stop shops 
offer information and broker services but do not offer dedicated mentors to firms; an 
example is Information Industries Bureau in Australia.
Business coaching measures are generally among the most successful measures in the 
sample. Of the measures in this category, 4 were very successful, 2 successful, and 2 not 
rated. A common approach among business coaching programs is to apply criteria for 
the selection of participating firms. For example, firms may be expected to target a 
certain turnover within 2-3 years. Coaching programs can be proactive in identifying and 
choosing firms, as e.g. the Growth Firm Service program in Finland does. Some of 
these programs focus on the early start-up and growth stages while others focus more 
on the expansion and maturity stages; nevertheless, all 4 of the “very successful” 
measures in the sample were focused on the seed, start-up and early growth stages, 
which indicates that this may be the better approach.
A universal challenge for business coaching programs is a shortage of mentors who are 
experienced in managing high growth or that there is a large variation in the skill level of 
mentors. Measures that depend on recruiting their own consultants for coaching (e.g. 
Firm growth service in Finland and West Yorkshire Ventures in the UK) have been 
faced with considerable challenges. When measures rely on contracting consultants from 
private firms, it appears important to uphold quality controls in order to ensure that 
firms benefit optimally from the coaching (e.g. the South Yorkshire High-growth Start­
up in the UK does this, and the Mustard.uk.com in the UK regularly audits the service 
providers). Meanwhile, private firms can assist in sponsoring these programs by offering 
their services at discounted rates.
More generally, business coaching programs seem like a better approach to high-growth 
firms than consulting subsidies. The important value-add of business coaching is that
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mentors can engage and motivate the firms to grow, and ensure that any subsidies and 
grants are used effectively.
Classes and training for entrepreneurs seems like an interesting concept, although the 
two measures of this type in the sample had quite different degrees of success. It is 
important that the quality of the training is high so that the high-growth entrepreneurs 
will consider it worthwhile to participate in and pay for the training sessions (the 
Mastering Growth Programme in the Netherlands seems to have achieved this). One 
successful aspect of the Mastering Growth Programme is its emphasis on experience 
sharing between entrepreneurs during the training sessions. Conversely, a feature that 
may explain the lesser degree of success for the Red de Pymes Innovadoras program in 
Spain is that the training and networking to a large degree takes place on the web. 
Nevertheless, both entrepreneur training measures in the sample were very new (2005, 
2006) and thus may require time to develop further.
By contrast, the one-stop information shop measures in the sample were quite old 
(1984, 1992), and in general these seemed to play a relatively small role for high-growth 
firms, and they were also generally regarded as less successful.
5.3.5 Theme 5: Seed, start-up and growth financing
Within this theme, there are a total of 16 measures from all 9 countries, making these 
types of support measures for high-growth the most common in the sample. These 
measures seek to support the start-up and growth of firms by either supplying or 
facilitating access to financing, most commonly venture capital.
There are four different types of measures within this theme: BA and VC access, loan 
subsidies, venture capital subsidies, and venture capital funds. BA and VC access 
programs facilitate the access to business angel and venture capital funding by assisting 
firms to become investment-ready, training entrepreneurs and potential business angels 
in early-stage financing, and/or encouraging networking between entrepreneurs and 
investors; a successful example is the TechnoPartner Programme in the Netherlands. 
Loan subsidies improve the risk/return ratio for lending to SMEs by providing banks 
with loan guarantees or subsidized capital for re-lending. Venture capital subsidies 
consists of measures that either co-invest with private VC funds, often with an 
asymmetrical payoff ratio (what I refer to as “venture capital equity subsidies”), or 
provide tax benefits for private sector investments in SMEs (what I refer to as “venture
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capital tax subsidies”); successful examples of each type include Innovation Investment 
Funds and Pooled Development Funds in Australia. Venture capital funds are publicly 
owned funds; a successful example is Prestecs Participatius del CIDEM in Spain which 
offers seed capital of up to 300.000 EUR. A distinction can be made between measures 
that facilitate access to or encourage private-market funding of firms (the three first 
types), and measures where governments themselves finance firms through equity 
investments and capital loans (the fourth type).
When considering various options for growth financing, it is important to recognize that 
it is not enough that firms get only some amount of financing. Rather, firms with a high 
potential need enough financing in order to enable growth. Experience from the Finnish 
INTRO project has shown that 500.000 EUR to 1 MEUR is a typical amount of 
funding needed for the start-up and early-stage growth stages for knowledge-based 
businesses. On the supply side, raising enough financing may call for syndication of 
business angels and venture capital funds, while on the demand side, this level of 
investment requires a very high quality of business plans as well as a high level of 
demonstrated commitment from entrepreneurs.
BA and VC access programs are quite cost-efficient programs for encouraging private- 
market venture capital and also seem to have a high success rate (3 of 4 programs in the 
sample were considered very successful). All of these programs are focused on high- 
growth SMEs in the technology- or knowledge-based sector. While most of the 
financing measures focus on improving the supply of capital, BA and VC access 
programs also seek to strengthen the demand-side of financing by improving the 
investment-readiness of firms. A good example of improving investor-readiness is g2i in 
the UK in which entrepreneurs initially can evaluate themselves through a software 
package. These programs also facilitate contacts between entrepreneurs and investors, as 
entrepreneurs and business angels need to meet in person in order for true networks 
and trust to form. These contacts can be facilitated through exhibits or joint training 
sessions; a good example of such a program is INTRO in Finland. Entrepreneurs also 
often need training in venture capital financing in order to understand what various 
financing options are available and how to valuate their firm. Similarly, also the investors 
may need training. Many potential business angels who may not have been involved 
previously in financing knowledge-based high-growth companies have limited 
knowledge about early-stage financing, e.g. in terms of contracting.
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There are two main approaches to increasing the supply of early-stage venture capital: 
through venture capital funds that governments themselves capitalize and/or manage (7 
measures from 5 countries) or through subsidies for private-sector venture capital sector 
(4 measures from 3 countries). While the latter approach has the benefit of being more 
market-based and in the longer run can help to form a self-sustaining VC market for 
early-stage financing, each of these two approaches seem appropriate for different 
purposes. Publicly funded venture capital funds can generally be argued to be more 
appropriate for the earliest stages of funding (seed stage), which involve the highest 
degree of uncertainty, while subsidies for private funds may be more appropriate for 
later stages of funding, e.g. during the early growth and expansion stages. By focusing 
public venture capital funding on the seed stage, there is also less risk that public VC 
funds would crowd out private-sector financing.
Programs that co-invest public and private venture capital also thereby tie in the private 
investors’ expertise (KTM 2004a). However, if public programs subsidize and support 
only a number of selected private VC funds, these funds may gain a competitive 
advantage over to their peers which could skew competition in the VC industry (LTT- 
Tutkimus 2005). Also fully publicly funded venture capital funds should benefit from 
cooperating with business angels and venture capitalists to choose investments, as 
public officials may not be the most qualified professionals to pick the firms with the 
highest growth potential (the Pre-seed fund in Australia employs this model). By 
contrast, the publicly funded Applied Research Fund in Hong Kong which picks firms 
itself has suffered considerable losses and recognized that its investments have often 
been inferior to those of private-sector funds.
While an important support tool for SMEs in general, loan subsidies can generally be 
considered inappropriate for high-growth SMEs due to the higher risk and higher 
potential returns of these ventures. The only measures in the sample that offers loan 
subsidies are the For the Prosperous Hungary Enterprise Development Credit Program 
in Hungary, which offers subsidized loans to banks for re-lending, and the 
TechnoPartner Programme in the Netherlands, which offers an 80% loss guarantee for 
up to 100.000 EUR loans to SMEs that have been certified by the program. However, 
the program in Hungary rather focuses on the “local SME sector”, and is thus probably 
not primarily meant for high-growth SMEs as we have defined them, while the
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guaranteed loan in the Netherlands is quite small and may be considered as merely a 
supplement to other forms of financing.
5.3.6 Theme 6: Internationalization
There are a total of 3 measures from 3 countries in the internationalization theme. Each 
of these measures is quite different but the broad goal of all measures is to strengthen 
the international-market capabilities of firms.
The Export Market Development in Australia provides grants for international business 
development, the PROGEX program in Brazil provides grants for product 
development and customization for international markets, and Corvinus International 
Investment in Hungary mainly provides financing for the establishment or purchase of 
subsidiaries abroad.
Although a focus on growth firms is implicit, all of the measures tend to focus on the 
expansion and maturity stages of growth and thus do not primarily address the needs of 
born globals. That is, the measures are principally targeted at companies that already 
have achieved a strong domestic base, and these measures are as such not wholly 
suitable for start-ups and young firms. Nevertheless, it is reasonable that born globals 
would use funding obtained from e.g. venture capital funds to finance also their 
internationalization activities, and therefore, no ear-marked internationalization 
financing may be needed for these firms.
5.4 Application to frameworks
As noted in the literature review, policy measures can act on four different levels of 
analysis: the entrepreneur-, firm-, sector-, or environmental level of analysis. Similarly, 
policy measures can act on various stages in the firm growth pipeline by either 1) 
creating more entrepreneurial firms, 2) increasing growth motivation, 3) improving 
growth success, or 4) improving internationalization success.
For this analysis, each measure has been fitted to one level of analysis, and each team 
has judged whether a measure successfully addresses any of the stages in the growth 
pipeline. For the measure’s effect at each stage in the growth pipeline, teams were given 
the choices of yes (a clear positive effect), possibly (an effect is possible but uncertain), 
or no (no effect or not relevant to the measure); each measure can address several stages 
in the growth pipeline. Figure 13 plots these measures to the corresponding levels of
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analysis and steps in the growth pipeline. Short names have been used to reference the 








AU1 AU9 HK1 HU4 IT2 UK1 
AU2BR1 HK3 HUS IT3 UK2 
AU4 BR3 HK4 HU6 IT4 UK3 
AU5FI1 HU1 HU7 ITS UK4 
AU6 FI2 HU2 HUS NL2 UK5 
AU8FI3 HU3 ITI ES4 UK7
More entrepreneurial Higher growth More successful More
firms motivation growth internationalization
Figure 13. Frequency of measures at different levels of analysis and steps in the "growth 
pipeline"
In terms of levels of analysis, we can see that the majority of measures act on the firm- 
level of analysis (36 in total). This is not surprising, since this level of analysis may offer 
the most direct way to support firm growth. These measures seem most successful in 
enabling more successful growth for these firms; but several measures also address the 
three other steps in the growth pipeline.
7 measures act on the entrepreneurial level of analysis, and these measures seem to 
display a reasonable success in encouraging the birth of new entrepreneurial firms and 
increasing growth motivation. However, measures at the entrepreneurial level of analysis 
do not generally address the successfulness of growth or internationalization of the firm; 
issues that indeed can be considered mainly concern firm-level of analysis.
2 measures act on each of the sector and environmental levels of analysis respectively. 
On the sector level, the Australian Co-operative Research Centres (referred to in the 
graph as AU3) seems to be successful in creating both new firms, motivating the growth 
of firms, and enabling the success of these firms while ASTRI in Hong Kong has a less 
clear effect. On the environmental level of analysis, the effects of the measures on firms
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are likewise less clear, which is not wholly surprising due to the high level of analysis and 
thus a larger degree of detachment from the actual growth processes of firms.
In terms of reported success, measures on the entrepreneurial level of analysis have 
generally had the highest success rate. Out of the 7 measures on the entrepreneurial 
level of analysis, 6 were among those 25 measures that were considered most successful 
and chosen for detailed case analysis. Firm-level measures show a more split success; 17 
were among the top-rated measures and 14 were not. Both of the two sector-level 
measures were among the top-rated, while neither of the two environmental-level 
measures were among the top measures. This is illustrated in Table 9 below.
Table 9. Success distribution for measures on different levels of analysis
Level of analysis Among top-rated 
measures (25 in total)
Not among top-rated 
measures (17 in total) Not rated (5 in total)
Entrepreneur 6 1
Firm 17 14 5
Sector 2
Environment 2
Based on the frequency analysis, what is missing completely from our sample are 
measures on the environmental level that address the issue of creating new firms and 
enabling internationalization. Examples of the former type could include programs for 
improving the entrepreneurial culture or the general attractiveness of self-employment 
(e.g. through fiscal measures). Additional measures that may be called for would include 
co-operative sector-level measures for internationalization, for example through by 
encouraging networks between young high-growth firms and large international firms 
on which the smaller firms can piggy-back. Nevertheless, although several measures 
were reported on the entrepreneurial level of analysis, even more measures could 
certainly be called for at this level given the importance of the entrepreneur’s intent and 
motivation for the birth and growth of firms.
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6 Conclusions and recommendations
6.1 Towards a high-growth policy
A greater degree of entrepreneurship is often considered an important source of new 
jobs and innovation as governments seek to encourage growth and development. 
However, as we have seen, encouraging more people to become entrepreneurs is only 
half correct. Even though, for example, campaigns that encourage unemployed persons 
to start new firms may service valuable social policy goals, they will not necessarily be 
effective in fostering job creation.
The majority of jobs are created by a small minority of firms that grow the fastest.
These ‘high-growth firms’ are in turn typically founded by the most ambitious 
entrepreneurs, and therefore, it will be important to get the right people to start new 
firms and for government to provide comprehensive support to these particular firms in 
order to effectively promote growth and development. The needs of high-growth firms 
are demanding. Therefore, effective policy will likely need to focus available resources 
on a lesser number of select firms rather than spread resources to a larger number of 
firms.
High-growth firms, as the SME sector in general, are highly heterogeneous, and it is 
unlikely that one type of policy fits all companies. Single support measures will not alone 
be able to spur new high-growth firms, but rather a comprehensive portfolio of 
measures will be needed in order to support firms through all stages of the firm life- 
cycle and for all critical growth factors (e.g. motivation, resources, and opportunity). As 
we have seen, a policy for high growth firms needs to address issues at several levels of 
analysis, namely the entrepreneurial, firm-, sector-, and environmental levels of analysis. 
Also in this line of thinking, Acs (2001) observes that ‘entrepreneurship policy’ will 
cover four ‘facets’ or ‘layers’ of society, from the individual entrepreneur to the national 
economic and societal context (Figure 14). Policies addressing only one layer may not 
lead to successive outcomes if other layers are neglected. For example, measures that 
seek to provide funding for high-growth firms are likely to be ineffective unless the right 
individuals have not already been persuaded to start these firms. Likewise, measures that 
seek to reduce compliance costs will have little effect on growth if the motivation and
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opportunities for growth are absent. Furthermore, background factors should affect the 
chosen measures. All countries are not the same, and therefore different types of 
measures may be needed in different countries in order to suit the cultural, 
entrepreneurial, economical, and legal environment. Therefore, a balanced portfolio of 
policy measures, tailored to suit the national economic and social context, is needed to 














































Figure 14. The Four Facets of Entrepreneurship Policy (Acs 2001)
As policy makers are recognizing the importance of high-growth entrepreneurship for 
economic growth and development, the time for “generic entrepreneurship policy” is 
passing. If economies are to take full advantage of their entrepreneurial potential, focus 
and quality must be emphasized when designing and implementing support measures 
for entrepreneurial activity in general and for high-growth SMEs in particular.
6.2 Answers to research question
The goal of this paper was to identify and analyze effective measures that policy can 
employ to support high-growth SMEs. The research question for this report was broad, 
what are goodpractice government polity measures for supporting high-growth SMEs?, and thus 
designed to permit an exploratory inquiry into the field of high-growth policy measures. 
To focus the work, three intended contributions were formulated for the thesis. These 
intended contributions are listed below in Table 10 with a brief evaluation of whether 
the thesis has successfully reached these intended objectives.
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Table 10. Evaluation of the contribution of thesis 
Original intended contribution Result
• Identify, describe and analyze support measures 
that have been implemented to support high- 
growth SMEs
Develop a framework for categorizing support 
measures for high-growth SMEs
Identify good practices and provide normative 
recommendations for policy makers about how to 
develop effective policy measures for high-growth 
SMEs
To this end, 47 support measures from 9 countries 
have been identified, of which the 25 most 
successful measures were described and 
analyzed in detail
A comprehensive categorization of similar 
measures has been made; and these categories 
were in turn assigned into distinct broader themes 
(6 themes in total) that can be used for evaluating 
the completeness of public support for high- 
growth SMEs
Examples of good practices that characterize the 
most successful cases have been identified. 
Furthermore, comparisons between measures 
within the same theme were also made and some 
success factors were identified. A less formal 
discussion around normative recommendations is 
included in the next section
One limitation of the results is naturally that the evidence is based on a number of 
limited cases, and that the analysis and evaluation of the cases in turn is based on the 
often inevitably subjective opinions of local researchers and policy makers.
Nevertheless, the purpose of the study has not been to create irrefutable fact in terms of 
effective measures to be implemented directiy, but rather to explore and identify useful 
examples and characteristics of good practice support measures. As such, I consider the 
study to be successful.
In addition to outlining characteristics of successful measures, the thematic division of 
measures into pre- and post start-up and the three perspectives (innovation, business, 
finance) as illustrated in Figure 12 can be used as a checklist for policy makers to ensure 
that a sufficient number of appropriate measures have been introduced within every 
theme. The thesis also provides a summary of the relevant literature on firm birth, 
growth, and internationalization from a principally behavioral perspective, as well as 
gives an overview of current practices in SME policy and Innovation policy.
6.3 Recommendations
Finally, the recommendations listed below are a result of what I have learned during the 
research process, in analyzing data and reports as well as in interviews with policy 
makers and other researchers. These recommendations may thus be considered a 
catalog of personal insights as well as of those insights proposed by participating policy 
makers and researchers, rather than empirical fact; but they should nevertheless be 
valuable as a comprehensive source of ideas on policy for high-growth firms.
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6.3.1 Integrate horizontally
Support programs are often introduced over time by various agencies and organizations 
and thus the structure of the support measures is therefore not necessarily developed in 
a coordinated way. As a result, the portfolio of support measures may often be 
perceived by firms as complicated and confusing, while firms also generally have a low 
awareness of public support services (CEC 2001). For example, in Finland, only about 
one fourth of new start ups use these services (Rouvinen and Ylä-Anttila 2004).
Furthermore, the multi-faceted nature of the entrepreneurial birth and growth processes 
means that a single policy department, or a single policy measure, is unlikely to alone 
achieve optimal results. There is thus a need to make support programs for 
entrepreneurs and firms both more streamlined and more coherent, and in order to 
achieve this, a broad-based cooperation between the existing support organizations and 
policy departments is called for. For example, as policy measures for high-growth firms 
cut across both SME policy and innovation policy, these policy areas should employ 
joint-effort programs to encourage high-growth entrepreneurship. In the longer term, 
various scattered organizations that support high-growth firms should be further 
integrated (KTM 2004b). Policies for high-growth firms should further seek to involve 
the education, labor, and fiscal policy departments in designing and implementing 
programs. Integrating policy organizations and programs horizontally should lead to 
more effective programs, increase the awareness of support measures by reducing the 
complexity of these programs and support organizations, as well as reduce any 
duplication of efforts that now may exist due to scattered efforts within and between 
agencies.
In addition, employment of one-stop shops or dedicated firm consultants (business 
coaches) may be appropriate in order to facilitate access by firms to support programs; 
the goal of such measures should be to provide one responsible “desk” or public officer 
for each firm (KTM 2004a). In addition to simplifying access to support measures, this 
approach may increase the awareness of support measures by reducing the search costs 
for the entrepreneur.
6.3.2 Think holistically
Firm choices and behavior regarding growth, innovation, product development, market 
segment, financing, and internationalization are all related and these decisions are made
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holistically by the firm (Luostarinen 1979). Effective high-growth policy will therefore 
need to respond with an equally holistic portfolio of programs to support these firms.
The need for a holistic perspective is related with the above recommendation on 
horizontal integration. This need arises from both the multi-faceted nature of the 
entrepreneurial processes, as well as from the time lags involved. The growth process 
for a firm typically takes around 7 years (Hanks et al. 1993), and appropriate support 
measures should be available during each stage of the growth process. Thus, policy 
measures should be orchestrated in such a way that they address all stages of the 
entrepreneurial process from opportunity recognition (e.g. in basic and applied research) 
to market launch and eventual growth and consolidation. Currently, it appears common 
that firms may experience “support gaps” as they develop and move between support 
programs. In order to avoid such gaps, the timing and objectives of different policy 
measures should be consistent and complementary.
6.3.3 Focus on quality
By quality focus I will refer to two separate issues; first, policy measures for high-growth 
firms should be selective and focus on the entrepreneurs and firms with the highest 
potential; second, in order to meet the demands of high-growth entrepreneurs, policy 
measures need to emphasize and improve their own quality of support.
On the individual-level of analysis, measures should focus at encouraging well-educated 
and reasonably high-income individuals to choose an entrepreneurial career, since these 
individuals typically are the ones responsible for high-growth ventures (GEM 2005). For 
example, policy measures designed to encourage entrepreneurial spin-offs from 
established knowledge-intensive companies and research institutions might prove useful 
in cultivating high-growth entrepreneurial activity in economically developed countries. 
However, employed and highly educated people typically face higher opportunity costs 
for giving up their current careers, and thus a higher level of support may be required to 
motivate these individuals to pursue an entrepreneurial career. Also educational 
programs may have a role to play for increasing the awareness of entrepreneurship as an 
attractive career choice for these individuals.
On the firm-level of analysis, policy measures should be more selective about which 
firms to support. There is generally a trade-off between “resources focus" where 
resources are channeled to only the highest-potential SMEs and “resource spread”
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towards a larger number of SMEs, but I have argued that public policy for 
entrepreneurship can achieve the largest effect on employment and welfare when 
concentrating on firms with a high-growth potential. The need to be selective about 
picking firms stems from a limited availability of resources for public support for SMEs 
combined with the demanding needs of high-growth firms. For example, generic 
mentoring of only a few hours is not likely to add significant value to ambitious 
entrepreneurs; instead, more in-depth mentoring services may be needed in order to 
effectively serve the needs of these entrepreneurs. Similarly, in terms of venture capital, 
10.000 EUR is will not typically be enough to achieve high growth; rather, around 1 
MEUR will likely be needed. For example, in Finland, the per-capita number of firms 
part-funded through venture capital is one of the highest in the world; one reason for 
this is that there are a large number of government-run venture capital programs in 
Finland. However, when looking at the level of investment per firm, Finland ranks 
among the lowest in the western world. Thus, the government-driven policy objective of 
capitalizing a larger number of firms with lower amounts of venture capital may 
arguably have resulted in a situation in which investments per firm is sub-optimal.
There is also a need for policy measures to become more sophisticated. In general, 
providing value-adding support for high-growth entrepreneurial ventures tends to be 
more demanding than for low-growth firms. A way to achieve a higher quality level of 
the support for high-growth firms in particular could be to earmark budgets for support 
measures targeted exclusively at these firms.
6.3.4 Target firms proactively
In order to increase the awareness about public support programs among high-growth 
firms and achieve a higher degree of selectivity, a proactive approach by which support 
measures actively identify and address high-growth firms instead of vice versa may be 
appropriate. Since it may be challenging to identify these high-potential firms, the 
selection should ideally be executed by groups of individuals who possess a good 
knowledge of projects and firms at e.g. research facilities or in incubators.
However, a proactive approach is not without risks. For example, policy-makers can 
easily fail to identify prospective high-potential firms and excluded firms may complain 
about perceived discrimination. Therefore, any proactive approach should be 
implemented carefully in order to maintain transparency, responsiveness, and flexibility.
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As it is questionable whether public agencies really are the best actors to choose which 
firms to support (private-sector actors such as business angels or venture capital funds 
are arguably more qualified to do this), proactive selection cannot be the only method 
for selecting firms to support.
Other methods to achieve a high degree of selectivity may be to filter applicant firms or 
let firms self-select based on specific criteria such as firm age, growth ambition, and 
strategy. Also competition-based measures may be appropriate tools for increasing the 
awareness of public support measures and raising the quality of participating firms.
6.3.5 Involve private-sector actors
As we have seen, in order to add value to high-growth firms, support measures need to 
offer sophisticated services. However, the public sector alone may not be able to meet 
all the demands for sophisticated services by high-growth firms (GEM 2005).
Therefore, market-based or mixed private/public measures (e.g. service vouchers, mixed 
private/public VC funds) should be used instead of direct public support whenever 
possible.
Private-sector participation is particularly important during the later stages of the firm 
growth process. Quite often, the provision of the right kind of support requires intimate 
understanding of the business and a wide network of contacts, which is something 
public sector support organizations more rarely can offer. For example, programs that 
offer coaching services should ideally involve entrepreneurs who have experience in 
managing rapid growth. Nevertheless, balancing public- and private-sector service 
provision is not easy, because overlaps and insufficient coordination may lead to 
crowding and market distortion.
Another important role for high-growth policy should be to promote networks and 
links between entrepreneurs/firms and various private-sector actors. Examples of such 
networks include business angel networks, venture capital networks, and 
researcher/industry collaboration networks. Policy measures should also promote the 
development of a private business service infrastructure which can cater to the needs of 
high-growth ventures.
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6.3.6 Care about image
In order to continuously attract firms with a high-growth potential (what venture 
capitalists refer to as “deal flow”), it is important that support measures achieve a strong 
reputation in the business community and thus enjoy an image of professionalism and 
competence. Such street credibility is especially important in order to attract the firms 
with the highest potential and ambition, as these firms may otherwise shun public 
support as inefficient and not sophisticated enough to deliver tangible value. In the 
study, this phenomenon was noted e.g. in the West Yorkshire program in the UK.
In order to achieve this credibility, measures need to be flexible and non-bureaucratic in 
order to ensure that entrepreneurs get appropriate support without undue delay. Private- 
sector participation, e.g. by involving established firms, venture capitalists, and 
experienced entrepreneurs in the program, may also be important in order to promote 
an image of relevance of the program. It is likewise important that programs are well- 
designed and tested before launch. Unless a support measures succeeds to establish a 
positive image at the outset, such credibility may be challenging to build up later.
6.3.7 Motivate and train entrepreneurs
Entrepreneurial motivation and entrepreneurial intent are strong determinants of the 
birth and growth of high-growth firms. While motivation to grow often may determine 
actual growth, satiation about the current firm size is conversely the principal reasons 
why firms do not grow or stop growing (Davidsson 1991). Thus, it is clear that policy 
measures that seek to promote high growth need to address the motivation, intentions 
and attitudes of entrepreneurs.
Policy can employ a range of methods on various levels of analysis to influence the 
motivation and behavior of entrepreneurs. An aspect that perhaps has enjoyed little 
previous mention in this study is the cultural dimension of entrepreneurship, where 
policy through directed programs could seek to improve the perceived social desirability 
of entrepreneurship and reduce the stigma associated with entrepreneurial failure. For 
example bankruptcy regulation may play an important role in how society views 
entrepreneurial failure.
The entrepreneur’s motivation can also be indirectly influenced through training 
programs that address the entrepreneur’s perceived level of ability. Training in
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evaluating different funding options and understanding the concerns of venture 
capitalists may be particularly important (CEC 2005d).
6.3.8 Target universities
While university students may generally be less prone to become entrepreneurs, 
universities may still offer an ideal spawning ground for high-growth entrepreneurs as 
founders of high-growth ventures are likely to be well educated (GEM 2005). 
Educational programs at universities have a role to play in increasing the awareness 
among university students about the possibilities of an entrepreneurial career and thus 
raising the students’ entrepreneurial intent. For example, the Embryo project at 
University Miguel Hernandez in Spain illustrates that students and researchers 
successfully can be encouraged to pursue an entrepreneurial career.
Commercialization of university-based research has traditionally been quite challenging. 
One problem, which e.g. the TULI program in Finland has experienced, is that there 
exists a gap in support between research commercialization projects and actual firm 
start-up. Thus, in order to yield more firms, research commercialization projects that 
evaluate the viability of a new venture need to be followed up with more comprehensive 
start-up support from the business and financing perspectives. Also incubation services 
have an important role to play in facilitating the start-up process of university spin-offs.
Furthermore, when directing resources towards applied research in public research 
centers and universities, an effective model may be to set up cooperative research 
centers with industry, since industry-driven research has been shown to be more likely 
to create opportunities for successful innovation and commercialization (Kotilainen 
2005).
6.3.9 Follow-up and adapt
Finally, in order to remain effective, policy measures need to be monitored and 
followed-up regularly and be allowed to continuously adapt to a changing environment. 
New support measures should be allowed to continuously replace old ones. For 
example, the average age of the 25 most successful measures in this study was 5.2 years 
compared to 9.4 years for the 17 measures that were rated as less successful. One model 
by which to achieve this would be that policy makers take a step back from governing 
actual measures, and instead provide a pool of funds for high-growth policy measures 
that separate support agencies can allocate to the most relevant and successful programs
130
Chapter 6. Conclusions and recommendations
(Kotilainen 2005). In any case, in order to attract qualified personnel to work with 
public support measures, it is important that employees are provided with an 
opportunity to easily move between measures as the policy focus changes.
In order to enable more effective monitoring and control of support measures for high- 
growth SMEs, better indicators are needed. As this study also illustrates, it is difficult to 
measure the effect and efficiency of these support programs. For example, there hardly 
exist any relevant indicators at all for measures that seek to promote and sustain the 
creation and growth of innovative firms (Arundel and Hollanders 2005). Policy 
measures should at the very least seek to operationalize and measure the growth intent 
and growth success of the client entrepreneurs and firms; although a complicating 
aspect of monitoring is that growth takes time.
Finally, high-growth firms are ambitious, and likewise, support measures should set 
ambitious targets for themselves. By employing a horizontal and holistic approach, 
focusing on quality, addressing entrepreneurs and universities, building a credible image 
through participation of private-sector actors, and by aiming high, public policy 
measures for high-growth SMEs can prove to be important tools for economic 
development and growth.
6.4 Limitations and avenues for further research
This research examines specific support measures for high-growth firms in a range of 
countries, and attempts to identify relevant success factors and good practices. In other 
words, the unit of analysis has been the measure. However, as noted previously, 
measures do not exist in a vacuum and an individual measure will not by itself be 
enough to support all types of needs for high-growth firms. Thus, a comprehensive 
portfolio of support measures is called for to effectively support high-growth firms. In 
fact, in each country there are probably at least around 50 separate measures or 
programs that all have some distinct part to play in the support of high-growth firms. As 
this study focuses on only a few select individual measures in each country, such an 
analysis of the system or portfolio of measures in economies was not possible. 
Nevertheless, for further research, a study with the portfolio of measures as the unit of 
analysis — looking e.g. at potential synergies and overlaps between measures - would 
have a potential to add significantiy to the current body of knowledge.
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Furthermore, as we have also noted, the design of support measures will to a significant 
degree depend on the national context. One obvious research avenue would thus be to 
analyze how contextual differences affect the appropriateness of various high-growth 
policy measures. Thus far, when evaluating the contextual dimension for support 
measures in the various catalogs and reports within SME policy and Innovation policy, 
the issue has usually at best been dealt with as individual “national suggestions for 
development”.
An alternative research approach that could generate useful results on the effectiveness 
of high-growth policy measures would be to conduct a case study on successful high- 
growth firms and analyze the role of public support measures in their development. 
That is, instead of taking the support measure as the unit of analysis, it should also be 
possible to obtain interesting results by taking the individual high-growth firm as the 
unit of analysis. Nevertheless, since many of the measures that specifically target high- 
growth SMEs as well as the firms they support are still typically quite young, such an 
evaluation may perhaps ideally be carried out only after a few years.
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Identification of Support Measure
Year started: Country & region:
Name of the support 
measure/initiative/program:
Ongoing practice / 
Long-term project (>2 
years) / Short-term 
project (<2 years)
Web address: Telephone: Email of contact 
person:
Support Measure Background Data
Participating institutions:
Main financiers, their funding shares; Is 
financing public/private/mixed?
Total budget, time allocation (from year to 
year):
Number of people directly working with the 
measure:
Support Measure Focus and Operation Data
Firm life cycle stage (Pre start-up/Start- 
up/Expansion/Maturity):
Industry or technology sector addressed:
Principal type of support (i.e. what does the 
measure provide, e.g. money [specify type, 
e.g. equity, loans, grants], advice, mentoring, 
training, forging of networks, etc)
Open-ended description of support provided:
Firm resource bottleneck addressed (e.g. 
capital, social capital and networks, 
reputation/brand, business expertise, 
technological expertise, firm-level innovation, 
infrastructure):
Growth mechanism addressed (e.g., more 
entrepreneurial companies, higher growth 
motivation, more successful organic growth, 
higher degree of internationalization):
Other focus and operation data:
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Support measure summary sheet, page 2
Support Measure Performance Data
Number of firms or projects processed 
in total:
Number of firms or projects per annum:
Growth rates achieved for the firms 
involved (if available):
Quantitative performance data for the 
support measure (results, impact):
Qualitative evaluation of the support [not 
successful, somewhat successful, 
successful, very successful]
Examples of notable success cases and 
particularly successful graduates 
(provide web sites if possible):
VC funding received:
Other comments:
Lessons Learned: Please describe below why this support measure has been successful, what have 
been the most important lessons learned, how the measure has evolved over time, what are the most 
important good practice lessons to be shared with other policy measures. Also use this space to 
provide your own analysis and insights.
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Web Year Description of support
address started term/Short cycle of support by bottleneck
Commercial Ready www.ausin 2004 
dustiy.gov.
Long-term Auslndustry (Department 120 






Competitive merit-based grants to SMEs for early-stage commerciäization, R&D with high commercial
potentiä, and proof-of-concept activities. Requires matching (dollar for dollar) contributions by 
receiving company; grants ranging from €30k to €3milion, for projects up to three years. Supports 







Long-term Auslndustry (Department 6,5
of Industry Tourism and
Resources)





Competitive merit-based mentoring and innovation management advice services through a network of 
private sector business advisers. Financiä assistance Is available to subsidize access to service 
providers in marketing, commerciäization, intälectuä property and business planning. The subsidy 
covers 50% or 80% of äigible expenses; from €3k to €72k tor up to two year projects. Directed at very 
early stage ventures; evaluates the potentiä of the applicant with regard to their perceived 
entrepreneur^ abilities. COMET provides support to early-growth stage companies, spin-off 
companies and individuäs who; 1. are looking to grow substantiäiy through commerciäization of an 
innovative product, process or service, 2. have identified weaknesses that are preventing them from 




httpsV/ww 1990 Department of Education, 500
Science and Träning




Establishes research centers in a joint effort between researchers and industry around multiple
specific technologies (2002:69 CRCs in 6 sectors: environment, agriculture, ICT, mining, medicä 











Grants to support export development. "The Export Märkä Development Grants (EMDG) scheme is
the Australian Government's principä financiä assistance program for aspiring and current exporters. 
Administered by Austrade, the purpose ä the scheme Is to encourage smäl and medium sized 
Austräian businesses to develop export markets. EMDG rämburses up to 50 per cent of äigible 
export promotion expenses above a threshold of $15,000. To access the scheme for the first time, 
businesses need to have spent $15,000 over two years on äigible export marketing expenses. The 
scheme supports a wide range of industry sectors and products, including inbound tourism and the 
export of intälectuä property and know-how outside Austräia."





Queensland Dept. State n/a
Development T rade and
Innovation






ICT, Biotech Assists Queensland technology SMEs with export, venture capitä and business growth issues





Long-term Auslndustry (Department 9
of Industry Tourism and
Resources)
Mix equä High growth Start-up, Money (Equity)
Expansion
Capital (VC) Technology VC program consisting of nine licensed private sector venture capitä funds which provide VC to
smäl, high tech businesses at seed, start-up or early expansion stages of deväopment; äm is to 
encourage development of new-technology businesses and develop a säf-sustäning eariy-stage VC 






of Industry Tourism and
Resources)
Environme All SMEs Early Money (Tax
growth, concession)
Expansion
Capital (VC) Tax benefits for private sector Investment companies which räse capitä from investors and invest in
SMEs. Pooled Deväopment Funds and thär shareholders recäve tax benäits on the income derived 
from thär equity investments. This is intended to compensate lor the higher risk of investing in SMEs. 
Pooled Development Funds are taxed at 15% on the income and gäns derived from equity 
investments in Austräian SMEs. Pooled Deväopment Fund shareholders are exempt from tax on the 
income and gäns derived from holding and disposing of Pooled Deväopment Fund shares. Eligible 
Pooled Development Fund investments ae made by acquiring newly-issued shares in SMEs with 
total assets of less than $50 million.The investee company must have issued the shares for the 
purpose of raising capitä to: establish a new business activity, substantiäiy expand production 
capacity or services, expand or deväop markets.
Australia Pre-seed fund www.ausin 2002
dustry.gov.
Ongoing Auslndustry (Department 7,8
of Industry Tourism and
Resources)
Mix public High growth Seed, Money (Equity) Capital (VC) Four eariy-stage venture capitä funds investing in projects or companies spinning out from
universities or government agencies. Investment is limited to €600k per project or company. Funds 





Ongoing Auslndustry (Department 240
of Industry Tourism and
Resources)




125% tax deduction for äigible expenditure on private sector R&D to encourage deväopment of 
innovative products, processes and services and to promote strategic R&D planning 175% tax 





Ongoing FINER, Brazilian research rVa
and projects financing
Mix public High growth Expansion Networks Capitä (VC) Technology Access to venture capitä. INOVAR PROJECT Intends to build an institutionä environment that häps
nurture the activity ä venture capitä in the country in order to fortify the incipient and emerging 
Brazilian technology-based companies, contrfouting, ultimatäy, to the nationä technological progress 
and for to generate jobs and income.
The INOVAR Project includes:
• INOVAR Fund Incubator;
• Brazil Innovation Forum;
• Brazil Venture Capitä website;
- INOVAR Business Prospecting and Development Network;





















Lessons learned and comments
Very successful No Very highly regarded and more applicants than funds available. Very effective for established companies, eg. M arki I product
Australia Very successful Yes Very favorably independently reviewed before continuation. COMET provides access to an expenenced case manger for the duration usually about 12 
months. The shortage is of experienced people in so many specialist areas that a new growth 
venture needs access to over a longer period.
Very successful Yes Recent rigid and conservative review showed "Australian economy's 
overall performance has been considerably enhanced when compared to 
the performance that would have incurred in its absence". Very favorable 
independently reviewed before continuation, the
An outstanding program with a solid record of generating spin-offs with high survival ad growth
3278 (2003/4) Successful Present program based on several reviews of earlier programs. Users 
generally satisfied, but not always.
Australia Successful
Australia Very successful Possibly Possibly Being evaluated at present. Government made a profit on its share of the 
investment.
Designed as early stage VC, but effectively middle/late stage VC due investor risk aversion.
Australia 95 investors in program Successful Widely used to create effective partnerships to fund start-ups.
Australia Po.SU, Only in early stage. Doubtful value. Difficult to agree valuations at this early stage. Have to give away too much equity. Looking at 
alternatives to (diluting) equity at pre-seed stage; for example exclusive licensing rights
Australia POSSU» Possu» PoroU» Possu» €4 billion of R&D expenditure reported by the 5503 businesses in income 
year 2003-04
Successful 55 MEUR of VC funding for 22 firms received between 2000-04, See 
http://www.capitalderisco.gov.br/VCNJNG/en_resultados_PI asp. 137 
firms selected (6% of candidates) and presented for VC funding; 22 have 
received funding. The Brazilian Economic and Social Development Bank 
announced in August 2005 that it will stimulate creation of 7 new funds å 

















Short Region Program name «V.Ö Year
address started
Ongoing / Long Principal Institution
term / Short
term
Total annual Privately or Principal High 
publicly unit of growth or
Firm life- Principal type Firm resource
cycle of support by bottleneck rr0' Description of support
PAPPE - Program (or www.finep. 2004 




FINEP - the Financing 
Agency (or Studies and




Technology, A program to provide research grants to individuals in small companies for new product development, 







Ongoing MCT. Ministry of Science
and Technology




Manufacturi "A federal government program established to stimulate Brazilian exports, especially by micro and 
small companies. The main point of the program is technological assistance to those who already 
export or who are on the way to export." Can e g. help cover the cost of a technology consultant. 
Provides funding, management, skills, advice, training, prototyping, logistics, manufacturing support 
for exports and import substitution. To generate new exporting companies or to extend the capacity of 
that already in the international market, through the technological adequacy of its products to 
requirements of specific markets.
AISP - Strategy (or
the (inancing and 
service system of 
innovative start-up 
companies
n/a 2005 Long-term Ministry of trade and Mix public High growth Seed, Money (Grant,
Start-up, Equity)
Expansion
Capital (VC) Takes selected companies through a three-stage process of business-plan development, seed 
funding, post-seed funding and provides appropriate financing through separate funds for each stage. 
Utilizes both private and public capital for the financing.
Growth Firm Service n/a 2003 Ministry of trade and
industry coordination






"One-touch shop" for public services relevant to growth firms such as finance and Internationalization. 
Field consultants in 4 public institutions proactively identify promising growth firms and offer a growth 
analysis session to the firms; based on the growth analysis, specific needs for achieving growth are 
prioritized and appropriate services from the 4 participating institutions are referred to.
www prese 2002 Ongoing The Finnish National
Fund for Research and 
Development (Sitra)




High growth Seed, Networks Capital (BA) Knowledge- Aim Is to support the investment readiness of earfy-stage and growth businesses by facilitating access 




www.tuli.ln 2002 Long-term Tekes. Tekel Entrepren High growth Seed Money (Grant) Business
expertise
Technology Aim is to promote the commercialization of research through licensing, creating of new firms and 
cooperation around new technologies. A grant of max 10,000€ is provided to cover the full costs for 
private sector experts’ advice on issues related to commercialization (legal advice, market analysis, 
etc) of a research result. The research results and teams are identified by the universities' technology 









n/a; thus far a
loss of 25
High growth Early Money (Equity)
Expansion
Capital (VC) Technology Government-owned venture capital fund (originally 75 MEUR) , investment decisions are made by






www.astri. 2001 Ongoing Innovation Technology
Commission, HK 
Government




Technology Perform R&D for transfer to industry for commercialization with a view to elevating the technological
level of industry and stimulating the growth of technology-based Industry in Hong Kong. ASTRI has 
five specific research areas: photonic technologies, integrated circuit design, Internet software, 
wireless communications and biotechnology. Bring together companies in select Industries to 
cooperate around commercializing technologies; chum out intellectual property that can be licensed.
Hong Kong Science
& Technology Parks 
(HKSTP)
























Small part of the innovation & technology fund (ITF), aiming to support projects that contribute to
innovation and technology upgrading in industry. Provides an interest-free loan of up to €200k on a 
dollar-for-dollar matching basis (the matching can be in terms of manpower), funding given in two 
phases: prototyping and second phase. Applications to SERAP is reviewed by an assessor panel 





Long-term Hungarian Development High growth Early Money (Equity)
Expansion 
. Maturity
Capital (VC) Technology Co-invests with SMEs for international expansion and improvement of competitiveness; the SMEs

































SSä? R.tton Program name If l !? Ongoing / Long Principal Institutionterm / Short Toni annual publicly unit of growth or Firm life- Principal type Firm resourcecycle of support by bottleneck Induilry or Description of support
Hungary Development of the 
technical and 
technological 
background of SMEs 
ECOP 2.1.1













Long-term Hungarian Development Expansion Money (Loan) Capital (Debt) All Financing between 20kEUR and 3.5MEUR. Maximum of 75% of the investment. Interest is euribor+1 
4% risk premium. Achieved by the development bank lending to partner banks at favorable interest 
rates that in turn lend to SMEs. Program focuses especially on the "local SME sector*.
Hungary Long-term Regional Development High growth Start-up, Money (Equity) Capital (VC) ICT VC fund for ICT companies. The fund is profit-oriented and invests in companies with a high potential 
for growthTechnology Venture 
Capital Fund
Manager
Hungary HU5 KVFP Venture capital wwwkvfp. 2002 Long-term Ministry of economy and 12.5 Pubic Firm All SMEs Expansion Money (Equity) Capital (VC) All Financing in equity (up to 49% of total equity) with investment horizon of 3-5 years in SMEs with
the investment period. Does not take part in the management of the firms. Seeks positive returns 
although it is "only moderately profit-oriented" Does not invest in ventures that can be financed by 






Long-term Hungarian Development Expansion Money (Capital Capital (VC) Financing between 0.2-2MEUR with investment horizon of 1-5 years for established SMEs with good 
track record. Maximum financing share Is 49%. Risk premium on interest is 6%. For all SMEs, i.e. not 
only high growth




www gvop. 2004 Long-term Ministry of economy and
transport




Subsides to firms for consulting and expert services




Long-term Hungarian Patent Office;
funded by the government
Pubac All SMEs All
(Subsidy)
IPR Technology Subsidy for mentoring, advice and experience sharing on patenting for SMEs by IP experts; also 









Technology Regional innovation centers that mainly provide advice and support to new business for business 
plans, and provides consulting services related to management, marketing, and legal issues. "BICs 
act as an interlace between the needs of SMEs and the specialist services on offer. SMEs can in this 
way benefit from a preliminary overall diagnosis of their actual requirements before applying for such 
services."
I3P (Incubator of the
Turin Politecnico)
www.i3p.it 1999 Ongoing Politecnico di Torino;
financing divided between 
6 partner institutions
High growth Start-up, Infrastructure Infrastructure Knowledge- Incubator linked to the Torino Politecnico (targeted at students, recent graduates and employees of 
the university) for knowledge-based start-ups. Firms can stay in the incubator tor up to 3 years. Has a 
high degree of selection for incoming firms. Also organizes a "Start Cup" provides seed capital 





Ongoing Cornu ne di Genova High growth Start-up,
growth
Infrastructure Infrastructure Technology Incubator linked to the University in Genoa providing office space and consultancy/mentoring services 
to support new entrepreneurs and firms (firms can stay up to a maximum of 3 years). Also can provide 
a small grant (13kEUR) and a zero-interest loan for co-financing up to 70% for investments




Mix public High growth Start-up, Money (Equity) Capital (VC) Technology Small venture capital fund operated by a publicly founded foundation, investing from 20kEUR to 
200kEUR for a 20-35% equity stake in start-up companies in Piedmont. Firms must have a high 







Ongoing Ministero per I'lnnovazione 100
e le Tecnologie
Mix equal High growth Start-up,
Expansion
Money (Equity) Capital (VC) Technology Governmental scheme to co-invest up to 50% in VC funds that invest in Southern Italy or up to 33% 
in general funds. Leaves management of the portfolio companies to the VC funds. The maximum 
duration of the investment in each fund is 10 years plus a maximum 3 years needed for divestment. 
Applying funds are chosen on criteria such as their consistency, professionalism, etc. Funds 
specialized in spin-offs and early staqe financing are prioritized.
Nelheriand NL1 Mastering Growth
Programme








Integrative Highly interactive masterclasses in which the (potential) fast growing companies learn from each other 
(advice, case studies, experience sharing) about achieving high growth, funding, human resource 






Long-term Ministry of Economic
Affairs (joint initiative of 
The Ministry of Economic 







Capital (VC. BA) Technology Consists of 4 subprograms: Knowledge Exploitation funding programme (for research 
commercialization; entrepreneur screening and scouting, help with patents, pre-seed financing); Seed 
facility (improves risk-return for private investors through a subsidized loan for co-investment); 
Certificate (reduces risk for banks financing high-growth SMEs through a loan guarantee of 80% up 
to lOOkEUR if firms pass a certification by the programme for its business outlook); Business Angel 
Programme (information service for "virgin angels"). Participating firms cannot be older than 5 years 
and must fall under EU's SME definition. "TechnoPartner wants to improve the growth climate by: * 
giving techno starters access to capital, knowledge, experience and equipment, " a platform where 
techno starters can put questions, ideas and comments; * motivating knowledge institutes and 
investors to offer their money and knowledge to pioneers."
Spain Contest of Ideas for








University Carlos III and
Technological Park of 
Leganés
Entrepren High growth Money (Grant) Firm-level
innovation
Technology Contest for new technology- or science-based business ideas. Also provides free access to incubator 























9139 firms applied and 3027
received support in 2004 and 
2005. No decision yet for 2006
1337 supported in 2005 Successful No Possibly Several success stories of firms that have been able to grow after
receiving support from the fund (Luk Savaria Kft - supplies Audi. Opel, 
Suzuki with clutches)
Not specifically for high-growth firms, but many high-growth firms have still benefited
Hungary Successful Posstiy No performance data available Deemed to fill a gap by providing credit to
SMEs that otherwise would not be able to obtain them
Hungary 40 applicants, 8 supported in
2004 and 2005 total
4 supported in 2005 Very successful Yes Possibly Success story: Stormregion Ltd (a game software development firm)
Hungary Successful 28 open investments, 5 closed. Average investment has been 200kEUfl.
No performance data for the measure is available. An exit realized in 
ALUKOL Kft in 2006
Hungary Successful POKU, No performance data available. Deemed to fill a gap by providing credit to
SMEs that otherwise would not be able to obtain them.
Hungary 1139 firms have applied in
2004 and 2005 of which 634
664 applied In 2005 of which
415 supported
Successful
Hungaiy ,5" 500 Successful No Yes P°““y Posstiy Has improved the patenting rate by SMEs. The direct influence on growthis difficult to measure. The Hungarian patent activity has fallen back since 1980s, but now with this new support system it stopped decreasing and turned upward the tendency.
Italy 876 (as of 2001) 431 (as of 2001) Not successful Not much monitoring has been performed on the measure; latest
evaluation carried out In 2001. Interviewee staled that the BICs in Italy 
"work well'.
No common logic is shared between the BICs in Italy, and the measure seems to be a question
69 firms have been in the 36 firms current in the
incubator, plus 18 pre­
incubator ideas that are 
offered training courses
Successful 50 firms created in 2000-05,220 new jobs and total turnover of 8MEUR
per year. Low mortality rate (out of 50 firms created in 2000-05 only four 
have gone out of business). Received the 2004 "Best Science Based 
Incubator Award" by Science Alliance.
Key strengths have been the closeness to the university and the high selectivity which has 
resulted in higher success rates
17 incubated out of 30 15 firms currently in Incubator Somewhat
successful
After a slow start, the incubator has started to attract a somewhat growing
interest among firms. TechnoAware is a success story.
Accepting year-round applications has worked better than setting a yearly application deadline. A 
downside is that it is located quite far from the university. The incubator has a high acceptance 
rate (over 50%), probably explained by the fact that the parent institutions are public
llaly 12 investments out of 600
proposals; the goal is to invest 
in 40-50 firms in total
12 current investments Successful 6 out of 8 first firms funded are generating revenues, none have gone out
of business. No divestments for the fund, but some negotiations about 
second-round financing.
Entrepreneurs are increasingly becoming aware about VC funding and prepared for the demands 
of institutional investors. Compared to other public support measures, the fund can be very strict 
in the selection of applicants
Too early to evaluate since there have yet been no investments made.
Nevertheless, the fund has attracted some attention from VC firms 
through their national association (AIFI)
Netherland NL1 Expected: 10-15 participating Very successful No
Nethertand NL2 In 2005: 7 VC funds (out of
14 applicants) supported; 7 
research ideas sponsored; 23 
firms certified
Very successful No
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name n total per year assessment
Mo..
entrepreneur! gr Internationallz Performance data and evaluationetion success
74 start-ups. 4-spinoff; 218 
business projects/ideas
14 start-ups, 1 spin-off Very successful Yes 150 new jobs in the start-up firms. 7412 students enrolled in the 
"entrepreneur's dub". 1068 participants in motivation and training 
activities. Example company: NutraCItrus
mportant to gain the acceptance of the university board to develop the program to suit the needs 
of the entrepreneurs and network partners
Successful Limited data available for the measure. Represents a good example of 
cooperation between universities, government agencies, entrepreneurs 
and firms.
3 so far, 26 expected for full
year 2006
Very successful Possibly Represents a good example of cooperation between universities, 
government agencies and entrepreneurs. Success story: Activery biotech
Spain Somewhat
successful
PoMUy PossMy Example of one network where innovative SMEs interchange ideas and 
experiences
Successful POSSÖ» No 12MGBP of investments was made in the firms last year The people involved In the business hubs are most important for the successfulness of the hubs, 
mportant to involve partnerships with local businesses, universities and institutions
69 companies have received
2h or more support; a smaller 
number has received more 
ntensive support
Very successful No 13 companies in the program have together raised 6MGBP (between 0,1- 
1MGBP per firm). Firms have created 117 new jobs. The target is to raise 
30MGBP by 2008.
Lack of financing is not a problem in London, but instead the knowledge and skills about how to 
access the finance is the bottleneck. The program thus acts as a gateway for firms to access 
financing. London has a lot of capital to be invested. Manage customer expectations among the 
firms; make sure the program is ready and robust before launch
270 (planned, over three year Possibly Several businesses already near 1 MGBP turnover in their first year in the 
program. 5 out of 38 clients have received VC investments, 4 additional 
firms are in discussions with VCs
Very successful No 2010 jobs created in 595 business starts mportant that the mentors have private-sector experience from entrepreneurial activities. 
Entrepreneurs need to be shielded from data collection requirements and bureaucracy.
17 (out of 84 applicant firms) The target of the pilot is to increase sales of the firms by approx 32MGBP 
(i.e. 2MGBP) per firm to 2008
The importance of matching the coach to the business; the personality testing and matching is 
very time consuming. The company's specific barriers to growth and problem areas have been 
addressed first to gain trust instead of improving core business capabilities that was originally 
planned to be addressed first.
Very successful Possibly The average size of companies that have participated in the program is 
400kGBP turnover and 8 employees; some star companies have grown to 
over 100 employees
Important to involve respected private-sector partners since the target audience had a negative 
perception of government start-up support programs. Important that services are not free to the 
firms but only subsidized - this challenges and motivates clients. Quality assurance of private 
service providers. Important to tailor the services and the solutions for each company.
Very successful No 566 businesses and 920 jobs created Need to be flexible to adapt to the varying needs of high-growth entrepreneurs, need to 
understand entrepreneur's dislike of bureaucracy, manage intermediaries to achieve a flow of high 
caliber clients, ensure the use of competent advisors that can build credibility with clients
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